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1. Elites and ei vil society actors in
transitions to democracy
1.1 Introduction
Chile and Argentina form part of what Samuel P. Huntington in his recent
writings calls the "third wave". Southern Europe in the 1970s. Latin
America, Africa, and Asia in the 1980s. Eastern Europe in the 1990s. And
finally South Africa in 1994. We are talking about democratization; the
wave of political change that has swept across the world in the course of
the last couple of decades. These sometimes totally unexpected changes
have given fodder to political theorists of various brands and ideological
convictions. Why have these political changes come about, what are their
driving forces, how may one classify them, and what are their outcomes,
have been some of the central questions posed within the field. The first
theories seeking to explain democratic transition were largely single- factor
approaches emphasizing the preconditions for democracy, i.e. trying to
identify which conditions were seen as most conducive to the proeess of
democratization. Seymour Martin Lipset based his theory on economic
factors, claiming that capitalist development was a necessary condition for
democracy to develop. Scholars like Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verb a, and
Lucian Pye stressed the importance of cultural factors, such as the existence
of a democratic political culture, for the successful establishment of
democracy. Barrington Moore Jr. favoured an approach as signing weight
to historical factors, whereas the fourth group of scholars, like Guillermo
O'Donnell in his early works along with Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
attributed a lot of significance to external factors, particularly to influence
from the United States, in bringing about the proeess of democratization.
The wide-spread demise of authoritarian rule in a number of Latin
American countries in the 1980s did not fit the frame-work of the
traditional single- factor approaches, and theorists began to assume that
those factors which had formally been regarded as the preconditions for
democracy should rather be interpreted as the outcomes of democratic
transition. This gave rise to a new body of literature which shifted its focus
on to "the strategic calculations, proeesses, and sequential patterns that are
involved in moving from one type of political regime to another" (Karl
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1991: 169). In a nutshell, the predominant trend in recent transition theory,
dep arting from O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead's four-volume study
Transitions From Authoritarian Rule (1986), has been to emphasize elite
action when accounting for the transitions from authoritarian to democratic
rule. It is some of the postulates from this body of recent transition
literature that I wish to question.
1.2 Three central hypotheses
The overriding general aim of this study is to show that elite- focused theory
is a one-sided approach to democratic transition because it leaves out, as
I see it, two central aspects of this specific type of political change. The
first aspect is the issues around which the transition process revolves, and
which the political and military elites consequently have to base their
calculated risks and decision-making on; a point barely touched upon in
re cent transition literature. The second, and equally important, point is the
down-playing of the role of civil society in the proeess of democratic
transition in this type of literature. i By using the test-cases of Chile and
Argentina, I will argue that the issue of human rights violations in
particular constitutes the "red thread" in the transition and consolidation
proeesses of these two countries and is important for understanding both the
type of transition as well as the alliances made or attempted by the elites
in the consolidation phase. My second argument is that closely tied to the
human rights issue there was a reaction from and continuous involvement
of civil society, in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. The
involvement of ei vil society poses a counterweight to the elite perspective.
I will try to clarify these two postulates by using the following three central
hypotheses in transition theory as the point of departure for the ensuing
analysis:
Given the fact that only 21 out of the 733 pages in ü'Donnell, Schmitter, and
Whitehead's four volume study of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1986) are
devoted to the role of civil society, it is hardly an overstatement to say that these authors
severely downplay the role of civil society actors in the process of democratic transition.
The subject of human rights is referred to on a total of 13 pages. The scholars seek
justification for their elite focus through arguments like "elite dispositions, calculations,
and pacts...largely determine whether or not an opening wil occur at all and...they set
important parameters on the extent of possible liberalization and eventual
democratization" (ü'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 48).
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Hyp. 1: Different modes2 of transition lead to different types of
democracy (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 269).
Hyp. 2: The mode of transition determines whether or not the emerging
democracy will be consolidated (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 269).
Hyp. 3: The case of transition by regime collapse is the one most likely
to lead to a fuller, less restricted type of political democracy (O'Donnell
1986: 8-9).
1.3 Authoritarianism, democracy, and consolidated
democracy
In academic literature, Chile and Argentina are commonly listed as
examples of regimes which passed from being "authoritarian" to
"democratie" in the 1980s (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead VoL. 2,
1986: 6-8). Such assertions call for clear definitions, taking into account
that "the boundary between democratie and non-democratic is sometimes
a blurred and imperfect one" (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1989: xvii) and
that democratic transition is not necessarily a one-way irreversible proeess.
Clear definitions of the concepts "democracy" and "authoritarianism" are
needed in order to answer the following important questions: how does one
determine when a transition proeess starts, and when can a transition be
said to have been completed? What impact does the form or mode of
transition have on the subsequent democratic regime and the proeess of
consolidation?
Definitions are analytical tools used to increase or facilitate the
understanding of social phenomena through categorization, analysis, or
explanation. The terminology one opts for inevitably influences the
conclusions one arrives at. In order to structure a comparative analysis of
two different cases of democratic transition, three key definitions are
required: one to characterize the pre-transitional regime, a second to mark
the end of the transition proeess by identifying features which set the post-
military regimes apart from the military regimes, and a third to evaluate the
type of democracy that results from the transition, i.e. the degree of
democratic stability or consolidation.
2 The mode of transition means the same as type of transition and involves primarily the
agreements between different political actors which drive the process of democratization
forward.
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Authoritarian and totalitarian3 regimes have in common that their rulers
cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors. Both types
of regimes are characterized by use of repression in order to control their
citizens. However, authoritarian regimes differ from totalitarian regimes on
the following important dimensions4: in contrast to totalitarian regimes that
seek legitimation through popular mobilization by use of ideology and
propaganda, authoritarian regimes seek legitimacy by allowing a certain,
albeit of ten very restrictive, degree of pluralism, although not legally
codified. The ultimate aim of totalitarian rulers is complete centralization
and uniform regimentation of all aspects of political, social, and intellectual
life. This extreme form of dictatorship aims at an absolute control of the
masses, based partly on terror and partly on propaganda. Totalitarian
regimes attempt to mobilize their entire citizenry into active support of their
policies. In contras t, authoritarian regimes perpetuate themselves by relying
on the support and commtment of a very small minority, notably the armed
forces, security services, key civil servants, and technocrats. The rest of the
population need only obey the laws and requirements put forward by the
authoritarian regime; such obedience is frequently ensured through high
levels of repression (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986: 10).
These characteristics of authoritarian regimes apply to both Argentina
(1976-1983) and Chile (1973-1990). The countries have been classified as
having been governed by a sub-species of authoritarian regimes;
"bureaucratic-authoritarianism" (BA) (O'Donnell 1986: 6-8).5 The main
defining features of such regimes, as expressed in O'Donnell's classic 1978
article on the subject, are: (1) an alliance between a narrow segment of
national capital (the state) and international capital, which (2) seeks to
introduce an economic model requiring a more thoroughgoing bureaucratic
organization of the state (a feature which makes BA regimes distinct form
3 Totalitarianism is a political term first used against and by Mussolini in 1923-25. The
term was applied to the three radical inter-war regimes of Hitler's National Socialism,
Mussolini's Fascism, and the Soviet Union's Stalinism (The Blackwell Encyclopaedia
of Political Institutions 1987: 614).
4 The following discussion on the characteristics of authoritarian versus totalitarian regimes
is based on the definitional terms encountered in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of
Political Institutions (1987: 34-35,614-16) and The Oxford Companion to Politics of the
World (1993: 60-63, 916-17).
5 This term was first coined by Guilermo ü'Donnell in 1973 in his book Modernization
and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in Latin American Politics (Berkeley:
University of California, Institute of International Studies). ü'Donnell has later published
several books and articles where this concept is extensively used.
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other patrimonial authoritarian regimes). (3) This transformation can only
be achieved through the exclusion and demobilization of the popular sector ,
which again requires a high degree of systematie repression. In Chile the
attack on civil society took the form of closing down Congress, banning -
or at least severely circumscribing - the activity of political parties,
dissolving the nationallabor federation, suspending national elections,
strictly censoring the press, and severely restrieting all kinds of civil society
activity (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986: 2). Nonetheless, in practice and
step by step, political space was opened up to various groups in civil
society (human rights organizations were from the very beginning, to a
certain degree, tolerated by the regime). Pinochet sought legitimation for his
personalist regime through institutionalizing his own role as president and
by launching a new Constitution, both ratified in plebiscites. The situation
in Argentina ran largely parallel to that of Chile, and was characterized by
a systematic attack on democratie institutions and by widespread violations
of individual human rights.
The post-military regimes of these two were in many respects of a
fundamentally different character, and fit Robert A. Dahl' s definition of
representative democracy or polyarchy (Dahl 1986).6 His classical defini-
tion of procedural democracy denotes a system of government that meets
three essential conditions: (1) meaningful and extensive competition among
individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all
effective positions of government power, at regular intervals, and excluding
the use of force; (2) a highly inclusive level of political participation in the
selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections,
such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and (3) a level of ei vil
and politicalliberties - freedom of expression, freedom of the press, free-
dom to join and form organizations - sufficient to ensure the integrity of
political competition and participation (quoted in Diamond, Linz, and
Lipset 1989: xvi). Both Chile and Argentina have post-transitional regimes
deserving of the label democratic according to this definition in that they
have had presidential, parliamentary, and municipal elections in which
candidates from all political parties have been allowed to compete. The
6 The term polyarchy was first coined by Dahl and Lindblom in Politics, Economics, and
Welfare in 1953 (Dahl 1986: 229). The concept of polyarchy draws on Joseph
Schumpeter' s definition of procedural democracy as a system in which the voters may
influence the policy of their country by voting for freely competing candidates
representing real policyalternatives. The democratic method, according to Schumpeter,
is "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people' s vote"
(Schumpeter 1965: 269).
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adult population in both countries was allowed, without systematic discrimi-
nation of any social or political group, to vote in the elections. That the
voters turnout was high, is perhaps besides the point, although that turn out
underscored the popular legitimacy of the newly established electoral insti-
tutions. Nevertheless, what is important for definitional purposes is that
people were allowed to freely participate in the elections without having to
fear repression, since civil and politicalliberties were respected.
Dahl' s conception of a procedural democracy has been criticized for
excluding certain aspects of democratic regimes that many scholars see as
important. Among his critics are scholars who believe that formal
democracy is aneeessary, but not a sufficient requirement for democracy.
Adherents of "popular democracy" include a number of substantive
properties, either as components, or empirical correlates, of democratic rule.
The existence of formal (political) democracy is by "maximalists" seen as
a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy; aspects of social
justice and economic redistribution should be included. Between these two
extremes lies a wide range of more or less modified definitions of
democracy, stressing either the proceduralist or the substantive aspect of
democracy, or both. However, Dahl's concept of polyarchy is useful in so
far as it clearly sets the Argentinean and Chile an post-transitional regimes
apart from past authoritarian systems as well as intermediary forms of
government variously referred to as "tutelary democracy" or "liberalized
authoritarianism" (dictablandas). The concept identifies important liberal
democratie features of the post-transitional regimes, in spite of all the
political and institutional restrictions inherited by them.7 Most importantly,
the post-transitional regimes of Argentina and Chile differ from the pre-
transitional authoritarian regimes on two dimensions; by the existence of
institutions of polyarchy, and by the scope of organizational pluralism
(Dahl 1986: 242). Dahl's "minimal", procedural definition of democracy
has been used in the bulk of recent transition literature (Diamond, Linz, and
Lipset 1989; O'Donnell 1992, 1993; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead
1986; Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela 1992). Karl and Schmitter
(1991) use a slightly revised version of Dahl' s definition. Such a common
language creates a solid basis for the empirical testing of hypotheses and
7 See Rhoda Rabkin' s article "The Aylwin Government and "Tutelary" Democracy: A
Concept in Search of a Case?" (1992) for a discussion on the term "tutelary democracy".
Dictablanda is a term used to denote a kind of sham democracy where authoritarian
rulers seemingly allow some form of democratic participation without being accountable
to the citizenry for their actions or allowing free and competitive elections. The structure
of authority remains unaltered (ü'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 9).
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further development of explanatory theories. Adam Przeworski echoes Dahl
when identifying the "procedural minimum" that must exist for a political
system to be called democratic: "Contestation open to participation is
sufficient to identify a political system as democratie" (Przeworski 1991:
10). I will use the "minimal" procedural definition of democracy because
it clearly demarcates the transition proeess.
It is more problematic to delimit the end of what O'Donnell in one of his
later articles refers to as the second transition, defined as the transition from
the instalment of a democratic government, in polyarcic terms, to the
consolidation of democracy, or the "effective functioning of a democratie
regime" (O'Donnell 1992: 18). O'Donnell operates with a definition of
democracy which extends in to the economic, cultural, and social spheres;
i.e. specific conditions for the attainment of what he calls socioeconomic
and cultural democratization.8 Since - admitted by O'Donnell himself -
there are no democracies in Latin America today fulfilling all these
requirements, his definition is not conceptually useful for this analysis. For
all practical purposes I will therefore stick to a more minimalist definition
of consolidated democracy, more in the line of J. Samuel Valenzuela (1992)
or Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter (1991). Which factors should
one place the focus on?
We ne ed some criteria up against which to measure the "success" of
consolidation. Dahl's definition ofpolyarchy, based on Western experience
with liberal democracy, has its shortcomings when it comes to discussing
the quality or type of a post-transitional democracy in Argentina and Chile.
This is due to two facts: we are dealing with an analysis of democratie
transition in two countries which belong to a continent where the military
as an institution has played a much more central role in politics than it
traditionally has in the West, and furthermore, the very meaning of
democracy in Latin America differs considerably from the Western ideal of
pluralistic democracy. In the Latin American context, as well as in third
world countries in general, the meaning of democracy is frequently linked
to the democratie government' s performance, i.e. how much the govern-
ment delivers, both in terms of political equality and in terms of economic
8 In essence, ü'Donnells five criteria for a consolidated democracy are, slightly rephrased,
(1) where political democracy or polyarchy exists; (2) where all socIal and political
actors abide by the rules of the democratic game, i.e. subordinate their interests to the
institutions of political democracy; (3) where there is a strengthening of these institutions
sustaining the outcomes of fair and competitive elections; (3) where political democratic
relations are extended into other spheres of social life; and (5) where rulers and
officialdom subject themselves to the distinction between the public and the private
(ü'Donnell 1992: 49).
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benefits (which is clearly reflected in O' Donnell' s definition of consolidated
democracy). This is mainly due to the economic situation of developing
countries, where people are primarily occupied with material benefits and
improved liv ing conditions first, and with democracy as a political form
second. Leaving the difficult discussion on output democracy versus
procedural democracy aside, one still arrives at one significant conclusion:
however well the governments may perform in terms of political
democracy, Latin American democratic regimes are of ten made unstable by
a factor largely absent in the European, or Westem, context: the presence
of autonomous armed forces. Without civilian controlover the military, a
democratic regime will be inherently unstable; a point I shall repeatedly
return to later in the empirical analysis. Whether the military in fact
interferes in politics or not may often be less important than the fact that
it has the power to intervene if it so chooses; a possibility no civilian
government can afford to disregard. One may say that the military
commonly exercises, with respect to civilian authorities, a large degree of
"power of anticipated reaction".
Since Dahl' s definition of polyarchy fails to capture this crucial
determinant of democratie stability in the Latin American context, ane
important criterion shall be added when speaking of democratic
consolidation, namely civilian controlover the military forces.9
Accordingly, consolidated democracy shall for our purposes be understood
as "a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as
citizens by choosing their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and
regularly scheduled elections which are held in the context of the rule of
law, guarantees for political freedom, and limited military prerogatives"
(Karl 1990: 2). Consolidated democracy may also be thought of as a kind
of political game in which
a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town, when
no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, and when
all the losers want to do is try again within the same institutions that they
have just lost. Democracy is consolidated when it becomes self-enforcing,
9 This additional condition was introduced by Terr Lynn Karl (1991: 165). She criticizes
Dahl and other democratic theorists of not emphasizing civilian controlover the military
as a defining condition of democracy, or for simply assuming this aspect to be an
unstated prerequisite in definitions of democracy (Karl 1991: 184). Karl has been
inspired by Alfred Stepan, whose book Rethinking Miltary Polities: Brazil and the
Southern Cone (1988), adds the dimension of civilian controlover the military as a
necessary defining feature of a democracy. Karl' s definition of democracy corresponds
to Przeworski's definition of consolidated democracy.
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that is, when all the relevant political forces find it best to continue to
submit their interests and values to the uncertain interplay of the
institutions (Przeworski i 99 i: 26).10
That means that all the relevant political forces, the military included, agree
to comply with the rules of the democratic game. To sum up, "the institu-
tional framework of civilian controlover the military constitutes the
neuralgic point of democratie consolidation" (Przeworski 1991: 29). As will
be shown later in the empirical analysis, the issue which has had the
greatest impact on civilian controlover the military in the phase of
democratic consolidation in Chile and Argentina is the legacy of human
rights violations, wherefore this issue forms the neuralgic point of my
analysis of the transitions in these two countries.
1.4 Elite focused transition theory
We have now established the definitions of the end points of transition, the
authoritarian and the democratic regimes, and shall move on to the process
of change from one type of regime to another. O'Donnell and Schmitter's
definition of transition as "the interval between one political regime and
another" (O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 6) serves the purposes of
this study. i i Transition will be regarded as a twofold proeess starting with
10 Przeworski's definition of consolidated democracy is supported by Schmitter, who
defines consolidation as "the process of transforming the accidental arrangements,
prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the transition into
relations of cooperation and competition that are reliably known, regularly practiced, and
voluntarily accepted by those persons or collectivities (i.e. politicians and citizens) that
participate in democratic governance" (Schmitter 1992: 424). Guilermo ü'Donnell has
crystallzed the requirements for a consolidated democracy into five points (see Note 10),
essentially capturing the subordination of conflcting individual interests and preferences
to democratic rules and institutions (ü'Donnell 1992: 48-49).
11 ü'Donnell and Schmitter do, however, partly contradict themselves when they later in
the same volume define transition as over when "abnormality" no longer is the central
feature of political life, i.e. when the different contenders agree to play according to the
rules (ü'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 65). This is a much vaguer interpretation,
as the setting of rules at the time of regime change does not necessarily mean that all
major political forces agree to follow these rules. The position of the military is
particularly important. Note that there are also scholars who define transition as a long
on-going process with no clear end. Dankwart Rustow: "...one generation is probably the
minimum period of transition" (Rustow 1969: 347), and Alejandro M. Garro: "an on-
going process involving gradual changes of societal mentality or ethos"... "a process of
transition to, and consolidation of democracy, is unlikely to take less than a generation
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the launching of the proeess of dissolution of the authoritarian regime and
ending with the installation of a new political regime, which theoretically
spe aking may be a democratic regime, an authoritarian regime, or any other
type of regime. The consolidation phase will be treated as post-transitional;
not as part of the transition itself. Before proceeding to the essence of
recent development in transition theory, it should be stressed that the
purpose of this tas k is not to give an exhaustive presentation of transition
theory per se, but to provide a theoretical framework for the empirical
analysis of the transition proeesses in Chile and Argentina to be undertaken
in Chapter 3. The ide a is to identify the elements around which the,
basically elite-focused, empirical analysis is structured and highlight central
traits of the transitions, with the ultimate aim of in Chapter 4 testing the
three hypotheses formulated at the beginning of this chapter.
Maximalists and minimalists alike agree that the form or mode of
transition will have an impact on the resulting type of democracy
(Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela 1992: 11). Although the outcome
of transition may in principle be any kind of political regime, we are
primarily concerned with the transition proeess from an authoritarian regime
to a democratic regime. The last decade has witnessed a shift in those
theories seeking to explain the emergence and sustenance of democratic
regimes from focusing on the more-or-less structural preconditions for
democracy to regarding transition largelyas a result of strategic choice
made by various actors in a structural-historical framework. I shall use the
latter approach, based on the theories of O' Donnell, Schmitter, and
Whitehead 1986; Przeworski 1986, 1989, 1991; and Karl and Schmitter
1990, 1991.12 To reiterate, the point of departure for the analysis will be
based on testing three central hypotheses, namely that different modes of
transition lead to different types of democracy (Karl and Schmitter 1991:
or two" (Garro 1993: 4, 99) are typical representatives for the camp of scholars who
consider the consolidation phase as part of the transition process. This vague type of
definition makes empirical application complicated.
12 While I was in the final stages of writing this thesis, I was introduced to Mainwaring,
ü'Donnell, and Valenzuela's Issues in Democratie Consolidation. The New South
American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (1992). Basically, the book carries
the theoretical discussion on democratic consolidation one step further, rendering
outdated some earlier statements made by Guilermo ü'Donnell in the four volume study
of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, on which many of my own arguments and
criticisms are based. I wil in my discussion, where relevant, try to point out where I
have criticized statements made by ü'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead in the mid-
1980s, which recently have been modified or even contradicted by the same authors.
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269)13; that the mode of transition determines whether or not the emerging
democracy will be consolidated (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 269), and that
the case of transition by regime collapse is the one most likely to lead to
a fuller, less restricted type of political democracy (O'Donnell 1986: 8-
9).14
The post-transitionaldevelopments in Chile and Argentina cast doubts on
the above statements. Based on these two cases I will argue that different
modes of transition may temporally lead to different types of democracy;
that the consolidation of democracy cannot be explained by the mode of
transition alone; and, finally, that transition negotiated in a slow and more
careful manner may increase the chances of reaching mutually acceptable
compromises, hence heightening the prospects for the long-term reconcilia-
tion that is sometimes crucial for democratic stability or democratie
consolidation. The importanee of this is underscored by the fact that too
often in Latin America, instability has tempted leaders to resort to
autocratic beha vi or in order to retain control.
More specifically, it will be argued that chances for democratic
consolidation in Chile and Argentina to a large extent rested on the way the
democratic governments handled the problem of human rights violations;
the most touchy issue in civil-military relations. Relating this to the modes
of transition, it is clear that the AlfonsÍn and the Aylwin governments'
policies regarding past human rights abuses were shaped in a political
reality full of constraints. Those constraints can partly be attributed to the
way the transition processes came about and the shape the transition
processes to ok, i.e. the mode of transition. Directly linked to the mode of
transition is also the distribution of power at the time of regime change,
which was vital for the framework within which the human rights policies
had to be confined. However, as will be argued, the mode of transition
alone does not succeed in accounting for the different outcomes in human
13 Which mode leads to which type of democracy wil be discussed later in this section.
14 ü'Donnell adds that "...because it leaves the dominant classes and the armed forces
heavily under-represented in the institutional arenas of political democracy,...the pattern
of democratization by collapse is also more likely to lead to the emergence of strong
disloyal opposition and to unmediated confrontations between parties, factions, and
organized interests. Consequently, this pattern seems more prone to lead to severe
authoritarian revers als" (ü'Donnell 1986: 8-9). There is clearly an inconsistency here,
since a democracy prone to authoritarian reversals hardly can be called a full,
unrestricted democracy. However, because it is empirically difficult to state when the
danger of authoritarian reversals is over, I shall for practical purposes concentrate on the
first part of ü'Donnells argument in this thesis.
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rights policy. Therefore, the above hypotheses fail to account for important
differences in the consolidation proeess in Argentina and Chile. Before
embarking on the empirical analysis, I want to outline the essenee of the
theories giving rise to these hypotheses that I am testing.
Transition is a period of great political uncertainty, and the choices made
byelites under such conditions help shape the institutions and rules which
form the foundation for the new post-transitional regime o The two central
characteristics of the transition period is that the rules of the political game
are not defined, and various actors are struggling to assert their short-term
interests as well as long-term interests by tempting to influence the
definition of these rules.15 The rules under transition tend to shift, as does
the balanee of power between the various contenders. During the proeess
of transition, what rules there are tend to be under the control of the
authoritarian rulers. Who the actors are will dep end on shifting alliances in
different phases of the transition.
The transition process is normally by political scientists divided into two
phases: liberalization and democratization. Liberalization refers
fundamentally to the relationship between the State and civil society.
Democratization refers fundamentally to the relationship between the State
and political society (Stepan 1989: ix). Liberalization may exist without,
and in any case precedes, democratization. The transition typically starts
when the authoritarian incumbents begin to modify their own rules in the
direction of providing more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals
and groups. Elite theorists sustain that the beginning of the transition is
always the - direct or indirect - consequence of important divisions within
the authoritarian regime itself, principally among the fluctuating cleavage
between hard-liners and soft-liners (O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986:
15; Przeworski 1991: 67). O'Donnell coined the original terms hard-liners
(duros) and soft-liners (blandos), signifying two opposing groups within the
authoritarian block. Those belonging to the first group believe that the
perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible and desirable, even if it, at
worst, has to take place behind some kind of democratic facade. Soft-liners
differ from the first group in that they see the unavoidable necessity of
introducing some form of electorallegitimation for the regime in order for
the regime to survive. To achieve this, the regime has to allow the
15 The emphasis put on the factor of uncertainty varies from scholar to scholar. In the
words of Przeworski, "the process of establishing a democracy is a process of
institutionalizing uncertainty, of subjecting all interests to uncertainty" (Przeworski 1986:
58). ü'Donnell and Schmitter downplay this aspect, and Karl hardly touches upon it at
all.
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introduction of at least some measures of freedom to the citizenry.
According to Przeworski, what is threatening to the authoritarian regime is
not the breakdown of legitimacy but rather the organization of counter-
hegemony, i.e. projects for an alternative political system forwarded by the
civilian opposition. In his own words, "what matters for the stability of any
regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the
presence or absenee of preferable alternatives" (Przeworski 1986: 51-52).
Following his line of thought, at some given point, an authoritarian regime,
characterized by its intolerance of independent organizations, decides to
tolerate autonomous organizations in civil society. Liberalization, therefore,
is a result of an interaction between splits in the authoritarian regime and
autonomous organizations of the civil society. Emblematie of liberalization
is that it makes effective certain rights that protect both individuals and
social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third
parties (ü'Donnell and Schmitter Vol. 4, 1986: 7).16
Civil society actors note the fissure in the power bloc and realize that not
all political activity will be met by repression. The result is the emergence
of smaller or greater spaces for political action, depending on the degree of
governmental power and toleration. Transition at this point is still a revers-
ible process. Jf political action by the opposition is not perceived as
immediately threatening by the regime, such activity tends to grow and
become institutionalized, thereby raising the perceived costs of repression.
Liberalization or apertura (opening), at the outset meant as controlled
openings of political space, may be encouraged by authoritarian rulers,
thinking that by relieving the pressure for democratization they may
continue ruling as before.17 However, liberalization is inherently unstable,
as the most instant response to apertura is an outburst of autonomous civil
society organizations; what O'Donnell and Schmitter refer to as
"resurrection of civil society" (O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 48).
This popular mobilization dictates the rhythm of transformation, since it
16 Individual guarantees include the classical elements of the liberal tradition: habeas
corpus; sanctity of private home and correspondence; the right to be defended in a fair
trial according to preestablished laws; freedom of movement, speech, and petition etc.
Group rights include freedom of expression; freedom from censorship of the means of
communication; freedom of association etc. (ü'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 7).
17 This situation where the authoritarian rulers are not accountable to the citizenr for their
actions has been referred to as "tutelary democracy", "liberalized authoritarianism", or
dictablanda. A sItuation where some form of limited democracy is allowed, meaning
where only some rights are extended to (only some groups) of the citizenry, is given the
label "limited democracy" or democradura (ü'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 9).
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forces the regime to repress, coopt, or devolve power. Przeworski argues
that because these organizations have no institutions where they can present
their views and negotiate their interests, "social movements are an
ambiguous actor under democracy, and always short-lived" (Przeworski
1991: 11). As a result, the organizations turn to the streets, gradually
leading to the rise of mass movements. I believe this is precisely the
strength of civil society organizations in that they are visible to everyone,
and therefore quickly gather momentum. Facing massive opposition, the
regime is left with two options; either to return to strict authoritarianism
through increased repression, or continue to the second phase of transition:
democratization.
Democratization is the proeess whereby "the rules and procedures of
citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed
by other non-democratic principles, or expanded to include persons not
previously enjoying such rights and obligations,... or extended to cover
issues and institutions not previously subjected to citizen participation"
(O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 8). In short, it deals with the rights
and obligations of citizenship and the accountability of the rulers.
Having roughly outline d the two phases of transition, we shall now turn
to the actors and their strategies in their struggle for power in an imagined
future regime. One of the central features of recent transition theory is the
focus on elite bargaining or interaction. In this presentation the approaches
of Schmitter and Karl (1990, 1991) and Przeworski (1986, 1991) will be
combined in an effort to clarify the modes of transition, moreover the
position of the various actors in the different modes. First a couple of
general statements. The struggle for democracy always takes place on two
fronts; against the authoritarian regime for democracy and against other
civil society actors for the largest possible influence within a democratic set
of institutions. Different actors or groups play different roles at different
stages in the transition proeess. At the time of the demise of authoritarian
rule, elite factions and social movements (including non-governmental
organizations) seem to play the key role. Political parties then move to the
central stage during the transition itself. More discrete and specialized
activity of interest associations and state ageneies may become major
determinants of the type of democracy that is ultimately consolidated.
Theories dealing with the modes of transition all place the focus on the
individual agreement-making level. 18 It is the specific combination of
18 It is interesting to note that it is the same scholars - particularly, ü'Donnell, Whitehead,
and Schmitter (1986) - who in the 1960s and 70s explained the breakdown of
democratic regimes by structural macro-Ievel factors only, who later make a 180 degree
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actors and their strategies in a certain historic-structural space which define
what type of transition has occurred. The actors may be divided into elites
and masses, and their strategies can be placed on a continuum ranging from
multilateral willingness to compromise to unilateral recourse to force (Karl
and Schmitter 1991: 274). Change may take place primarilyas a result of
"pressure from below", as when mas ses take the initiative, or "from above",
as when elites take the initiative to form political openings. The
combination of actors and strategy variables produces four ideal-types of
regime transition: (1) Pact, when elites agree upon a multilateral
compromise among themselves; (2) Imposition, when elites unilaterally and
effectively force through a regime change against the resistance of the
incumbents; (3) Reform, when masses mobilize from below and impose a
compromised outcome without resorting to violence, and (4) Revolution,
when masses rise up in arms and defeat the previous authoritarian rulers
militarily. Between these four extremes lie many mixed types of transition,
Le. the actors participating or the strategies they choose are not easily
classified into any of the four comers of the model-table below:
Figure 1
Modes of transition: the property space
fSTRTEGY 1
COMPROMISE
Multilateral
) FORCE
Unilateral
MASSES
PACT IMPOSITION
CHILE
ARGENTINA
REFORM REVOLUTION
ELITES
\ ACTORS I
Source: Karl and Schmitter (1991:' 275-76).
U-turn and resort to purely individual micro-Ievel factors when seeking explanations to
the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and the reconstruction of democratic regimes.
15
Neither Chile nor Argentina fit any of the ideal modes of transition.
Because they occupy a kInd of unclear middle-category, we shall henceforth
concentrate on the two types of modes which they come closer too, namely
pacts and imposition. For a more detailed analysis of what brings about
these two ideal forms of regime change, it may be useful to single out four
political actors on the elite level: Hard-liners and Reformers (or Soft-liners)
within the authoritarian bloc and Moderates and Radicals within the
opposition bloc (O'Donnell and Schmitter Vol 4, 1986: 15; Przeworski
1991: 67). As mentioned, the transition process is distinguished by a high
degree of uncertainty. The strategies adopted by these four forces or groups
will result in different alliances or agreements leading to different
outcomes. According to PrzeworskI, some kind of democracy as an
outcome can only result from understandings between the Moderates and
the Reformers, a process referred to as extrication, meaning a type of
transition where the negotiations involve the forces associated with the
previous authoritarian regime (Przeworski 1991: Xi).19
As shown in the above tab le, extrication may take the form of either pact
making or imposition. Political pacts are most frequent where the
democratization proeess is relatively slow and controlled. The pacts are
agreements among leaders of political parties to di vide government offices
among themselves independent of election results; fix basic policy
orientations; and, if necessary, exclude outsiders. These pacts secure the
interests of at least some of the major power groups in the transition
proeess and may hence bode well for the stability of the new regime. Karl
maintains that pact making is the best solution in a transition, although
pacts are, in essence, "antidemocratic mechanisms bargained by elites"
(Karl 1991: 176). Jf the civilian Moderates opt for an institutional
arrangement in which the armed forces remain autonomous, the equilibrium
outcome will be a democracy in which the armed forces will exercise
controlover the democratie proeess. This particular point is important
regarding the human rights issue: if the armed forces can ensure that they
will not be purged by the new ei vil government for crimes commtted under
authoritarian rule, they are more like ly to embark on a extrication strategy.
The possibility of extrication is absent when either the armed forces have
fallen apart, in which case the civilian opposition controls the
democratization process, or they support the transition to democracy.1°
19 The ensuing discussion is based on Przeworski's functionalist approach to the process
of transition.
20 The latter has been characteristic of the recent transitions in many Eastern European
countries.
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The forces struggling against the authoritarian regime are obviously more
efficient if they form a united front, but at the same time they are
necessarily divided when it comes to their specific interests in the new
regime. The democratie forces must be strong enough to ensure a viable
alternative to the authoritarian regime, but at the same time they cannot be
so strong as to threaten the military and hence run the risk of halting the
democratization process.
Although it is the strategies chosen by individual or group actors that
produee the changes that lead to transition, it should be borne in mind that
these actors do not operate in a vacuum. The modes of transition are
determined by historically created structures which may constitute
"confining conditions" that restrict or enhance the choices available to the
political actors.21 Leadership therefore has to be interpreted in a context,
where for example economic factors and civil-military relations play
important roles and may determine the range of options available to the
decision-makers. Those making the decisions may even be predisposed to
choose a specific option by the structural frameworks. The arrangements
which are crafted by key political actors in a transition proeess set the new
rules of the game, which in turn become the institutions shaping the
prospects for regime consolidation in the future. This may concern
economic policy, electoral systems, constitutional rules, distribution of
power between institutions, and, most importantly , for our purpose, the
agreements reached regarding civil-military relations; whether these are
confined within or outside of constitutional rule and institutions. In the
words of Karl and Schmitter,
informal accords between political parties and the armed forces can
establish the initial parameters of civilian and military spheres in ways
that deviate from formal constitutional norms. Thus, what at the time may
appear to be temporary allances during the uncertain transition may
become persistent barriers to change (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 273).
The mode of transition involves primarily the agreements which drive the
proeess of democratization forward. According to recent transition theory,
these agreements are mainly confined to elites. Whenever the ancien régime
negotiates its way out of power, the optimal strategy of democratization is
inconsistent in that it requires compromises ex ante and resolutions ex post
(Przeworski 1991: 51). Negotiated agreements with the old regime tend to
21 These historically created structures are mentioned in a general manner by Karl and
Schmitter (1991), but are not defined or specified.
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drag out the transition proeess and make it more complicated. Transitions
by extrication leave institutional traces; most importantly, the autonomy of
the armed forces. Wherever the arme d forces have remained independent
of civilian control, the military question is a permanent source of instability
for democratie institutions. Modalities of transition are believed to
determine the features of the new regime; specifically, that unless the
armed forces collapse, successful transition can be brought about only as
a result of negotiations; pact-making. The political implication is that pro-
democratic forces must be prudent; they must be prepared to offer
concessions in exchange for democracy.
Karl and Schmitter' s line of argument may be summarized as follows:
polities undergoing regime change from autocracy do so by a variety of
means; these changes can be specified and clustered into a limited number
of modes of transition; these modes, to a significant extent, determine
which types of democracy will emerge; and whether or not they will be
consolidated (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 269). In other word, this kind of
theory claims to predict the outcome of transition on the basis of the type
of transition. O' Donnell specifies Karl and Schmitter' s general approach by
stating that it is one specific mode of transition, namely that of regime
collapse, which is most favourable to the establishment of a fuller, less
restricted type of political democracy. This raises two of the central
questions underlying my empirical analysis in Chapter 3. Is it true that
modalities of transition alone determine the finaloutcome? And is it true
that regime collapse bodes better for political democracy than does a
carefully negotiated transition ?
Karl, Schmitter, and O'Donnell assume that it is adequate to analyze the
role of elites in the transition proeess. In fact, the down-playing of the role
of civil society has been one of the main criticisms against the re cent
development in theories seeking to explain democratic transition. It has
been mentioned that the liberalization process starts in response to a fissure
in the authoritarian block, and that the ensuing liberalization process is
largely the result of an interaction between authoritarian elites and civil
society. But it is not specified just what this interaction implies, or how it
comes about, or who takes part. What, then, is the role of civil society in
the democratization proeess ? This is the topic of the next paragraphs, as we
turn to the extensive body of literature focusing on another aspect of
transition: that of the non-elites.
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1.5 The role of civil society in the proeess of transition
On the role of civil society I want to make two arguments. The study of
transition is incomplete if the role of civil society is left out or severely
down-played, as is the case in much of transition literature. Secondly, it is
important to focus on the role of non-governmental human rights
organizations when studying the role of civil society in the transition
proeess. Human rights NGOs have so far only been given scarce attention
in the academic debate on transition, while in fact the issue of human rights
violations has been arallying point for the opposition against military rule
and a lasting source of continuing civil-military tension in the post-
transition or democratic consolidation phase in many Latin American
countries.
Two factors were crucial for the fall of authoritarian regimes in Latin
America: a severely deteriorating economic situation and an increasingly
intolerable leve! of repression. For the purpose of this analysis, the aspect
of economy, although very important, will be kept in the background.22
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the failure of the military
juntas in both countries to deliver positive economic results (one of the
main stated objectives of the national security doctrine) led to a loss of
legitimacy. Przeworski would argue against this, as he claims that
liberalization does not come about as a result of legitimacy, but rather due
to a split within the authoritarian block between hard-liners and soft-liners
(Przeworski 1991: 51). However, Przeworski fails to explain why this split
comes about in the first place, which is what interests us here.
The sec ond factor, i.e. high levels of repression, spurred an increasingly
audible opposition from civil society, forcing, as will be argued in Chapter
5, the incumbent elites to change their way of action, which eventually
resulted in regime change. Gross human rights violations was the one single
issue which the opposition against the regimes in both countries rallied
around from the very beginning, and it has also been one of the prime
issues in both the proeesses of democratization and democratic
consolidation. Non-govemmental human rights organizations were the first
actors that came to the scene. Moreover, they were the only civil society
actors which had human rights as their specific field of action. Because the
human rights organizations in Argentina and Chile were heavily influenced
by the position of the Catholic Church, and paved the way for the
22 For an account of the Chilean economic development, see Angell 1992; Edwards and
Edwards 1992; Foxley 1986; Rabkin 1992; E. Silva 1993; P. Silva 1991; and Vergara
1986. For an account of the economic development in Argentina, see Corradi 1985;
Peralta-Ramos and Waisman 1987; Snow 1979; Vacs 1987.
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reconstitution of political paries, these three civil society actors will be
examined together in some detaiL. In order to clarify the relationship
between these actors and the state, I would first like to place the concept
of ei vil society in a broader theoretical framework.
It has already been stated that non-governmental human rights
organizations, the Church, and the political parties are civil society actors.
This is not totally unproblematic and straight-forward, as the term civil
society has been given a wide range of interpretations through a two
century long scholarly debate and political discourse, and no clear
definition has so far been arrived at.23 Scholarly literature usually draws
a distinction between the state with its mïlitary, policing, legal,
administrative, and cultural organs on the one hand and civil society as a
market regulated, privately controlled or voluntary set of associations on the
other hand (Keane 1988: 3). For our purpose it is sufficient to single out
some of the term' score values, settling on a definition which includes the
institutions I want to concentrate on. Civil society will therefore be taken
to mean those structures that lie between the state and the family, the so-
called meso level. This refers to networks of voluntary associations which
interact with the state while retaining relative financial and organizational
autonomy, including such structures as political parties, labor unions,
church organizations, NGOs of various kinds, voluntary organizations such
as women's groups and student unions, just to mention a few. Finally, civIl
society is one of the sources for the legitimation of state power; an
important point in the transfer from an authoritarian to a democratic regime.
As previously observed, one of the features of authoritarian rule is to
severely restrict or even circumscribe the activity of civil society, because
if the regime allows for protest it becomes vulnerable to the democratic
principle of contestation, thereby risking the erosion of its legitimacy. The
democratization process is characterized by the resurrection of civil society,
meaning the gradual comeback of non-elite actors to the political arena,
voicing their demands to the government and influencing policy formation.
Dahl' s concept of pluralis t democracy adds to the c1assical concept of
polyarchy (political democracy) a dimension of the existence of voluntary
23 Some of the classical literature on the subject includes works of Aristotle, Rousseau,
Thomas Paine, Adam Ferguson, Alexis de Toquevile, Karl Marx, and HegeL. Principal
questions in the debate have been whether civil society is indistinguishable from or
autonomous from the state, whether it is a theoretical or an empirical concept, and
whether civil society should be distinguished from political society. See Raker (1992:
26-30) for auseful summary of the classical literature dealing with civil society.
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organizations operating autonomously from state structures, hence defining
pluralism as essentially the civil society aspect of democracy:
Independent organizations are highly desirable in a democracy, at least in
large scale democracy. Whenever democratic processes are employed on
a scale as large as the nation state, autonomous organizations are bound
to come into existence. They are more, however, than a direct
consequence of democratizing the government of the nation-state. They
are also necessary to the functioning of the democratic proeess itself, to
minimizing government coercion, to political liberty, and to human well-
being (Dahl 1982: 1).
In spite of the desirable features of civil society in democracy, the literature
on democratic transition (Przeworski 1991; Karl and Schmitter 1990 and
1991; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1986; O' Donnell, Schmitter, and
Whitehead 1986) which founds the basis of this analysis, has in its almost
exclusive focus on elite negotiations and agreements largely excluded the
role of civil society. Transitions from below, i.e. either reforms forced on
the regimes by pressure from the masses, or revolution brought about by
full-fledged mass-mobilization, are in this literature mentioned as possible
modes of transition, but practically all the theoretical discussion focuses on
transition imposed from above, i.e. transition by imposition or pact-making,
as discussed in detail in section 1.4. This in spite of the fact that most
scholars consider the existence of a strong civil society an important check
on the expansion and abuse of state power. In this sense, the voluntary
associations and organizations contribute to the fostering of democratie
values by stressing the feature of state accountability, as well as serving as
a training and recruiting ground for politicalleaders (Diamond, Linz, and
Lipset 1989). V oluntary organizations also constitute channels of interest
articulation outside the electoral field, in which demands on the
authoritarian as well as democratie government may be made. The way
civil society organizes its survival and carries out governmental resistance
under an authoritarian regime is largely a non-explored area in transition
theory. We know that there is a mobilization of civil society in the
liberalization proeess, and that once political space is opened up, the
possibility of exercising influence on the incumbent regime is enlargened,
which in its turn may lead to further mobilization and hence
democratization. This mobilization, which O'Donnell and Schmitter refer
to as the "popular upsurge", is, however, explained as a respons e to elite
action:
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Once something has happened - once the soft-liners have prevailed over
the hard-liners, begun to extend guarantees for individuals and some rights
of contestation, and started to negotiate with selected regime opponents
- a generalized mobilization is likely to occur, which we choose to
describe as the resurrection of cIvil society (O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL.
4, 1986: 48).
They argue that when the cost of engaging in collective action is perceived
as being lower, "the former political identities re-emerge and others
appear...to expand, beyond anyone's expectations, the public spaces the
rulers dec ide to tolerate at the beginning of the transition" (O'Donnell and
Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 48-49). In my opinion, transition theory fails to
explain why the split within the authoritarian block comes about in the first
place. Why do the incumbent elites suddenly start to tolerate the opposition
voicing their demands? It is precisely at this point that civil society is
important. Human rights NGOs were crucial in that they were the first to
point out the excesses of the authoritarian leaders, i.e. drawing the world's
attention to gross human rights violations, thereby serving to delegitimize
the military governments. Contrary to Przeworski's statement that
liberalization always is brought about by splits at the top, I believe one has
to take one step back and examine the causes for this split. The
authoritarian rulers' ne ed for legitimation should not be underestimated,
even though they can always resort to the powerful weapon of repression.
Because we are not dealing with totalitarian but authoritarian regimes (a
key defining trait of which is limited organizational pluralism), a study of
the transition proeesses in Argentina and Chile will, in my view, be
incomplete if the focus is placed exclusively on the role of the elites.
Furthermore, since the issue of gross human rights violations was what
spurred the birth of the human rights NGOs and remained a key issue
throughout the transition process, I shall proceed to clarify this term.
1.6 Defining gross human rights violations
The following definition of human rights may serve as an appropriate
starting point for our discussion of what constitutes gross human rights
violations:
The most prevalent conception of human rights draws on a theory of
natural rights: human rights are the inalienable entitlement of individuals,
based on their nature as human beings (moral persons); they protect those
potentials, attributes, and holdings that are essential to life worthy of a
human being. In other words, human rights are the rights one has simply
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by being a human being. Thus they imply strong prima facíe moral
obligations, even across state boundaries (Donnelly 1982: 575).
Donnelly' s definition stresses the essentially normative aspect of the
concept. However, for analytical purposes we need to go further and give
this inherently normative concept a more concrete empirical denotation. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) may serve as the appropriate
benchmark. The rights contained in this dec1aration range from civil and
political rights, such as freedom of opinion, con science and religion, press,
assembly, free correspondence, and freedom from arbitrary detention, to
social and economic rights, such as the right to work, health care, food,
education, and participation in cultural life. These rights have been
incorporated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
respectively. In addition to these "classic" human rights, whose antecedents
date as far back as Magna Charta (1215), the declaration of the French
Revolution of 1789, and the American Bill of Rights (1797), this century
has witnessed the development of a "third generation" of human rights in
the form of collective or group rights.24
The main difference between human rights violations and ordinary
offenses is that "the subject of the perpetrator of the human rights violation
is an agent of the State; either a public employee or a person or a group of
persons who has the State's assent, consent, or protection" (FASIC 1991:
81). In the moment the State puts the perpetrator before ordinary justice and
does not defend him or her, we are dealing with an ordinary offence.
Human rights violations are particularly serious because the institution
which is supposed to protect its citizens' rights is the offender. The victim
accordingly has nowhere to turn for protection. Although it may be argued
that all human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights are indeed inseparable and of equal importance, there is a general
consensus that the right to life is the most basic right of aii.25 I have
therefore chosen to exclude economic, social, and political rights in general,
and put the main emphasis on what Alex P. Schmid has defined as gross
human rights violations. They differ from other kinds of human rights
24 For a thorough presentation of the background for and content of the three "generations"
of human rights, see Alex P. Schmid, Research on Gross Human Rights Violations
(1989).
25 See Paul Sieghart's The Lawful Rights of Mankind (1987) for an introduction to the
international legal code of human rights, and a philosophical debate of the regarding the
concept of human rights.
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violations in that the state or state agents act as active, not merely passive
or indirect, abusers of human rights. More specifically, the above term
refers to the violation of three fundamental rights as stated in Articles 3, 5,
and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Article 3: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."
Article 5: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
Article 9: "No one should be subjected to arbitrary arest, detention or
exile" (cited in Schmid 1989: 6).26
Gross human rights violations, then, shall in this study be defined as
crimes against the fundamental rights of a person, as a member of
humanity, defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
State commits them - directly, indirectly or by omission - under the
protection of its unique power. When this occurs, the state annuls its
essential purpose and puts an end to the State subject to the rule of law
(FASie 1991: 81).
The three most common manifest violations of these basic rights, as defined
in Articles 3 and 5, are political murder, torture27, and "disappearance".
The latter term refers to people who are detained for political reasons and
whose detention is repeatedly denied by the authorities, and whose current
location remains unknown in spite of all efforts to find them.28 Political
26 All three articles belong to the first generation of human rights, and were incorporated
into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
27 According to the 1984 U.N. Convention Against Torture, torture is: "any act by which
severe pain or suffering,whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
commtted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflcted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity" (definition used by the Chilean Commssion of Human
Rights, cited in Schmid 1989: 25).
28 The criteria are based on definitions given by the Chilean Commission of Human Rights.
üriginally, the term desaparecido was coined in Guatemala in the 1960s, when, for the
first time in Latin American history, the kidnapping and disappearance of political
opponents was employed as a systematic method for ridding the country of troublesome
individuals (Guest 1990: 31). However, the antecedent for this particular kind of
repression goes back to the Second Wodd War, when Hitler had people who were
opponents of the Reich "disappear" in large numbers. For details of the conditions
necessarily present in order for a person to be classified as "detained-disappeared", see
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murder, torture, and disappearance of ten occur together, and are considered
the "ultimate tools of repression" (Schmid 1989: 6). There are obviously
various ways of classifying human rights violations, dep ending on how the
information will be used. The Informatics Network have drawn a
distinguishing line between "general" and "specific" human rights
violations. Human rights violations may also be classified by concepts, for
example by the cause of the act; by the victims' background; by the version
of the act (official or unofficial); by the specific act (the kind of torture)
etc. (FASIC 1991: 83).
It is important to be aware of some of the main problems involved in the
registering and classification of various kinds of gross human rights
violations which, from a scientific point of view, lead to unreliable data.
One brief example is the problem of obtaining enough information or
"proof' to settle a case, which may involve significant complications.
Another obvious difficulty is the inevitable existence of duplication in
statistical material due to the fact that the same person may suffer several
types of gross human rights violations during the same detention, or the
same person may suffer repeated violations at different occasions. How
does one for example register a person who has been detained, then
imprisoned by arbitrary arrest (both violations of Article 3), then tortured
(violation of Article 5), and finally, whereupon given the choice between
perpetual imprisonment or exile, the victim chooses exile (violation of
Article 9). Should this case be treated as one case since it concerns one
individual, or should it be registered and classified as four separate
incidents of gross human rights violations? What happens when the body
of a person reported as detained-disappeared is found and identified; should
the person be transferred from the category of "disappeared" to "executed"?
V arying practices in the registration of gross human rights violations by
different national or international non-govemmental organizations or private
investigators result in highly heterogeneous interpretations of the same
reality. Depending on which data is used, one may arrive at staggeringly
different conclusions. This inevitably leads to the danger of uncritically
Schmid (1989: 26). The term detained-disappeared evolves from the terminology
"presumably disappeared" (presuntamente desaparecidos), employed by human rights
organizations in Argentina (Meijide 1986: 61). Then the organizations started talking
about "disappearances"; the government continued denying their responsibility. Finally,
when having enough proof that government officials were directly responsible for the
disappearance of these people, the organizations introduced the term "detained-
disappeared" (detenidos-desaparecidos). The terms disappeared and detained-disappeared
wil be used interchangeably in this thesis.
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comparing figures from different sources. Bearing these problems of
conceptualization and classification in mind, the figures and numbers
presented in the remaining part of this study should not be interpreted as
an indisputable truth, but as an approximation to the empirical realities
referred to.
Gross human rights violations have been commtted by a large number
of authoritarian regimes, including those of Argentina and Chile.
Democratie regimes, by contrast, have on the whole a much better record
of human rights protection. Indeed, the respect for human rights is one of
the defining elements of democracy, although the existence of a set of
formal democratic institutions does not rule out occasional repression. The
ensuing analysis of gross human rights violations in Chile and Argentina
will focus mainly on the right to life (Article 3), although violations of the
right to personal integrity (Article 5) and personalliberty (Article 9) will
be treated in somewhat lesser detaiL. Given that Chile and Argentina are
only two among a large number of authoritarian regimes that have engaged
in the widespread practice of gross human rights violations, why have these
two particular Southern Cone countries been singled out for this analysis?
1.7 Case seleetion, method, and sources
Argentina and Chile are theoretically interesting cases due to their centrality
in the transition literature. Recent transition theory has largely been based
on the empirical experiences of the Latin American, the Southern European,
and the Eastern European transitions, and both Chile and Argentina hold a
prominent position among the Latin American cases discussed by
O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead; Karl and Schmitter; and Przeworski.
Nevertheless, in my opinion, development in these two countries over the
last two decades challenge key explanatory statements in this literature. Jf
the theories do not stand up to the empirical reality they claim to explain,
some revision or alternative thinking may be in place. The comparative
analysis of the Chilean and Argentinean transitions undertaken in Chapters
3 and 4 will clarify this point. Chapter 5 will proceed to explore some
explanatory variables alternative to those highlighted in elite-focused
theory. My comparative analysis has been facilitated by access to a wealth
of sources, and in particular by the availability of abundant data on human
rights issues. Such data are absent or grossly incomplete in so many other
Latin American countries due to inadequate registering or reporting
practices. Furthermore, Chile and Argentina have a series of relatively
similar background variables, which minimize intersystemic variation, and
favour the singling out of the factors I wish to study. In other words, for
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my purposes these are two cases which may be regarded as "most similar
systems" .
When countries share many economic, cultural, and political
characteristics, the number of "experimental" variables, although unknown
and still large, is minimized (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 32). Argentina
and Chile should come close to this optimal situation for inquiry in the
Latin American context. Not only are many of the intersystemic (i.e.
domestic) variables similar, but the object for the first part of the analysis
- the transition process - takes place within the same international climate,
which reduces the variation in those variables (such as historie al context)
which may have had an impact on the phenomenon we are studying. Some
of the common variables shared by Chile and Argentina are culture,
religion, the type of and time of independence, the level of technical
development, and the international political situation. Furthermore, the
countries' socio-economic structure and political development, although in
many ways distinet, are relatively similar compared to analogous
development in other Latin American states. In a regional context of more
or less underdeveloped countries, Chile and Argentina constitute cases of
comparatively early development.3o On the surface, Chile and Argentina
seem to have undergone aremarkably similar historical development. In
both countries the oligarchic type of government was replaced by a
democracy of political parties at the beginning of this century. After a
gradual weakening of the party system, both countries entered a profound
political crisis in the 1970s. The armed forces staged a coup to restore order
and put the economy right. To achieve their aims of "national security", the
military governments entered a practice of excessive human rights abuses.
In response to these violations grew a large apparatus of human rights
organizations. These organizations played an important role when, after
years of authoritarian rule, democracy was restored in both countries in the
1980s.
In spite of their apparent similarities, however, there is one prominent
background variable which differs considerably in the two cases, and
therefore merits special mention, namely that of the political pre-coup
development. Chile is the Latin American country which can boast the
longest-standing democratic tradition of this century, virtually unbroken
30 "Early development" is a term translated from desarrollo temprano used by María Esther
del Campo in "Unas notas sobre el sistema de partidos en Chile y Argentina" (del
Campo 1991: 178). It should be stressed that this holds true for the Latin American
context. In comparison to Western European countries or North America, Chile and
Argentina do, of course, constitute cases of "late" or even "late late" development.
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before the coup in 1973. Argentina, in contrast, went through almost fifty
years of rapidly alternating civilian and military govemments prior to the
1976 coup. I believe it is crucial to keep this factor in mind when exploring
the variables which (1) may account for the fact that two diametrically
opposite modes of transitions have led to two basically similar types of
democracy (in the polyarchical meaning of the word), and (2) may account
for the fact that the consolidation proeesses in Chile and Argentina differ
considerably from those predicted by transition theory. In other words, I
want to investigate why two so different modes of transition created
relatively similar outcomes in type of democracy, but substantial differences
with respect to the aspect of consolidation.
The distinet political realities of Chile (1973- 1994) and Argentina (1976-
1989) in the period we are dealing with, I.e. the period from the onset of
military rule to the end of the first constitutionally elected government, may
be summarized as follows: at the time of the coup the lev el of economic
development was higher and the trade unions stronger and more
autonomous in Argentina than in Chile. On the other hand, Chile enjoyed
a higher degree of political stability prior to the coup, with less interference
from the armed forces in political matters. The Chilean political parties -
built on a European model - had stronger ideological programs than their
Argentinean counterparts, which had a much more dominant partidaria
structure. Argentina lacked a political Right, which was traditionally strong
in its neighboring country, but on the other hand Argentina could boast a
unique political phenomenon totally absent in Chile an polities: Peronism.
Another main difference between the two countries lies in the type of diet a-
torship that was installed, and linked to this, the duration of the
dictatorships. Chile qualifies as a personal dictatorship, whereas Argentina
is best described as an institutional dictatorship, ruled as it was by four
military juntas. The difference lies in the loyalty to a personal figurehead
as against loyalty to an institution. This influenced both the type of
repression during the dictatorship, and, subsequently, both the type of
response to the repressions from civil society, as well as the solutions that
the institutional governments taking over after the military juntas had to
find. To sum up, I shall focus specifically on the variation in gross human
rights violations; the two different modes of transition; the human rights
policies followed in the two countries after the formal restoration of
democracy; and, finally, on civil society's (exemplified by human rights
organizations, the Catholic Church, and political parties) response to these
human rights violations and the attempts at dealing with the problem after
the change to civilian rule.
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I have used both primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources form
the basis for the descriptive and analytical parts concerning the historical-
political back-ground to the coups and the periods of transition. Primary
sources have been extensively employed in the account for human rights
abuses during the dictatorship; the role of the human rights organizations
during and after the period of military rule; as well as in accounting for the
recent development in the field of human rights. The latter is especially true
for the case of Chile, as the first transitional government was still in power
when this analysis was started, and the recent development in human rights
has not yet had time to enter the formal body of transition literature. The
primary sources may be divided into two main categories: written material
and personal interviews. During four months of field work in Chile and
Argentina during the Spring semester of 1993, I consulted an extensive
body of primary sources in the form of newspaper articles, periodicals, and
printed material from a large number of human rights organizations. This
provided me with insight into the opinions prevailing during the time of the
dictatorship regarding the human rights issue; attitudes towards the Nunca
Más report and the Informe Rettig; public opinion of the Argentinean trials;
as well as much valuable information hard to get hold of in secondary
sources.
The written material was supplemented by about thirty personal
interviews carried out in Santiago and Buenos Aires between mid-April and
mid-July 1993, which deserve special mention (consult Appendix A for
name of interviewees and occupational status). Among the interviewed were
representatives, many of whom held central positions, from all the main
human rights organizations as well as some of the smaller ones, moreover
lawyers, psychologists, and various other people involved in the struggle for
human rights during and after the military regimes. These interviews,
largely unstructured, were carried out in a relaxed atmosphere and provided
me with an invaluable insight into the horrors of the dictatorships, which
can only be conveyed through personal experience, not through analytic
secondary sources. Cold figures turned into personal tragedies. However,
more than painting a vivid picture of the topic of my investigation and
supplying me with useful inside-knowledge about the problems involved in
transition and consolidation, the information I received through these
interviews raised issues which led me on to question the validity of the
theoretical material I am criticizing in this study. I was spurred into looking
for answers to questions I would not have thought of posing if I had not
been confronted with the problems by my informants. Due to the nature of
the interviews and the difference in time regarding the end of the
dictatorship in the two countries, the information gathered serves more as
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a supplement to all the other sources consulted. Needless to say, the
information given through these interviews should not be considered
objective or neutral due to the inherently politically or emotionally biased
position of the informants vis-à-vis the issue of gross human rights
violations. The enthusiasm, or lack of such, conveyed by the interviewed
human rights activists and lawyers, among others, pinpointed the
importance of the time factor. The time span from the end of the
dictatorship to I carried out the interviews (ten years in Argentina in
contrast to three years in Chile), and, even more importantly, the
informants' distance to the most repressive era of the dictatorships at the
moment of regime transition, suggested changes in attitude over time - an
important reminder when dealing with qualitative approaches and sensitive
issues, such as gross human rights violations. Due to the nature of the
matter and the personal involvement in the issue of human rights by the
persons who helpfully offered me their time and assistance, I had no
problems at all gaining the information I was seeking. On ly time limits
prevented me from fully exploring all the sources avaIlable.
1.8 The structure of the analysis
Following this introduction aimed at theoretical and conceptual clarification,
the analysis of the Chilean and Argentinean ultimate transitions to
democracy is divided into four chapters. Because - as will be argued
throughout this study - gross human rights violations was one of the
principal reasons for civil society' s mobilization against military leadership;
further remaining a salient issue for elite negotiation in the transfer to
democratic rule; and moreover constituting the greatest potential for
authoritarian revers al after the reintroduction of democratic government,
this central core around which the analysis is structured receives detailed
treatment in Chapter 2.
After the "scene of repression" is set, Chapter 3 offers an in-depth
comparative analysis of the Chile an and Argentinean transition processes.
i.e. from the moment of political opening till the formal reintroduction of
democratic government. Focusing primarilyon the elite-actors and their
choices and alliances, the aim is to test Karl and Schmitter hypothesis that
different modes of transition lead to different outcomes. Is it so that regime
collapse is the type of transition most conducive to a fuller and less
restricted political democracy?
U sing the immediate political outcome of the two transition as a point of
departure, Chapter 4 will proceed to analyze the consolidation of
democracy, covering mainly the period from 1983-1989 for Argentina and
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from 1990- 1 994 for Chile. How did the democratically elected presidents
deal with the legacy of past human rights violations, what were the
reactions to their policies, and how did this affect the proeess of democratie
consolidation? Is it true that the mode of transition determines the prospects
for democratic consolidation? Jf not, one has to turn from elite negotiations
and search for other explanatory factors. That will be the task of the fifth
and final chapter.
Chapter 5 introduces some alternative perspectives on democratie
transition and consolidation by shifting the focus over to ei vil society' s role
in these proeesses of political change. How may one account for the
paradoxical outcomes of the Chilean and Argentinean transitions ? The
analysis of the role of human rights organizations and two other civil-
society actors, the Catholic Church and the political parties, has been
reserved for the end because it makes the discussion more structured, ties
it together time-wise, and brings us back to the note on which the whole
discussion starts: the relevance of the issue of human rights violations in
the transition to democracy. Finally, some concluding remarks will be made
on the empirical findings in relation to the theoretical perspectives
constituting the departure for the analysis.
When turning to the context surrounding the establishment of the Chilean
and Argentinean authoritarian regimes and the scheme of terror embarked
upon in an effort to institutionalize a wholly different kind of economic and
social model, the following questions should be borne in mind: how did the
implementation of the national security doctrine affect the position of the
mentioned civil society actors? To what extent did the systematic use of
human rights violations man age to break down the structures of civil
society, and to what degree have the same violations constituted a source
for solidarity and united action against the government?
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2. Gross human rights violations: A
central issue in democratie transition
2.1 Why study gross human rights violations?
There are two main issues which provoked mass-reaction under military
rule in Chile and Argentina, precipitating the splits within the military ranks
and eventually leading to the downfall of the dictatorial regimes: massive
human rights violations and, particularly in the case of Argentina, economic
mismanagement. The principal justification for placing the focus primarily,
but not exclusively, on the issue of gross human rights violations when
studying the transitions to and the consolidation of democracy of these two
countries is that it has been the main topic for civil-military conflict from
the very onset of military rule up to the present, affecting the actions of
elites and ei vil society actors alike. First, repression spurred civil society
in to action against the military governments, thus marking the onset of the
transitions and forcing the military incumbents to make concession to the
pressure for widened democratization. Due to the persistent work of the
human rights movement, the issue of human rights violations remained a
rallying point for all opposition activity against the military regimes all
throughout the transition proeess. Secondly, the issue was a prominent topic
for elite negotiation at the time of transfer of power, leaving behind a series
of constitutional, judicial, and political restraints on the new democratically
elected governments. Lastly, the legacy of past gross human rights
violations has constituted a main obstacle to democratie consolidation in the
two countries.
That the question of human rights violations has had a profound
influence on democratie stability and consolidation in both Chile and
Argentina may better be understood by considering the extensiveness of the
impact of repression on the two societies. The officially recognized figures
for deaths due to gross human rights violations during the last dictatorship
in Chile are around 3,000; for Argentina, the figures are close to 10,000.
Leaving all disputes of the "real" numbers aside, these figures indicate that
~
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large sectors of the two societies were affected by repression. 1 The
magnitude of the figures also suggests that it is not likely that the deaths
were due to arbitrary or unsystematic violence.
The overall objective of this chapter is twofold, namely to explore the
issue of gross human rights violation as a contextual and explanatory
variable. Contextual in the sense that it sets the scene of repression serving
as a backdrop to the empirical analysis to follow in the ensuing chapters;
explanatory in the sense that human rights violations provoked reactions in
civil society which to a substantial extent explains the onset of the
transition in both countries, as well as the difference in outcome of
democratic consolidation.
Because the differences between the Chilean and Argentinean "maps" of
repression partly account for the variation in organized response, an effort
has been made to show how these differences may be attributed to the pre-
coup context and military traditions of the two countries. It is essential to
comprehend the crises of 1973 and 1976 in order to understand the genesis
of subsequent human rights violations and the political development that
followed. By directing the attention to the rationale or ideology dominating
the military forces at the time of the coups, the cases will also be placed
in a larger international context.
2.2 The geopolitical context and the national security
doctrine
The latest military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina are located within
the same historical framework; that of the Cold War. The coups of 1973
and 1976 took place in an international context of general anti-communism
following the Cuban Revolution in 1959. In the wake of the Revolution,
Marxist ideas spre ad all over the Latin American continent. Not only did
the United States live in constant fear of such anti-capitalist ideas gaining
a stronghold in its so-called backyard. Also, the growing strength of
Marxist-oriented political parties and more unorthodox militant left-wing
groups worried many national right-wing governments, and the military in
particular. One should not forget that the military in Latin America on the
whole have hel d a much more central position in politics than have their
Exact numbers for human rights violations are invariably open to dispute. It is extremely
difficult to quantify repression as it deals basically with qualitative phenomena affecting
the personal dignity or life of a human being. On the subject of problems involved in
quantification, see Orellana 1992.
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European counterparts. Right-wing governments have more often than not
been backed by the military , and the practice of military interventionism
holds long traditions on the Latin American continent. The national security
doctrine was launched by the right as a new strategy of political violence
to combat the perceived threat of Marxist and Socialist ideas.2 In the words
of the Chilean lawyer and human rights activist, José Zalaquett,
In its essentials, the national security doctrine regards domestic political
struggles as an expression of a basic East-West conflict and sees Marxist
penetration and insurgency as an all-pervading presence of a new type of
enemy fighting a new type of war. Civilans are also warriors, ideas a
different form of weapon. Democracy and politics cannot lead the fight
against Marxism (indeed, they often pave the way). Neither can they
coordinate all national resources effectively so as to achieve
modemization and economic development, pilars of a modem notion of
national security. It is the professionals of national security - the military
- who can ensure that both objectives are achieved, and this can only be
done by controlling the power of the state. Since the war on Marxism is
an insidious one, unorthodox methods are called for, inc1uding torture and
extermination of irredeemable political activists (Zalaquett 1985: 18-19).
From the above quote we may deduce that Marxism is the principal enemy
of the state, both in terms of ideology and as an alternative economic
mod eL. Furthermore, it is the duty of the armed forces to protect the state
and the nation against such enemies, as well as to introduce an economic
model which makes society impermeable to the doctrine of Marxism. The
national security doctrine was explicitly developed in Brazil at the Escuela
de Guerra (War School) by the military after the overthrow of the populist
government of J oao Goulart in 1964, although the antecedents date back to
1954 with La Declaración de Caracas (The Caracas Declaration). The
Brazilian military's adoption of systematic repression from 1968 onwards
introduced a new trend in Latin American military dictatorships in that it
assigned a new and important role to the military in what was formerly
considered the sphere of civilian polities. In short, the Brazilian military did
not see itself as an interim government. It presented, on the one hand, long-
term goals for national policy and a model for economic development, and,
on the other hand, a strategy to fight leftist opposition and align itself with
the West. Thus, the national security doctrine was developed by the military
to giv e ideological justification for its own role in society. The security of
2 Accordingly, those Latin American military governments takng an anti-communist
stance were likely to be supported, directly or indirectly, by the USA.
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the state was placed before the security of the individuaL. The doctrine was
formulated to justify military intervention in civilian politics on the grounds
that the military were to protect the "national security" of the country when
the country was "threatened". It is a circular definition in that the army
decided both what the content of national security was to be at any time,
and also when the country' s security was threatened and hence needed the
military' s protection. This new ideological and political alternative to
democracy embodied in the doctrine of national security gave the military
regimes in the Southern Cone a sense of mission and stature.
In sum, the doctrine of national security launched a two-sided attack. On
the individuallevel, it propagated the extermination of all opposition and
installing fear to prevent the recruitment of new opposition.3 On the
institutionallevel, it sought to eliminate all those structures of civil society
through which oppositional voices could be formulated, and simultaneously
make the population unreceptive to Communist ideas through enabling them
to enjoy the benefits of new economic policies. This second goal could
only be reached by the military taking full controlover the state by
destroying existing social and economic structures. In the following
paragraphs the concrete effects of the adoption of this doctrine in Chile and
Argentina will be examined by specifically exploring the mechanisms
contributing to massive gross human rights violations.
2.3 The national contexts
The national context of Chile and Argentina at the moment of military take-
over may be summed up in two words: political and economic crises. This
was a situation prevailing over much of the Latin American continent.
However, most scholars discard the "contagion" effect as the principal
reason for the serial overthrows of democratically elected governments in
the 1960s and 1970s. Explanatory factors for the coups should be sought
for in the national, rather than the international context. This is not to say
that the international climate did not have a profound and visible impact on
national political and economical situations, as it undoubtedly provided an
outer framework for the formation of intern al policies. The adoption of the
national security doctrine by the armed forces in Chile and Argentina, for
3 This involved uprooting all opposition, including also the destruction of any recruitment
ground for potential subversive elements; the so-called "cancer theory" (Dealey 1985).
A prevailing opinion within the military - although rarely officially stated - was that it
is legitimate to employ unorthodox methods, such as torture and extermination of
political activists.
35
_ ____i.:~,A"'.C.'~,:_:...~..,-".'f;6'
instance, was a direct response to the prevailing climate of increasing
ideological and political polarization accompanied by a severe economic
crisis in both countries prior to the coups. On the national leve!, an
ideologization of political parties and movements had taken place,
favouring complete models of society and lea ving little room for
compromise. The left-wing side of the spectrum was occupied by militant
groups. As a counterweight to the Marxist-inspired economic ideas
professed by these groups, the popularity of the neo-liberal model, inspired
by the Milton Friedman school in the United States, had risen sharly
across the continent, reaching also the Southern Cone. This economic
model was also introduced to Chile and Argentina by the military
governments in the hope of ending the prevailing chaotic economic
situation. In order to be successful, the model required a comprehensive
restructuring of society, made possible only through the demolition of many
existing political and social structures. Massive human rights abuses was
a regrettable, but necessary, price the authoritarian governments had to pay
in order to bring about the desired changes. Giving a thorough account of
the factors facilitating military intervention in civilian politics in Chile and
Argentina in the 1970s is the not the task of this study. It may nevertheless
be useful to take a brief look at the national pre-coup contexts in order to
gain a better understanding of what drove the military into adopting their
policies of brutal repression.
2.3.1 Chile
In Chile the growing acceptance of socialist ideas came mainly in response
to a crisis of confidence in the model of capitalist development in the late
1960s, accompanied by an increasing political polarization. In fact, the
attraetion of the Marxist Left in Chile was unusually strong in the Latin
American context. The most extreme left-wing party was el Movimiento de
la Izquierda Revolutionaria, MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left),
which had early adopted the ide a of confrontation in the wake of the Cuban
Revolution.4 The organizations of the Left united around Unidad Popular,
UP (Popular Unit y Coalition) as the political centre witnessed an erosion.
Some of the UP parties, such as the Socialist Party, the Movimiento de
Acción Unificada, MAPU (Movement for Unified Popular Action), and the
4 MIR started of as a Che Guevara-inspired movement which later gave way to the
foundation of a formal political party. Although MIR occupied the extreme end of the
Chilean political spectrum in the 1970s, it is not as extreme left-wing as for example the
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru.
36
Izquierda Cristiana, IC (Christian Left), adopted a similar posture to that
of MIR. However, the ide a of revolutionary struggle as a strategy was
discarded by other UP parties, such as the Partido Communista, PC
(Communist Party), the MAPU Obrero Campesino, and the majority of the
Partido Radical, PR (Radical Party), as well as the President himself.
Salvador Allende ' s success in the presidential elections in 1970 introduced
a socialist economic experiment, which partly due to governmental
mismanagement and partly due to intense, however carefully concealed,
pressure from the U.S. government led to economic chaos, spurring a wave
of political chaos and violence.5 The failure of the UP government' s
socialist experiment led the country "from partial to total crisis" (Garretón
1986a: 97). The economic chaos accompanied by a fair measure of
increasing violence and the growing abandonment of democratic values by
the middle classes and the political centre made possible the military
intervention in September 1973.
Chilean society now faced a crisis on severalleveIs: profound capitalist
decomposition and political polarization as the middle classes underwent a
process of fascistization (Garretón 1986a: 98), resulting in the regime's
general loss of legitimacy. Some smaller right-wing groups, like Tacna and
Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty), had openly called for a military
coup. The military interruption in civilian politics was initially welcomed
by many segments of the Chile an society, including the political centre
dominated by the Christian Democrats, and the economically dominant
sectors, represented by the parties of the Right. An alliance between the
armed forces (submitted to the increasingly personalized hierarchial
leadership of Pinochet) and the technocratic group in charge of the state's
economy, known as the "economic team" or the "Chicago Boys", formed
a hegemonic nucleus gaining control of the state, which remained intact till
5 It should be noted that Salvador Allende won the three candidate national elections race
in 1970 by a marginal vote; 36.3 per cent of the total as opposed to the Right-wing
candidate Jorge Alessandri's 34.9 per cent, and Christian Democrat candidate Radomiro
Tomic's 27.8 per cent. In other words, the Left only enjoyed the support of a third of
the voting population at the time of the election, and as the political and economic crises
deepened, much of the initial support was turned to outright opposition, facilitating the
delegitimation of the government. For a historical account of Chile in general, and the
run-up to the 1970 election and following political failure of the socialist experiment in
particular, see Alexander 1978. Consult Bitar 1986 for an in-depth analysis of the
economic aspects of the Allende government.
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1981.6 Initially, the military did not plan to stay in power, as it declared
that it assumed power "only for the time demanded by circumstances, with
the patriotic commtment of restoring Chileannes, justiee and the ruptured
institutionality" (Summary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Report 1992: 30). Their political project was at the outset simply to
overthrow the Popular Unit y regime and restore politicalorder. However,
in March 1974, the military published a manifesto in which they affirmed
that the regime did not intend to be "a parenthesis between the destruction
of one democracy and the restoration of another" (Garetón 1986a: 107).
The issuing of Actas Constitucionales (provisional constitutional guidelines )
in September 1976 was an attempt at making the military regime permanent
by giving the military junta constitutional status and legalize their
repressive operations. The ideology of the national security doctrine was
now clearly predominant. The material and social reorganization of the
country came later. In asense, one may say that the national security
doctrine was not explicitly formulated at the time of military take-over in
Chile, although the ide as embodied in the doctrine prevailed in military
thinking. Nobody, however, was aware that this break in the country's more
than 150 year democratic tradition would lead to the horrors of a
dictatorship which was to last for seventeen years.7
2.3.2 Argentina
Similar to the Chilean situation three years earlier, the Argentinean coup
against the increasingly unpopular government of President Isabel Martínez
Perón in 1976 was a direct response to a domestie situation characterized
by a continuous deterioration in the economy and a dramatie upsurge in
6 This gro up of technocrats were followers of the doctrine of Milton Friedman and of the
Chicago School of Economics. The essence of this economic doctrine was that economic
freedom is the only solid basis for political freedom. The Chicago Boys were charged
with the state's management of the economy, aiming at replacing the economic model
of import-substituting industrialization prevailing during the Allende regime by a "new
model of outward development" (Garretón 1986a: 102). The monetarist economic
experiment of the Chicago Boys collapsed in 1982. For a detailed account of their
workings, successes, and failures, see Borzutsky 1987; Foxley 1986; Garretón 1986a;
Remmer 1991; E. Silva 1993; P. Silva 1991; and Vergara 1986.
7 Chile had enjoyed a virtually unbroken tradition of political democracy between 1830-
1973, only interrupted by the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez in the 1924-1932 period,
which ended with a total breakdown of military discipline, moral, and prestige (Remmer
1991: 122). For a thorough analysis of the factors leading to the 1973 military coup in
Chile, see Garretón 1986; Remmer 1991; and Valenzuela 1989.
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violence. The 1976 coup was due to economic mismanagement; a non-
flattering characteristic of alternating civilian and military governments
dating as far back as the 1930s.8 The climate of political violence was in
part caused by the radical guerilla movements composed of the Ejército
Revolucionario del Pueblo, ERP (People's Revolutionary Army) and three
Peronist groups: Montoneros (a radical offspring of the Peronist sector,
mostly militant Catholics)9; the Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas, FAP
(Peronist Armed Forces); and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, FAR
(Revolutionary Armed Forces) on the one hand, and on the other hand by
the state intelligence service known as the Triple A (Alianza Anti-
communista Argentina), under Isabel Martínez Perón's command. The
Triple A, characterized by Iain Guest as a "right-wing peronist death squad"
(Guest 1990: 18), was believed to be organized by Perón's minister of
social welfare, J osé Lopez Rega, in retaliation to guerrilla-sponsored
activity, which had the military as its main target. During the period 1970-
72, the Montoneros , who quickly absorbed the other Peronist guerrilla
groups, staged several terrorist actions with the aim of pressing the
government to legalize Peronism. This succeeded with the return of Perón
from his exile in 1972. The Montoneros, with their "highly authoritarian
8 The cycle of military coups began in Argentina with the overthrow of President Hipólito
Yrigoyen by General José Uriburu in 1930. Uriburu stayed in power only for one year
before civilian rule was restored. The next coup, masterminded by Juán Perón, took
place in 1943 against President Ramon Castilo. Perón was elected President in 1946,
reelected in 1951, and overthrown in 1955. The next civilian President, Arturo Frondizi,
served for four years before he was overthrown in 1962. In 1963 a new civilian
government was restored under President Arturo Ilia, only to be ousted out of office by
General Juan Carlos Onganía in 1966. A hard-line Marxist, Onganía's government was
the first in Argentine history to adhere to the doctrine of national security. Returning
from exile, Perón was elected to his third term as President in 1973. On his death 1 July
1974, he was succeeded by his third wife, MarÍa Estela (Isabel) Martínez de Perón
(Guest 1990: 449-50).
9 The Montoneros named themselves after guerrilas who had specialized fighting the
Spanish from horseback. Their first public move was to kidnap and murder General
Pedro Aramburu, a former President, on 29 May 1970. Throughout the next couple of
years the Montoneros stag ed a series of terrorist actions, financing their operations by
bank robberies, blackmail etc. The activity of this left-wing guerrlla group was a main
reason for the government allowing the Peronist Party, long banned, to participate in the
1973 elections, which resulted in the reelection of Perón after Balbín steeped down
(Guest 1990). The ERP was a multi-ideological dominantly Marxist, organization
comprised of various left-wing ideologies, founded at the Fifth National Congress of the
Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRT; a Trotskyite party) in June 1970. The Montoneros
wanted a socialist state through revolution and civIl war.
39
command structure", largely refrained from terrorism while Juán Perón was
in power, but resumed their activity after Perón's death on 1 July 1974
(Rock 1993: 217). The political situation became increasingly chaotic. The
Triple A launched their attacks in retaliation to the activities of the left-
wing guerrillas, starting on 21 November 1973 with the murder of Hipólito
Solari y rigoyen, a deputy of the Radical Party and a nephew of the former
President. The Triple A is believed to be responsible for 19 murders in
1973; a figure ris ing to 549 for the three first months of 1976 alone (Guest
1990: 20).10 Although the Montoneros and the ERP together at any one
time mustered no more than seven hundred combatants, they enjoyed
widespread popularity, and succeeded in spreading terror in Argentine
society. 
l lIsabel Perón declared a state of emergency at the end of 1974,
passed several anti-terrorist laws and tried to combat terrorism by using the
army.
By the beginning of 1976, left-wing terrorism had been greatly surpassed
by right-wing terrorism. The military justification for intervention on the
grounds that they had to wipe out left-wing "subversion" was accordingly
rather weak. 12 However, the military attacked the Casa Rosada (the
presidential palace) on 24 March 1976 under the pretext of restoring order
and creating conditions favourable to the reintroduction of civil
government. As this was the sixth in a series of military coups that had
alternated with civilian governments since the first coup against the Uriburu
government in 1930, the military had acquired an image as a democratic
force in many people's minds. However, it soon became clear that the
military junta taking over in 1976 was to employ massive repression in
their efforts to create order and introduce a new economic model.
The Argentine military had already towards late 1975, i.e. prior to
staging the coup against the government of Isabel Perón, sworn a formal
pledge to the national security doctrine and agreed on the tactic of
disappearances to strike terror in the population and to prevent the
guerrillas from gaining popular support (Rock 1993: 224). This may best
be seen as the culmination of the development of ideas which had emerged
in Argentina already in the early 1960s. The fundamental ide as of the
10 The numberof disappearances recorded by CONADEP were 19 in 1973, 50 in 1974,
359 in 1975, and 549 in the three first months of 1976. In the previous five years 687
people were reported dead as result ofleft-wing terrorism (Guest 1990: 454, Note 34).
11 The figures are estimates given by Emilio Mignone, cited in Guest (1990: 19).
12 The number of "subversive actions" fell from 520 in September 1974 to 22 in January
1976 (Guest 1990: 20).
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national security doctrine had been publicly advocated by the military
strategist, GeneralOsiris G. Villegas, who proposed the concept of
"permanent war" as early as 1963 (Rock 1993: 196).13 The 1966 military
regime under the fanatically right-wing Catholic Juan Carlos Onganía has
in fact been characterized as the first national security regime in Argentina,
where the military were taught to believe that the threat posed to Argentina
by subversive internal enemies was greater than that of external foes.14
Guest explains the domination of the armed forces over that of the navy
and air force on these grounds (Guest 1990: 16). The traditional isolation
of the Argentine military from the rest of society also contributed to their
self-perception of being superior to civilian politicians in deciding what was
in the interest of their country, which was also true for the Chile an military.
In Argentina there was yet another factor contributing to the ferocity
employed in the eradication of subversion: the long-standing hate between
the armed forces and the Peronists (rather a paradox given the fact that
Perón himself started his career by actively participating in the military
coup in 1943), and the obsession to keep Perón out of politics before his
return to power in 1971 (Guest 1990: 17).
2.3.3 A comparison of Chile and Argentina
Due to the timing of the Chile an and Argentinean coups, the international
pre-coup con text was basically similar. The national contexts had in
common a high degree of economic chaos and political instability, but were
otherwise distinct in several ways. The extent of pre-coup violence in
Argentina was far greater than that in Chile, mainly due to extensive left-
and right-wing guerrilla activity resulting from the Peronist/anti-Peronist
struggle. Moreover, Argentina had the basic ideas of the national security
doctrine firmly incorporated into its military thinking well before the 1976
13 According to Emilio Mignone, the doctrine was imposed from outside by the United
States (Guest 1990: 16). David Rock on his part argues that the adoption of these ideas
by the Argentine military has to be understood on the background of the struggle
between the coloradas (milItary hard-lIners advocating perpetual military rule) and the
azules (military soft-liners initially favouring civilIan rule), both virulently anti-Peronist,
and fighting each other after Perón was overthrown in 1955. Rock sustains that the roots
of the doctrine of national security may be traced as much to the French influence over
Argentine military coloradas after 1957, as to the U.S. influence over Argentine military
azules replacing the French presence after 1966 (Rock 1993: 195-96).
14 For an account of the impact of the national security doctrine in Argentina during the
period 1963-66, see O'Donnell 1986; and Rock 1993.
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coup, contras ting with Chile, where the imperatives of the doctrine were
implemented basically after the coup had taken placeo Furthermore, the
cyc1ical pattern of regime changes in Argentina stands in stark contrast to
Chile's long tradition of democratic stability. The 1976 coup in Argentina
differed from earlier coups in that the military intended to remain in power,
based on the ideas in the national security doctrine. In Chile, the entrance
of the military on the scene in 1973 was to mark the prolonged interruption
of civilian polities. The gradual adoption of the national security doctrine
gave the Chilean military a new sense of mission, whose rule proved to be
more efficient and long-lived than that of the Argentine military juntas.
These factors together would later come to influence the type of repression
under the military governments, albeit the repression was legitimized by the
same kind of ideology, embedded in the doctrine of national security.
2.4 A general map of repression: Chile
In order to put the following discussion into perspective, I will start by
giving a quantitative picture of the overall repression in Chile during the
years 1973-89:
Table 1
The pyramid of repression: gross human rights violations in Chile
(1973-1989)
Violation
Disappeared
Executed
Tortureda)
Exiledb)
House-searching
Threats
Detentions
Persons
999
2,456
114,000
247,000
483,000
2,106,000
3,253,000
Source: Orellana 1992 and 1993.
a) These figures are specified in Orellana' s unpublished paper La Represión Política en
Chile 1973-1989 (1992: 87). b) Estimates of exiled range from 352 (figures recognized
officially by the military government representative Carlos Varas) to 1,675,558 persons,
reported by INCAMI (Orellana 1992: 220-21). The figures in this thesis, based on official
governmental documentation as well as documentation from various human rights
organizations, are slightly lower than those presented in Orellana' s above mentioned paper
(Orellana 1992: 249), and may be assumed to be relatively dose to the actual number of
exiled.
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The pyramid of repression indicates that literally millions of Chileans
were affected.15 According to the ideology outlined in previous
paragraphs, repression was one of the weapons used in the battle against
Marxism to fulfil the dual aims of eliminating subversion and breaking
down all social structures. Both were a link in the strategy of introducing
a new economic model and creating a new constitutional framework. These
dual aims were implemented simultaneously in Chile by means of
individual and institutional repression. The aim of eliminating all opposition
seemed clear enough from the very day of the coup. Broadly speaking, the
war against subversion in Chile was fought in two parts, first against the
Communists (MIR and PC), then against the Socialists (PS). The intensity
of the repression can further be divided into three periods: September-
December 1973, covering the period of institutionalization of the military
government; 1974-1977, covering the DINA period; and 1977-1990, what
we may refer to as the transition period.
2.4.1 September - December 1973: Institutionalization of the
military regime
Repression in Chile went hand-in-hand with the institutionalization of the
military regime. The newly established Junta started its rule by declaring
that it had assumed the exercise of the executive and legislative power. 16
15 The figures are from an unpublished paper by Patricio Orellana, written in Santiago in
June 1993. The figures are based on information from all the Chilean NGOs, as well as
indirect information obtained from Carabineros, Investigaciones, and INE. The victims
are classified according to the definitions given by Red de Informática de Instituciones
de Dereehos Humanos de Chile (FASIC 1991). It should be noted that the same person
may appear more than once in the figures if the person suffered several types of
violations in sequence, or suffered repeated violations over a period of time. The figures
should therefore be treated as estimates, not as absolute values.
16 The Junta as an entity held these powers until June 1974, when the executive power was
transferred to the President of the Government Junta; the Supreme Chief of the Nation.
The position was shortly converted into the President of the Republic of Chile, fusing
the position as head of the Armed Forces and President of the nation into one office. The
most powerful political office in the history of Chile was held by General Augusto
Pinochet. As a result, the military regime ceased to be the direct responsibility of the
Armed Forces and the Police as an entity as they became accountable to the President
of the Republic-Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
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On 11 September 1973, a State of Siege17 was declared throughout the
country, upon which the National Congress and the Constitutional Tribunal
were dissolved; heavy censorship on media and institutions of higher
education was imposed; trade unions were banned; all political parties,
groups, or movements of the Left professing the idea of Marxism were
dissolved and dec1ared illegal; and those political parties, groups, and
movements not belonging to the first category were first declared to be in
recess and later dissolved. Election rolls were cancelled; elected Mayors
and Aldermen were replaced by junta-appointees. Obviously, this repression
on the institutionallevel involved the violation of a series of political and
civil rights, such as freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. Broad
powers were given to the intelligence services of the Armed Forces and the
Police, especially in the provinces. The only democratic institution which
remained largely untouched and kept its apparent autonomy was the
Judicial Power. Given that the majority of members of the Supreme Court
sympathized with the new regime, it was unneeessary for the Junta to
control the Judiciary (Summary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Report 1992: 24). Moreover, since the Judiciary is basically a reactive
institution handling the cases brought up before it, it had little opportunity
to interfere in the scheme of repression that was implemented immediately
after the coup. Due to cumbersome speciallegislation and a general scarcity
of resources - lack of police cooperation in particular - and partly due to
the biased role of the Judiciary, legal rights, such as the right to due
proeess, were not protected.18 As will be seen later, the human rights
activists organized primarily in response to the judicial system' s inaptness
L 7 In the Latin American context the term state of siege (estado de sitio) is usually
considered equivalent to a state of war. A state of siege differs from a state of
emergency by being more grave in that the right to legal procedings is suspended in
addition to the suspension of the right to habeas corpus. Generally, militar authorities
take over normal civil powers, and civil and political rights are restricted during both.
According to the Informe Rettig, Chile was, with very brief exceptions, under either a
state of emergency or a state of siege in the period from 11 March 1981 to 27 August
1988. Law no. 18.415 of June 1985 systematized the states of emergency.
18 For example, out of the 1312 denouncements of torture made by the Vicaría between
June 1978 and December 1989, not one case led to conviction (Orellana 1992: 70).
During this period Vicaría also presented 8,906 petitions of "habeas corpus" (based on
cases of detention) to the courts. The courts accepted only 30 of the petitions (Apsi, No.
380, March 1991, p.12). For an account and criticism of the role of the courts martial
and the civilian courts during the authoritarian regime, see Summa ry of the Truth and
Reconcilation Commission Report (1992: 35-40).
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to provide legal protection for the victims of gross human rights violations,
thus giving birth to the human rights movement.
Repression directed at individuals was at its highest during the three first
months following the coup, when the military was trying to root out all
opposition or "subversion" while simultaneously consolidating its power.
At the outset, repression seemed largely unorganized and arbitrary, but it
rapidly gained a well-planned and systematic character. During the first few
days after the coup, thousands of people were rounded up in the streets and
gathered in public places. Although it was a relatively bloodless coup and
armed resistance to the new power-holders was sporadic, there were several
confrontations between civilians and armed police, mainly in the capital,
causing several deaths.19 Wide-scale detention and imprisonment took
place all over the country. Due to inadequate facilities, places unorthorized
to receive prisoners, such as Army baracks, ships, sports stadiums and
other places, also served as provisionary prisons.
Most of the prisoners suffered various forms of torture; a widespread
practice referred to as the "master key" or "vertebral column" of repression,
occurring throughout the dictatorship (Orellana 1992: 17,80). This practice
was legally facilitated by the passing of Decree Law 3168, which permitted
the military to keep a person incommunicado for 20 days, thus leaving
sufficient time for both torture and the recovery of physical wounds in
cases where the prisoner was later released. Poor registration practices and
the nature of torture itself makes it difficult to exactly determine how many
suffered from torture, and estimates vary considerably.20 It is assumed that
roughly 80-90 per cent of those detained during the three first months were
subjected to some form of torture at some point. This period was
characterized by extensive, massive and indiscriminate practice of torture,
19 These are listed in the Informe Rettig as deaths due to "violations of human rights
perpetrated by private citizens under a political pretext" , subclassified as deaths due to
political violence and deaths during confrontations, referring principally to uniformed
personneI kiled in armed confrontations on the day of the coup and the days
immediately afterwards. Strictly speaking, these kind of deaths fall outside the limits of
our definition of gross human rights violations. The majority of victims "perpetrated by
private citizens under political pretext" (a total of 30 victims in the entire country for the
period 11 September-31 December 1973) were killed on the day of the coup and the
days immediately following. The figures are taken from the Summa ry of the Truth and
Reconcilation Commission Report (1992: 58).
20 For the problems involved in the registration of torture and details regarding Orellana' s
estimates of 114,000, see Orellana (1992: 80-87).
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caried out by Armed Forces groups or civilian groups at their service.21
Torture was carried out individually, in groups, in isolation, or in the
presence of relatives. The long list of types of torture shows a shrewd sense
of inventionism on the part of the torturers. Methods were developed and
perfected by the intelligenee services to avoid leaving traces on the body.
Testimonies from tortured victims show that many of them were given
good food and medical care for weeks or months before being set free, in
order to heal the wounds and scars.
Primarily, torture was a method applied to extract information from the
detained. Asecond objective was to break down the physical and moral
courage of the prisoner, and a third to scare eyewitnesses or other people,
like family members, who heard about the torture. There were also cases
where pure sadism was the only apparent reason. In these cases the
treatment was considered "cruel, inhuman, and degrading" (Sieghart 1985;
Donnelly 1986).
The majority of prisoners were released after shorter or longer periods of
imprisonment and torture. Those who were not, constitute the large bulk of
deaths and disappearances in Chile which took place in the three months
following the coup. The practice of detained-disappearance was a method
employed by the state to elude responsibility and manifest the extreme
imbalance of power between itself and the individuaL. The majority of
deaths and disappearances following detention were actions carried out
against people having close affiliations with the Allende regime, such as
high-ranking and mid-level officials, politicalleaders of left-wing parties
and militant activists. Non-militant sympathizers with the deposed Allende
government formed another main-target group. In addition, people were
killed for alleged criminal activity, or die d from excessive use of force. The
procedures involved in the killings ranged from supposedly courts martial
(believed to be just an excuse for illegal execution), shooting (single or
multiple shots in the head or the back), stabbing by knife etc. According to
the findings of Informe Rettig, none of the accused and sentences in courts
martial in 1973 enjoyed the rights to due process (Summary of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission Report 1992: 48). In about five per cent of
21 More refined torture methods included widespread practices of various forms of sexual
torture; application of electric shock to sensitive parts of the prisoner' s body; pro longe d
exposure to extreme heat, cold, isolation, or total darkness; deprivation of medical care,
food, sanitary facilities etc.; submersion in water, foul-smelling liquids, excrement, and
the like; prolonged painful postures, such as the paude arará (paITot s perch; whereby
the detainee is hung by wrists and ankles which are tied behind his back); simulated
executions, and so on.
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the cases, the so-called Ley de fuga or Law of escape was employed,
whereby prisoners were executed on the pretext that they had tried to flee.
Dead bodies were disposed of in rivers; dropped from helicopters into the
sea; contained in secret mass graves; buried in cemeteries marked NN; or
simply left in the street. 22 In the latter case the bodies were frequently
mutilated beyond recognition.
There was a further intensification in the repression after the forerunner
of DINA, the "DINA Commission", was formally set up by the military
government in November 1973. This was an intelligenee organization
firmly commtted to the principles of the national security doctrine.23 This
first period of massive repression, without any great coherence or technical
coordination, directed at all militant leaders and UP government
sympathizers, was succeed by a period of more selective repression,
designed primarily to instill fear.
2.4.2 January 1974 - August 1977: the DINA period
Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, DINA (National Intelligence Direc-
torate) was created on 14 June 1974 by Decree Law No. 521 in response
to the technical requirement for the coordination and specialization of
repression. According to the decree, DINA had three main functions: to
gather all information at the nationallevel needed by the government for
the formulation of its policies; to take measures to pro mote the protection
of national security; and to take measures to foster the development of the
country (Summary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report
1992: 64). Although predominatelya government intelligenee organization,
22 The military' sinvolvement in the disappearance of people was "proved" by the
disc10sure of several mass graves containing bodies which were identified as those
registered as disappeared. The large majority of persons who were identified in the mass
graves of Lonquén, Mulchen, Laja-San Rosendo, Paine, Tocopila, Temuco, Vicuña-
Angostura, Pisagua, and Calama were people who had disappeared in 1973. After 1973,
the government took much greater care to conceal the bodies (Orellana 1992: 118).
23 The DINA had its roots in a highly cohesive group of Army majors and colonels, who
began to act in the Military School from 11 September 1973. In November 1973, they
became the "DINA Commission", and finally, in lune 1974, all the intellgence forces
of the Armed Forces were united into DINA. The core group had from the start been
commtted to the principles of the doctrine of national security and assigned itself to the
liquidation of the extreme Left, its principle targets being MIRists. After 1974, the DINA
was given the formal power to carry out searches and arrests through secret artic1es
incorporated in the same decree that created it.
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DINA was also actively engaged in the repression of perceived political
enemies. DINA was formally controlled by the Government Junta, but in
practice it answered only to the Presidency of the Government Junta, and
later to the President of the Republic. The years during which the DINA
operated was the period in which the method of forced disappearance of
persons was officially established. This was closely linked to the practice
of selective and technical torture, which is presumed to have caused many
deaths, in spite of the frequent presence of medical personneI in order to
control how much the victim could support. According to witness reports
from surviving victims, torture was universally employed by DINA and
organizations specialized in torture (Orellana 1992: 79). Unlike the partly
chaotic couple of months immediately following the coup, the gross human
rights violations taking place in the DINA period, and specifically those of
detained-disappearances, were distinguished by a high level of central
planning and coordination. A whole range of other intelligenee services
from different branches of the Armed Forces and the Police were also
operating, first separately, and later together in the so-called Joint
Command. This was an organization created for political repression, in
which the Air Force was predominant.24 The J oint Command was in
operation from the end of 1975 until the end of 1976, mainly in Santiago,
and targeted at the repression of Communists. The intelligence was also
extended beyond the Chilean borders. In 1976 DINA took the initiative of
organizing a collaboration among the intelligence services in the Southern
Cone countries Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, setting in motion
the so-called Condor plan which aimed at the elimination of political
opponents.25
24 For details on the structure and command of the different intelligence services, see
Informe Rettig 1990.
25 Archives from this period have recently been found in Paraguay, including
documentation of both the atrocities taking place in Paraguay during the regime of
Alfredo Stroessner (1954-89) and extensive documentation on the collaboration activities
among the intellgence organs in the Southern Cone countries. These archives are
considered unique in the Latin American context in that they include documents signed
by police officers and other people directly partaking in gross human rights violations.
The Condor data nett includes all information regarding political refugees from the
dictatorships in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as well as
detailed documentation on Argentinean politicians who disappeared in Paraguay. A
peoples tribunal of Tepresentatives of a wide number of human rights organizations in
South America have asked the United Nations to send a commission to inspect the
archives and secure them for future use (Dag og Tid, No. 34, 26 August 1993).
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The great majority of victims during this period were leftist militants
(from MIR, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, MAPU, and the
Christian Left) who disappeared after their detention. Most of them were
young; many highly educated. A small percentage, estimated at roughly 4.5
per cent by the Rettig Commssion, were women, nine of them pregnant.
In 1976 the leadership of the SocIalist Party was targeted, and many more
disappeared. The practice of forced disappearances had the obvious double
motive of killing and concealing. The DINA took great pains in concealing
its actions by studying the habits of the victim prior to the abduction,
making sure there were no eyewitnesses in order to elude accountability.
During the period 1974-77, the Informe Rettig has reported 560 cases of
deaths produced by violations of human rights and by political violence
(Summa ry of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report 1992: 71).
The total figure for this three-year period is less than half of the figure
from the three first months after the coup, meaning that on the average the
repression was twenty times higher during the three first months than in the
succeeding period. Nevertheless, the number of detained-disappeared as a
percentage of the total number of victims dead from human rights abuses
increased from less than a third of the total for the period September-
December 1973 to more than eighty per cent for the period 1974-77, thus
indicating a marked shift in the military' s strategy against subversion. The
second period had on ly a handful of cases of "deaths perpetrated by private
citizens under political pretext" . 26 Instead, also in contrast to the first
period, there was a number of human rights violations resulting in death
taking place outside the borders of Chile, principally in Argentina. With the
dissolving of DINA in August 1977, yet a new pattern of repression was
initiated.
2.4.3 August 1977 - March 1990: the transition period
This period, characterized by the interaction between counter-organization
and governmental repression, may be subdivided in two parts. The first part
was distinguished by a low level of repression, followed by an upsurge in
violence after the initiation of public protest actions starting in 1983.
Human rights organizations had been active since the onset of military rule
and had succeeded in forming a coherent, well-organized movement. This
26 The Informe Rettig reports four such cases, all determined to be attributable to MIR, in
which six people died; three military, two Carabineros, and one agent of Investigaciones
(Summary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report 1992: 72).
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in turn had strengthened the political parties, which due to the massive
repression directed at its members had kept a very low profile during the
first few years after the coup. The relatively rapid decrease in repression
after 1974 gave the political parties an opportunity to fortify their damaged
structure and encouraged a gradual mobilization of civil society in general.
One of the principal reasons for change in governmental policy was
pressure from within and public outcry from abroad, principally in response
to the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washington D.C.
on 21 September 1976, in which DINA agents were believed to have been
directly involved. Public pressure forced Pinochet to dissolve DINA in July
1977. However, DINA was immediately replaced by another intelligence
service organ, the Central Nacional de Informaciones, CNI (National
Information Centre). This was a specialized military organization linked to
the government through the Ministry of the Interior, as opposed to the
DINA's direct link with the President. CNI aimed at overseeing the normal
development of national activities and maintaining the established order.
One of its tasks was to defend existing institutions. Although bearing a
different name, the new intelligence organ employed largely the same staff
and the same methods used by its predecessor, the DINA, with one notable
exception: the discontinuity in the practice of disappearances. This may be
attributed to the profound delegitimation of the military regime as aresult
of both international, including massive UN, pressure and increasing
national pressure from human rights organizations; a point which will be
discussed in more detail in the final chapter. 27
The third and last period of repression may be divided into various
stages, roughly fleshed out as follows: the CNI initially retained the same
practices as DINA the first few months after its creation. Then followed a
period (November 1977 - mid- 1 980s) of decreased repression and a radical
reduction in the numbers of disappeared as the CNI directed itself more
towards political intelligence. Encouraged by this relative relaxation of
repression, MIR returned into operation after a period of virtual inactivity.
Two new politicalleft-wing groups, Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez,
FPMR (the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front) and later the "Lautaro
Group" (offspring of MAPU), were organized. There was a wave of public
protest and demonstrations during the years 1983-85, partly in response to
repression and partly in response to an economic crisis. The CNI,
guaranteed impunity and given extended powers to combat this increased
27 The UN, supported by 81-96 countries in each case, had repeatedly condemned Chile
for its use of torture in 1975, 1976, and 1977, and were to file more complaints in 1978,
1979, 1980, and 1981 (Orellana 1992: 71).
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political "subversive" activity, retaliated by resorting to repression, which
lasted throughout the rest of the period. There was a renewal of selective
disappearances after 1981. The methods employed were Iiow of a different
character. The overwhelming majority of victims belonged to MIR, the
FPMR, and the Communist Party. People were either killed in real or
simulated confrontations, or, in a smaller number of cases, selectively
kidnapped and executed by throat-slitting or shooting. The total number of
victims has been estimated to 160 for this last period of repression during
Pinochet s regime, marking a substantial decrease in gross human rights
violations in comparison to the previous two periods. The number of
detained disappeared dropped to about a quarter of the total of victims,
approaching ratios comparable to that of the first three months, although on
a much lower scale (Summary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Report 1992).
In order to clarify the above discussion, the gross human rights violations
in the form of deaths and disappearances in Chile are summarIzed in the
below table so as to give an impression of the ratio between deaths and
disappearances within each period, and also the variation in the intensity of
repression between the three periods. It should be stressed again that the
figures vary considerably from source to source and should accordingly not
be taken as absolute values.28 The different trend of repression between
the three periods in question should, however, be clear:
+~ \k J;~ ~tM--J l',~ ~
28 Due to discrepancies between subtotals and the total figures of numbers of victims given
in the governmental report used here as a source, there are inaccuracies in this tab le. The
total figure for victims due to death, detained-disappearance, political violence, and
citizens acting under political pretext is 2,279. Excluding the two last categories, which
are left out of this table because they strictly speaking fall outside our working definition
of gross human rights violations, the number of deaths and detained-disappearances give
a total figure of 1,885 victims. Adding this figure to the number of victims of the
excluded categories (254), there is a discrepancy of 140 victims unaccounted for in the
detailed analysis of the Summary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report
(1992: 1-93).
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Sept.- Dec.
1973
Jan. 1974-
Aug. 1977
Aug. 1977-
March 1990
Table 2
Deaths and detained-disappearances in Chile 1973-1990
Length of No. of No. of det. Total no. of Victims
period deaths disappeared victims per month
753 403 1156 330
P eriod
3.5 months
119 480 599 14
43 months
97 33 130 oe1
152 months
Source: Summa ry of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (1992: 1-93).
To sum up the main trends of repression, we see that for the first period
the number of deaths is about twice as high as that for detained-
disappeared, strikingly shifting to only a quarter of the number of detained-
disappeared for the second period. The pattern is revers ed again for the last
period, tripling the predominance of deaths over disappearances. The main
conclusion to be drawn from this is that the method of detained-
disappearance was far preferred to execution in the DINA period. As
regards absolute numbers of victims, it is c1ear that repression in Chile was
at its peak right after the coup, considerably declining in the second period,
and almost levelling off in the third and last period of the dictatorship,
which also is by far the longest period in terms of time. That means that
when democracy was reintroduced in Chile in 1990, roughly seventeen
years had passed since the height of repression. As I will argue later, this
created an emotional distance to the events of repression for a large part of
the public which contributed favourably to the spirit of reconciliation. For
a year-by-year account of the cycles of repression, see Appendix B. Having
dealt with the two most grave types of gross human rights violations, it
may now be appropriate to turn to another distinctive feature of the
repression carried out in Chile under Pinochet.
2.4.4 Exile
In accordance with our definition of gross human rights violations given in
Chapter 1.6, a separate short notice is due on the violation of the human
right to live in ones country (Article 6 of the UNDHR), as it effected large
parts of the Chilean population and also had the unforeseen consequences
52
of facilitating civil society opposition.29 Exile to ok place in two waves.
Immediately after the coup this was manifested by thousands of people
seeking asylum in embassies, which played an active role in the evacuation
or smuggling out of Chilean citizens.30 Many embassies worked closely
together with local non-governmental human rights organizations (NGOs).
The second wave of exile was a direct result of government policy. Due to
the pressure from many NGOs and the international community, Pinochet
was forced to set free a number of political prisoners. A great number of
these were offered exile as an alternative to imprisonment, and were later
joined by their families abroad.31 This method was deliberately used to rid
society of troublesome elements. It was safer and cheaper than keeping
people in prison, and involved less risk than having them disappear.
Moreover, those who sought exile were portrayed as traitors living in
luxury abroad while leaving their fellow citizens behind to fight. In the
beginning, most Chileans fled to Argentina or other Latin American
countries. When the dictatorship proved itself to be long-lived and one
refuge country after another suffered military coups, increasing numbers of
Chileans were forced to flee to Europe.
The exact number of exiled people is hard to certify for at least two
reasons. Firstly, there are the difficulties involved in distinguishing between
political and economic exiles. It has been discovered that there were groups
in Chile specializing in smuggling people out of the country by providing
them with false identification papers and promising them an economically
prosperous future in Europe - in return for a great sum of money. Some of
these economic exiliados were sent back to Chile by the governments of the
countries in which they sought refuge, whereas others were accepted as
refugees for humanitarian reasons. Should they be included in the statistics
of political exiles? They did not flee for political reasons, but they have
certainly suffered the hardships of living in exile, as well as the associated
29 Estimates vary considerably. This is due both to registration problems and classification
problems. Usually, one draws a line between political and economic exiles. Based on
official registers of migration and other official statistics, Orellana has arrived on an
estimate of roughly 225,000 for political exiled and 150,000 for economic exiled. During
the period 1973-89, a minimum of 30,000 Chile ans living in exile are thought to have
returned to Chile (Orellana 1991: 249).
30 A detailed account of the role of the Norwegian embassy in Santiago in helping Chileans
and other people fearing for their lives leave the country, with references also to the
work of other European embassies, is to be found in Nilsen 1993.
31 During the period 1973-75, 777 persons were expelled in accordance with Decree Law
81 (Orellana 1992: 218).
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traumas of those who later have chosen to return to Chile; the so-called
repatriates. A further registration problem is how to quantify those living
and returning from exile. Should family members who left Chile to join
their politically exiled husband or son be counted as political refugees?
What about the children born in exile? For these as well as other reasons,
only rough estimates of those exiled and returners can be given. What we
know is that a substantial part of the Chile an population was directly or
indirectly effected by exile. Not only did it deprive the country of a large
part of its intellectual and organizational elite, but also of an able part of
its young population. Argentina faced similar problems to those of Chile,
only of a different character and on an even larger scale.
2.5 Gross human rights violations iD Argentina
The following words of a retired army general may serve as an introduction
to the political climate prevailing among the military hard-liners in
Argentina anno 1976:
First we kil all the subversives; then we kill their collaborators; then their
sympathizers; then those who are indifferent; and finally we kill all those
who are timid (Snow and Manzetti 1993: 33).32
When mapping out the broad lines of the Argentine repression, particular
emphasis will be placed on those aspects which differ from the repression
caried out in Chile. As the nature and aims of the various forms of gross
human rights violations have already been discussed in some detail,
repetition will be sought avoided.
In line with the ideology of the national security doctrine, el Proceso in
Argentina was initiated with the replacement of the constitution by the
"Statute for the Proeess of National Reorganization", published by the
military government on 31 March 1976. By this, the Junta assumed the
right to enact laws, amend the constitution at its pleasure, as well as
granting itself extensive judicial, legislative, and executive powers (Guest
32 José Zalaquett believes that this kind of statement only helped reinforce the myth about
the Argentinean repression being targeted arbitrarily at all segments of society. Zalaquett
holds the opinion that the vast majority of the victims of gross human rights violations
in Argentina were singled out by the military juntas due to involvement in opposition
activity at some leveL. The top leaders were marked for death; those less involved for
exile; and a large number of collaborators or sympathizers were imprisoned and tortured.
Information was given in an interview with the author in Santiago in July 1993.
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1990: 456, Note 11). The Junta sought to implement three basic objectives:
improvement of the economy, the elimination of subversion, and the
creation of a new institutional framework (Snow and Manzetti 1993: 31).
We shall focus on the second objective, as this is the point most directly
related to the form and type of ei vil opposition during the transitions, as
well as the sore point in civil-military relations reflected in the human
rights policies followed by the democratically elected presidents after ended
transitions.
The 1976 coup in Argentina was in many ways a continuation of the
militarization dating back to 1930. However, the officiallaunch of the First
Junta' s "war against subversion" marked a new period in Argentina' s
turbulent history, distinet from previous military regimes by the immense
increase in repression, both in scale and in brutality . This dirty war was
used as an excuse for committing gross human rights violations on a large
scale, greatly superseding pre-coup figures for violence that could be traced
to either left- or right-wing terrorism, which is believed to have caused the
death of some 1,660 people. The aim of eliminating terrorism was achieved
relatively early. The ERP ceased to function by 1978, and the Montoneros
were virtually wiped out by 1980. The official numbers of persons
assassinated by the ERP and the Montoneros declined from about 1,500 in
1976 to perhaps 700 in 1977, and to around 30 in 1978 (Snow and
Manzetti 1993). Given the relatively small number of left-wing guerrillas
and the vast number of recorded victims of gross human rights violations,
it is clear that the intensity of repression was outrageously disproportionate
to the perceived threat of "subversion". How did the military juntas actually
legitimate the onset of large-scale repression ?
The overall aim of el Proceso was to totally reorganize society by
crushing down all direct or indirect opposition to the introduction of the
neo-liberal economic modeL. The arme d forces were put in charge of the
dirty war against terrorism, in which the goal justified the means, while the
newly appointed minister of the economy, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz,
was given the tas k of reforming the Argentine economy. 33 In line with the
ideas of the national security doctrine, the model was seen as a counter-
33 A series of neo-conservative economic policies were set to work between 1976 and
1980. The first couple ofyears saw an improvement in the economy, only to be followed
by a severe economic crisis and widespread social discontent and unrest. Martínez de
Hoz was asked to leave office early in 1981. The drastic reduction in the value of the
peso is an indicator of the total flop of his economic experiment. When Martínez de Hoz
took office in 1976, there were 140 pesos to the dollar; in 1981, there were 2,300. AIso,
the cost of living in this period had increased some 18,500 per cent, and the foreign debt
had tripled. For details on the economic fiasco, see Snow and Manzetti 1993.
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balance to Marxism-Leninism, and was to be imposed on Argentinean
society, irrespective of its immediate costs. Unlike its Chile an counterparts,
the first Argentine Junta had no intentions of later handing over power to
a civilian government. Rather, it aimed at institutionalizing its power and
securing the road to true authoritarianism by establishing its own rules and
seeking new principles for legitimacy. This is probably related to the firm
anchoring of the doctrine of national security within the armed forces, as
well as to the repeated negative experience with civilian governments in the
past.
The peak of gross human rights violations in Argentina followed
immediately after the coup during the imposition and institutionalization of
the military regime, but was maintained at a high lev el during the first
couple of years, unlike Chile, where there was a sharp decline in and
change in character of repression already three months after the coup
(consult Appendix C). There was a steady decline in repression, not marked
by renewed cycles of repression, as was the case in Chile. This may be
attributed both to the shorter duration of the dictatorship, as well as to the
better organized repression from the very beginning in Argentina. The latter
forms a stark contrast to the Chilean military' s trial-and-error approach to
its perceived enemies prior to the effective installation of the DINA. There
was no Argentine equivalent to DINA, or later, the CNI. Argentina was
divided into a given number of security zones, where the various branches
of the Armed Forces, represented by high-ranking officials, were given the
command over a certain territory. This is what has led some scholars to
claim that repression was the responsibility of individuals, thereby
discarding the notion that repression was centrally planned and coordinated.
However, the magnitude and systematie character of the Argentine
repression makes it very unlikely not to have been master-minded by the
Juntas, although it may well be that the individual officers in charge of the
various geographic zones were given relatively free hands in how to
implement the objectives of the national security doctrine.
The types of violations in Argentina and the reasons for them are similar
to those of Chile, but with notable exceptions. Most importantly, the
disappearances were effected on a much larger scale and greatly
outnumbered the victims of extrajudicial executions. Secondly, the
proportion of women was much higher in Argentina than in Chile. Thirdly,
and related to the second point, was the disappearing of children; a
phenomenon unique to Argentina. These three points shall now be
examined in some more detail, as they produced different effects in the two
countries and thus conditioned variation in the response from civil society
in general, and the organization of human rights groups in p articu L ar.
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2.5.1 Detained-disappearances
Disappearance following detention constitutes the most extensive and
gravest form of gross human rights violation in Argentina. Cases of
detained-disappeared were known in the country long before the military
coup in 1976,34 but this type of repression was practised with
unprecedented ferocity under the military juntas governing after 1976.
Nobody knows for sure how many families were affected, how many
bodies were dumped into rivers or the sea, or how many civilians were
disposed of in mass graves. A large number of such graves have been
excavated in the course of the past decade. The biggest graves have been
found to hold up to 200 bodies, including those of several children. Only
a small percentage of the bodies have been identified.
Exile and execution were presumably used on a much smaller scale then
in Chile.35 Themain reason for this is believed to be the lessons learnt
from Chile. The Argentine generals avoided carrying out massive public
roundups, which in Chile had attracted the attention of foreign journalists
and left its government open to international criticism. Also, the Argentine
Junta did not send thousands into exile, thus avoiding one basis for well-
organized opposition abroad which might have drawn unwanted inter-
national attention. In stead, the Junta employed the tactic of detained-
disappearance from the first day of the coup. The figures climbed to over
4,000 for 1976 alone. The effects were several. This massive attack on
private individuals paralysed all opposition and resulted in widespread fear.
At the beginning, those affected supposed that the victims were imprisoned
and would soon be released. The families therefore refrained from
34 Only the year before the coup, under the government of Isabel Perón, the operation
Independencia carried out against the armed guerrilas in the province of Tucumán
resulted in claims of about 600 disappearances.
35 No reliable data on the number of victims of execution or exile in Argentina has been
encountered. Most written and oral sources have generally asserted how infrequent
execution was used as a method by the military juntas in Argentina in the war against
subversion, which in that sense was much more "dirty" than the corresponding war in
Chile or other countries, such as Brazil or Uruguay. Consequently, there is reason to
believe that the problem of gross human rights violations in the form of execution was
relatively small in Argentina. However, Nunca Más makes a note on the dramatic
increase on the number of cremations in the cemetery "La Chacarita" for the 1976-79
period. The number of cremated people rose from about 15,000 in 1975 to more than
30,000 in 1978, indicating that large number of these persons may have been ilegally
executed and hence belong to the disappeared (Nunca Más 1991: 238-39). Due to poor
reporting and recording practices at the beginning of the dictatorship, it is hard to assert
any absolute figures.
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protesting, lest their involvement would slow down the proeess of releasing
the detained. When inquiring about the abducted victims, they were always
met with the same answer: the government knew nothing of the dis-
appeared' whereabouts, or they reported that the victims had been detained
but later released, or that they had fled the country. 36 The tactic of large-
scale detained-disappearance created non-people and gave the military
government an image of being omnipotent. Besides spreading terror in the
society - nobody could be sure about who would be the next victim -
having people disappear was a very efficient way of getting rid of
opponents. Nobody can be proved responsible for the disappearance as long
as the body remains undiscovered, wherefore the Argentine military
personneI went to great lengths to conceal their crimes. Few mass-graves
were found during the period of authoritarian rule, thus making it extremely
difficult to attribute guilt to any specific institution or individuaL.
In the absenee of a clearly administered secret DINA-style service
system, there have been ongoing discussions on whether the gross human
rights violations commtted in Argentina should be attributed the govern-
ment, or whether they should be considered individual criminal acts,
committed beyond the control of the president of the military junta.37
However, the methods employed so systematically with such precision and
refinement from day one, leave little scope for believing that the killing of
some 10,000 people was arbitrary. In all, the governments investigation
commttee CONADEP reported the existence of 340 clandestine torture
centres, spread all over the country. Out of the 8,960 people who have been
registered as disappeared, about 1,300 have at some point been observed by
eye witnesses in the clandestine centres before their disappearance (Nunca
Más 1991: 479). In special cases the military let the disappeared occasion-
ally communicate with their family members in order to keep up their
hopes, add to their frustrations and confusion, or simply to blackmail the
families, offering information about the detained in return for large sums
of money.
36 62 per cent of the detentions happened at night (Nunca Más 1991: 25). The person was
dragged out of the house at their most vulnerable, asleep in the dark. This procedure had
the double effect of adding darkness to the sinister situation, and having the family
members witnesses the brutal kidnapping of the victim, thus increasing their fear.
37 The latter is the position of the editor of La Opinión, J acobo Timerman (Timerman
1982).
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2.5.2 Who were the victims ?
Among the detained-disappeared were all kinds of professions, but
primarily socialist and trade union activists.38 The distribution for the
various professions is similar to that of Chile (Summa ry of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission Report 1992: 94). In absolute numbers, workers
and peasants constitute the largest category of victims. In proportion to
their relative numbers in society, however, the middle class in Argentina-
defined as people in professional occupations - suffered more. This is not
surprising, as the leve! of political consciousness is generally high er among
this segment of society. Moreover, the ideas of Marxism struck more
sympathy among the professionals than among workers, where Peronism
was the dominating ideology. The Communists suffered much less than in
Chile. In fact, the Argentine Communist Party supported the military
government at first. The paradox of this situation can partly be explained
by the positive attitude the Soviet and Chinese regimes held to the
Argentinean military Juntas, due to trade agreements, reflected in the fact
that China and the Soviet Union systematically abstained from voting in
UN resolutions condemning the human rights violations in Argentina. Most
of these victims are not believed to have been subversives, as they are
reported to have no known political affiliation. Moreover, the majority of
terrorists went into exile or died in combat operations. Accordingly, the
Holy war to protect values of Western Christianity turne d into indiscrimi-
nate repression and business. The wide-spread practice of looting homes
and the selling of babies are but two perverse effects of this doctrine.
Characteristic of the Argentine map of repression was the high proportion
of women; 30 per cent, as opposed to only 4.5 per cent in Chile. This is
generally explained by the structure of the opposition. It was much more
common in Argentina for couples to be involved in so-called subversive
activity together, therefore both the man and the woman were targeted. As
shown in the figure below, another distinctive feature of the victims in
Argentina, is that the proportion of young people (in the age groups 21-25
38 The CONADEP reported that the victims fall into the following categories: blue-collar
workers 30.2 per cent of total, students 21 per cent, white-collar workers 17.9 per cent,
professionals 10.7 per cent, teachers 5.7 per cent, self-employed and others per cent,
journalists 1.6 per cent, actors and performers 1.3 per cent, nuns and priests 0.3 per cent
(Nunca Más 1991: 296). It is unc1ear whether the percentages refer to the victims of
detained-disappearance only, or whether they inc1ude all victims of gross human rights
violations. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that the groups targeted by the
various forms of gross human rights violations should vary significantly. These
distributions may therefore be regarded as representative, if not absolute.
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and 26-30) was substantially higher than for Chile, whereas the number of
victims in the age groups 41-45 and 46-50 was almost twice as high in
Chile as in Argentina. This may in part be accounted for by the same
reason as mentioned above; the more massive targeting at professionals and
revolutionary couples in Argentina.
Figure 2
Victims of death and detained-disappearance in
Chile and Argentina according to age
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Sources: Nunca Más (1991: 294) and Summary of the Truth and Reconcilation Comniission
Report (1992: 93).
The Argentine military was also more ruthless than its Chile an counter-
part in its elimination of potential recruiting grounds for subversion. Many
professionals working in presumably "suspicious" fields, like medicine or
psychology; people openly criticizing the regime, such as journalists; or
people openly trying to help victims of repression, for instance lawyers,
were vulnerable targets. Due to the higher proportion of professional
women in Argentina than in Chile, women as a group were more
victimized. As aresult, many children also became victims of the dirty war.
The disappeared children in Argentina merit special mentioning, because
they illustrate the particular ruthlessness and perverse logic of the regime:
children of subversives were like ly to become subversives too, therefore
they must be eliminated, or taken away from the context which may
influence them in the wrong direction. Children born in captivity, when not
killed with their parents, were frequently adopted by military personneI and
raised as their own children. 217 children have been reported among the
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disappeared; a large number of them unborn. The unique Argentine
phenomenon of abducting children and highly pregnant women was to give
rise to an equally unique human rights organization, Abuelas de Plaza de
Mayo (Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo).
2.6 Why Argentina was worse
The figure below shows that even when using the lowest estimate for
detained-disappearance and other gross human rights violations, Argentina
comes out far worse than Chile both in actual numbers of victims, as well
as in percentage of the population affected.39
Figure 3
Repression in Chile (1973-1990) and Argentina (1976-1983).
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Sources: Sikkink (1993: 427); Summa ry of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report
(1992: 93); United Nations Demographie Yearbook (1984: 152; 1992: 129).
39 For Chile, the total figures for detained-disappeared and executed are 2,279, according
to conservative Informe Rettig estimates (Summa ry of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Report 1992: 93), and 3,458, according to Orellana's estimates (1992: 109).
For Argentina, the officially accepted figures for detained-disappeared alone is estimated
to 8,960 (Nunca Más 1991: 16). Several of the human rights organizations, backed by
a large number of scholars (Keesing's 1982, Veiga 1985, Guest 1990) believe the true
number of detained-disappeared to be doser to 30,000. No certain figures for executed
have been found.
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It should be noted that only the number of detained-disappeared are
included for Argentina, due to the lack of reliable figures for deaths as a
result of gross human rights violations. The figures for Chile include
victims of both death and detained-disappearances. Repression in Argentina
was therefore in reality even harsher than indicated here. Note particularly
the difference in repression between the two countries in the second year
after the military coups.
The Argentine juntas also surpassed the Chile an military government in
the grossness and brutality of the methods employed in their fight against
subversion.40 The reasons for this are many; ideology may be one. The
Argentine military , whose organization was based on the Prussian model,
had always contained a streak of fascism. Such tendencies were
strengthened during the rule of Perón. Peronism has by several scholars
been characterized as in many ways a fascist ideology (Guest 1990; Veiga
1985). The elimination of thousands of human beings was based on the
military' s conviction that they were fighting a war against intern al enemies
for the glory of their country. Having a large Jewish population, anti-
semitism has a long tradition in Argentina. Witness reports accounted for
in the Nunca Más (1991: 69-75) indicate that Jewish prisoners were treated
in a particularly brutal manner.41 In contrast to the Argentine military, the
military in Chile had a long tradition of non-interference in civilian polities,
and prided itself on its professional character. In spite of this, it is evident
that changes had taken place also within the Chile an military ranks prior to
the coup. The ideas of national security were developed and perfected
during military rule, enabling the implementation of practices of repression
and terror as mapped out above.
Geography is a second explanatory factor to the dissimilarities in
repression. The sheer vastness of Argentina made it easier for the Juntas to
cary out their crimes. To use political prisoners as an example, the
prisoners were systematically kept in detention centres as far away from
their families as possible in order to minimize any kind of communication.
A prisoner from Buenos Aires would risk being sent to Tucumán, whereas
40 Mana Isabel de Miriam, a representative of the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo, told
me she had lost nine of her family members: her husband, four daughters, two sons-in-
law, one three-year old grandchild, and a second grandchild to be bom a month after its
mother was abducted. They all remain disappeared. Information was given in an
interview with the author in Buenos Aires on 2 July 1993.
41 Cases have been reported where metal tubes were introduced to the vagina of Jewish
women, into which live rats were forced, gradually destroying the intemal organs of their
victim in their frantic search for an exit (Nunca Más 1991; Guest 1990).
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a person from the north usually ended up in a prison camp in the extreme
south.42
Timing is a third variable explaining the differences between the two
countries. The fact that Argentina had learned from the Chile an experience,
made the Juntas employ the policy of massive detention followed by
disappearance rather than execution or exile. This was a particularly
traumatic experience for Argentina, both physically through the elimination
of many of its young and able people, but also psychologically.43
Mourning is difficult when there is no tomb to mourn by; the known is
always easier to deal with than the unknown. That is why the terror
produced by disappearance is of ten considered worse than that produced by
visible death (Meijide 1986: 62).44 As long as the body of the detained-
disappeared is not recovered, there is always a possibility that the person
may still be alive somewhere. This particularly brutal method of repression
left thousands of Argentinean family members vacillating between hope and
despair for years, breaking them down psychologically and weakening their
potential for protest and mobilization. Due to its nature, the practice of
disappearance has produced ongoing problems in both societies up till
today. The magnitude of this practice, however, has produced greater
sufferings in Argentina than in Chile. The practice of abducting children
has been particularly traumatic, as a group of the children' s grandmothers
are still doing what they can to trace them and, where possible, restore
them to their biological families.
The purpose of this chapter has been to giv e an account of and
explanation to one of the main characteristic features of the Chilean and
Argentinean dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, because it is important
for the rest of this analysis to have an ide a of the trauma repression
inflicted on the two societies and what reactions it provoked. No society
can be left unmarred by the psychological, physical, intellectual, and
political effects of gross human rights violations of the type and scale
suffered by Chile and Argentina. The situation was worse in Argentina than
in Chile due to the extensive practice of disappearance and a higher level
42 Several of the persons I interviewed who had suffered imprisonment, including
representatives of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo or families of the disappeared,
stressed this fact. Many families did not have the opportunity or financial means to visit
their imprisoned family members. I talked to a woman who had to drive 18 hours to see
her husband; something she was permitted to do only twice a year.
43 For an account of the psychological effects of repression, see Kordon et aL. 1988.
44 For the effects of repression of society, see Summary of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Report (1992: 93-103); Kordon et aL. 1988. For the psychological effects
of repression in particular, see Lira 1986.
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of repression. Deep damage was caused to individuals and their families.
Civil society structures, such as political parties and trade unions along with
a wide number of other voluntary organizations, were seriously weakened,
even partly destroyed. In spite of all the negative effects of repression,
however, there was one positive outcome: individuals joining forces to
protest against the ruthlessness of the military rulers and the absence of
state of law constituted the seed of a new social structure, namely the
human rights organizations. I will argue that it is precisely the organized
protest around the normative and politically explosive issue of human rights
which initially caused cracks in the military leadership, leading first to a
careful political opening in the liberalization phase, which gave way to
widespread mobilization as the human rights organizations were joined by
other civil society actors helping them carry the banner of human rights.
The military were forced to respond to this criticism during the transition
phase. Due to continued domestic as well as international pressure, neither
the military , nor the political elites could afford to ignore the issue of
human rights when bargaining about the rules for the future democratic
game. And finally, in the ensuing consolidation phase, civil society in both
Chile and Argentina made sure the matter was not allowed to rest.
In spite of the apparent importanee of the human rights issue, it has
barely been mentioned in transition theory, which focuses primarilyon
form, not on substance. Leaving the role of the human rights organizations
in the transition to democracy for detailed treatment in the final chapter, the
ensuing chapter will proceed to analyze the Argentinean and Chilean
transition from primarily an elite-focused point of view. The aim is to see
what this theoretical perspective offers in terms of explaining the transitions
to democracy in our two cases. What is the form of transition, and how
does it affect the political outcome ?
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3. The form of transition
3.1 From theory to reality
Drawing on the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1.4, we will now embark
on an analysis of the transition proeesses of Chile and Argentina, starting
with the formal onset of transition and ending with the restoration of
democracy. The aim is to test the hypotheses that different modes of
transition lead to different types of democracy (Karl and Schmitter 1991:
269) and that the case of transition by regime collapse is the one most
likely to lead to a fuller, less restricted type of political democracy
(O'Donnell 1986: 8-9). Was Argentina a fuller and less restricted
democracy than Chile at the time of regime change, and if yes, in what
ways? Some central issues for the discussion are: what spurred the
transition proeesses ? How did the various actors make calculated risks,
given that uncertainty is an inherent feature of democratie transition? Was
there a pact between the outgoing military elites and incoming democratic
elites? Jf so, how were the elites allied? How long was the transition, and
in which ways did the length of the transition have any effect on the
resulting power constellations?
3.2 Military defeat and transition by collapse in Argentina
Argentina is the classic example of transition by regime collapse.
O'Donnell has called it an "all or nothing situation"; a country which was
simply precipitated into democracy (O'Donnell 1986: 8). The transition was
characterized by suddenness, lack of control, unexpected outcomes, and
discontinuity. That is why there was no clearcut division line between the
liberalization and democratization phases. The one barely preceded the
other, and there was no phased or guided interaction between the two
processes. In the following empirical analysis I will therefore refer to these
two phases combined as transition, divided into two stages. What spurred
the transition ?
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3.2.1 The first stage oftransition. Apertura: March 1981 - lune
1982
The crushing defeat suffered by the Argentine armed forces in the
Malvinas/Falk-lands war in 1982 is usually considered to be the catalyst for
the collapse of the last authoritarian regime, marking the end of the first
stage of transition in Argentina. It may be interesting to ask why the
military junta dec ide d to bring the Falkland Islands back under Argentinean
rule in the first place.1 What were the events leading up to this crisis?
The apertura or the onset of the Argentine transition process, meaning
what Przeworski refers to as liberalization, is for practical purposes usually
dated to early 1981, when General Videla was succeeded in the highest
office by army commander General Viola. This reshuffling at the top came
as a direct response to a failure to handle the socioeconomic crisis that had
exploded in March 1980, when triple digit inflation and a financial crash
created a crisis which rapidly spre ad to other sectors. As such, one may say
that the crisis was due to elite mismanagement. In a more nuanced
perspective, however, one will notice that the formal opening was preceded
by a gradual strengthening of civil society running paralleI to a gradual
delegitimation2 of the military regime, due not only to a deepening
socioeconomic crisis and rumours of widespread corruption within the
armed forces, but also to growing domestie and international criticism of
large-scale gross human rights violations. After three years of massive
repression, the Argentine people had started to pick up strength and
mobilize against the military government. Labour unions mounted mass
rallies against the regime's policies in July and November 1981 - for the
first time since the beginning of el Proceso.3 The granting of the Nobel
Peace Prize the year before to the Catholic activist, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel,
Just a short historical note: there has been an ongoing century long dispute over who
discovered the Falklands/Malvinas islands; the Spanish, the English, or the Dutch.
Argentina declared sovereignty to the Falklands by inheritance from Spain in 1820 and
administered the islands til 1833, when Britain occupied the territory. The issue has
remained a wound to Argentine national pride and a sore point in Argentine- British
relations ever since, eventually leading the Argentineans to invade the islands in 1982
to free them from what they claimed to be Britain's ilegal occupation. See Bums 1987
for a detailed account of the war, its preconditions, and aftermath.
2 The legitimacy of a given politicalorder can be guaranteed by a belief in its validity or
by the expectations of specific benefits, or both. See Weber 1969.
3 El Proceso is the Spanish abbreviation for "The Process of National Reorganization",
referring to the policy line of the juntas after the coup in 1976. Its ideological basis was
the national security doctrine, with its twofold aim of ending subversion and creating
economic prosperity.
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along with the support of international organizations and foreign
governments had given courage to a number of human rights groups, which
began to organize rallies against the government. In other words, the
mobilization of opposition was due partly to economic dissatisfaction and
partly in respons e to massive repression.
The fact that the military had to resp ond to visible opposition meant that
its implementation of the model set forth by the national security doctrine
had failed on two points: it had failed disastrously to improve the economy,
thus bre aking its promise of delivering economic performanee superior to
that of previous civilian governments. More importantly, it had failed to
curb all opposition, although it had been relatively successful in eliminating
guerrilla terrorism and severely damaging democratic institutions. As a
result of this double failure, the military junta did not succeed in its initial
plan of establishing permanent military rule, i.e. transform the military
regime into a truly authoritarian regime.4 The response of the new
government to this upsurge of civil societyactivity was not uniform, since
"military circles were still divided on what form their regime should
"(Snow and Manzetti 1993: 35).
There was a careful attempt at liberalization by not strictly enforcing the
ban on political activity. The Junta, headed by Viola, initially tried to relax
the rules of the authoritarian regime by inviting former party leaders and
union bosses to participate in formal discussions; in other words, an attempt
by military soft-liners to enter negotiations with civilian Moderates. These
moves were meant to diffus e criticism, but had the unintended consequence
of creating the impression that the government was weak and lacked
resolve. This careful attempt at apertura, aimed at creating political
stability, was interpreted by the civilians as a golden opportunity to press
the regime into holding elections. According to Przeworski's theory, the
military now had two options: either give in to the demands for more
liberalization thus risking to let the situation get out of hand, or resort to
repression (Przeworski 1991: 63). The hard-liners, headed by the new army
commander, General Leopoldo Galtieri, won. Strongly opposed to any kind
of political opening, they responded to Viola' s softening by turning the
careful apertura into renewed repression, especially targeted at politicians
4 While the economy was still in good shape, the military junta had in 1978 released a
document about "the political basis for national reorganization" in which they proposed
the creation of an officialist party. This party would be the essential element in the
gradual transfer of some political offices to their civilian allies through carefully
controlled elections in which one of the traditional parties would be allowed to
participate. This project of legitimizing a kind of semi-authoritarian regime failed due
to the sociopolitical crisis (Vacs 1987).
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and trade unionists. The hard-liners were supported by the Liberals, who
severely criticized the policies of Viola' s new economic team and hoped to
return to power after Viola' s expected fall.
In spite of renewed repression, the junta did not succeed in halting the
process of transition. The new military government lacked the support of
important socioeconomic groups and political parties, which were pressing
for a faster speed of liberalization and setting a firm date for new elections.
Encouraged by the timid attempts at democratization made by Viola, the
groups of the old Unión Cívico Radical, UCR (Radical Civic Union) for the
first time in twenty five years joined forces in a campaign for elections to
be scheduled for 1984.5 Later, the Radicals and the Peronists joined three
smaller parties of the centre and left of the political spectrum in an ad hoc
multiparty alliance called the Multipartidaria, agreeing on three restrictions:
they would not collaborate with the military government; they would not
lend their consent to a tutored or partial "democracy", or to a civil-military
government; and they would oppose the creation by the state of an official
party (Corradi 1985: 146). Viola, well aware that the military was no longer
in control of the political development, tried to strike a civil-military pact
with the Multipartidaria in November 1981, but the latter rejected his
conditions. In other words, the attempt at pact-making between the military
soft-liners and the civilian Moderates failed. The same month, about 50,000
people staged a peaceful protest march demanding peace, food and work
(Paz, Pan y Trabajo). The military made a new attempt at tightening their
grip. Proposed elections were called off, and the military announced its
intention to remain in power. Squeezed between the military hard-liners and
the discontented opposition, the Viola administration collapsed. Viola was
deposed in a palace coup in December 1981, and Galtieri took over.
The new government had two main objectives: to stop the political
opening initiated by Viola and to restore the economic policies followed by
the first military junta of the Proceso. Suspension of political activity was
again strictly enforced by the security forces. The attempts at improving the
economy by the new economic team headed by orthodox neo-liberals were
not very successful, and the splits between the hard-liners and the soft-
liners within the armed forces deepened. The nationalistic sectors of the
5 There are two main political parties in Argentina: the Peronists and the Radicals. The
original Radical party was in 1980 split in three groups, the Radical Civic Union, UCR
(Unión Cívico Radical) headed by Ricardo Balbín, the Movement for Integration and
Development, MID (Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo) headed by Arturo
Frondizi, and the Intransigent Party, PI (Partido Intransigente) led by Oscar Alende.
Together these three groups make up what wil be referred to as the Radicals.
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officer corps were unhappy with the return to Martín de Hoz-like economic
policies.6 Other military soft-liners considered their mission completed with
the defeat of terrorism, and favoured a retreat to the barracks while the
arme d forces were still in a position to negotiate an exit on favourable
terms. Political parties, disregarding the renewed ban on political activity,
continued to protest against the government. They demanded changes in
economic policy and a rapid retum to democracy. The multiparty alliance
was supported in its claims by trade unions and large middle-class sectors.
The human rights organizations' demands that the authorities explain the
fate of the disappeared and pressure to restore civilliberties continued to
grow. This was the first united civilian front tolerated by the regime. News
about corruption in military circles started to circulate openly in the press.
On 30 March 1982, the clandestine General Confederation of Labour (CGT)
called for the first general strike since the onset of military rule in 1976; a
strike that paralysed the country.
In early 1982 fUmours would have it that president Galtieri was planning
to ally with right-wing politicalleaders and union bosses in order to form
a conservative movement that would enable him to contest future elections
(Snow and Manzetti 1993: 37). Galtieri could choose between several
strategies. With the popularity of the regime having hit a low, the holding
of free elections would most surely bring the Peronists back into power.
Controlled elections meant that a weak government would only inherit the
pressing economic and social problems. Jf the military junta remained in
power and did nothing, intern al splits would eventually destroy their ability
to rule. Finally, if the hard-liners had their way, another bloodbath was
likely to result. In short, there seemed to be only two ways of saving the
regime: either find a rapid solution to the economic and social crisis, or
find an issue around which the nation could unify. Attempts at the first had
repeatedly failed, so Galtieri turned to the second option.
The Argentine transition proeess was hastily speeded up by the watershed
event of the Malvinas/Falkland war.7 On 2 April 1982, an Argentine tas k
6 This quick-moving political drama was accompanied by high-pace changes in the
economy. The catastrophic economic development had the junta replace Martínez de Hoz
with Lorenzo Sigaut, but also he failed in curbing the inflation significantly. Galtieri,
once in office, appointed Roberto Alderman his new minister of economy. Economic
policymaking took a U-turn in less than a year. See Snow and Manzetti 1993 for a more
detailed account of the economic development.
7 Apparently, this was a move that had been long planned by the Argentine armed forces.
The navy had been pressing for an invasion of the islands since the beginning of the
military regime. Already in 1977, Admiral Massera, then navy chief, had insisted on an
invasion, but had not been able to transfer this into action. See Corrade 1985.
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force took controlover this group of islands far off the South Atlantic coast
that the British had occupied and ruled as a colony since 1833.8 Galtieri
had correctly calculated that the invasion would lead to a much hoped-for
outburst of nationalism. Dissidenee practically disappeared, and support to
the military came from religious organizations, labour unions, and political
parties covering the ideological spectrum from left to right. Even parts of
the population who from the very beginning had been strongly against the
authoritarian regime, such as the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo and Argentine
Socialists exiled in Mexico, supported the invasion (Rozitchner 1985: 16).
Most scholars believe Galtieri staged the invasion specifically to divert
attention from domestic trouble by arousing nationalistie feelings and
thereby strengthen the dwindling support for his government, and also to
restore to the military the in stituti on al prestige they had lost through
economic mismanagement and the dirty war.9 The war presented a pretext
for the Argentine as well as the British government to revert atten ti on from
domestic problems, although there may have be en much more at stake in
this conflict, such as economic, political, and strategic interests (Rozitchner
1985; Snow and Manzetti 1993).
The outcome proved fatal to the Argentine government. Had the
emotional involvement of the Argentine population been less, it might have
been easier to accept the military's defeat when they were forced to
capitulate to the British on 14 June.1O The disillusion and disappointment
in the Argentine population was complete. The military, now stripped of all
legitimacy and support, had but one option left: to throw in the towel. An
infuriated civil population reacted to military defeat by staging a wave of
violent demonstrations against the government and the armed forces in
general. Already existing splits between the army on the one hand and the
air force and the navy on the other hand, now exploded into open conflicts.
The air force and the navy withdrew from the junta, leaving all the political
responsibility to the army. Galtieri was force d to resign under strong
8 The population, all English speaking and mainly descendants of Scottish settlers, counted
about 1,800 people when the Argentines invaded the islands in 1982. The issue of the
Malvinas/Falklands had been a topic for dispute for years, becoming particularly intense
in 1967-68, when the Labour government in Britain appeared ready to open negotiations
with Argentina over the status of the islands; a suggestion that did not materialize (Rock
1993: 211).
9 Galtieri apparently remarked, after he had been ousted from power, that his intention had
been to call elections after the final victory over the British. He himself would be the
presidential candidate in the elections he was confident of winning (Vacs 1987: 28).
10 See Corradi 1985 and Bums 1987 for thorough and analytical accounts of the Malvinas/
Falklands affair.
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civilian pressure, and on 22 June 1982 the junta set up a provisional
government headed by retired General ReinaIdo Bignone. His only purpose
was to hold elections and ensure the return to constitutional government.
Bignone started by lifting the ban on political party activities and to
promise elections before the end of the year. In fact, the second stage of the
transition process to civilian rule was to take 18 months. Ironically, by
losing the Malvinas war, the Argentine population won the domestie battle
against repressive authoritarianism.
3.2.2 The second stage of transition. The failure of negotiation
attempts: lune 1982 - October 1983
Following upon the Malvinas disaster started a hectic period of attempts at
bargaining and negotiations. Interestingly enough, it was not the economic
situation that worried the military most. Rather, their prime concern was to
negotiate their exit from power in an orderly way which would ensure them
immunity for the crImes commtted during the so-called dirty war.
Accordingly, the military tried to make the political parties agree on three
negative conditions: not to investigate the state-terrorist actions; not to
investigate the sources of mismanagement and corruption; and, not to
reorganize the armed forces or curtail their power in matters related to
external defense and intern al security (Vacs 1987: 30). The Multipartidaria
refused to have these restrictions imposed on the next civilian government
and accordingly rejected the pacto de salida on 16 December 1982 (de
Brito 1992: 40). Some parties went even further and declared they would
positively investigate these issues, dismantle the repressive military
machinery, and put the military under total civilian control. The military
was unable to gain concession from the political parties for at least two
main reasons. Firstly, the armed forces were virtually incapable of acting
collectively. Not only were the navy and the air force incapable of
cooperation with the army, but they were also internally split. Secondly,
there were few incentives for the opposition to enter into agreements with
a rapidly collapsing and illegitimate authoritarian regime that had killed
thousands of people, plunged the economy into a deep crisis, and suffered
humiliating defeat in war. The on ly "success" the military juntas could
point to was the eradication of subversive activities; a policy that had
produced deep divisions and open wounds in society, resulting in a
mobilization of civil society which, in my opinion, was highly contributive
to the dismantling of the military regime.
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In spite of splits over the mismanagement of the Malvinas/Falklands war,
the military displayed an impressive intern al cohesion in the question of the
dirty war against subversion. When failing to seal their interests through
negotiated compromises with the political parties, the military reverted to
other less orthodox methods in order to safeguard their position. The
outgoing government headed by Bignone to ok several steps to avoid
accountability for human rights abuses. Firstly, on 28 April 1983, the
military presented their Documento Final, or Final Document on the War
against Subversion and Terrorism, in which human rights abuses were
mentioned as "errors commtted in all wars", adding that those disappeared
who were not in exile or dead should be considered dead "for all legal and
administrative purposes" (Keesing's 1983: 32553). Secondly, on 23
September 1983, only a couple of weeks before the general elections
scheduled for 30 October, the military proclaimed a self-amnesty in the
form of Law of National Pacification (Ley de Pacificación Nacional, Ley
22.924), which granted full amnesty to members of the security forces who
had either carried out or given orders during the "period of exception": 25
May 1973 (the date for amnesty for political crimes) to 17 June 1982 (the
date of Galtieri' s resignation). Amnesty was also granted to detainees, but
not for members of "illegal terrorist or subversive associations", nor for
people already convicted (Keesing's 1983: 32554). This law also prevented
the exercise of civilian justice in cases referring to repression on the part
of the armed forces. Thirdly and lastly, there were rumours of Bignone
issuing a decree ordering the destruction of the documentation related to the
military repression. 1 l
The public was infuriated and reacted against these measures by staging
massive protest demonstrations. On 20 May 1983, for instance, about
40,000 people rallied in Buenos Aires, protesting the Final Document
(Keesing's 1983: 32553). Human rights groups, who by this time had
gathered important numerical strength, also immediately rejected the self-
amnesty law. The relatives of the disappeared challenged the law's legality
on the grounds that criminals could not grant themselves amnesty. They
were supported by some political parties, including the Radicals, who
promised to repe al such a law if they came to power. Frightened by the
massive opposition, the military' s next move was to establish a corporatist
pact with sections of the Peronist party and labour movement in an attempt
to guarantee that the so-called law of national pacification would not be
l l This decree was never made public. Zalaquett, in an interview with the author in
Santiago on 7 July 1993, claimed that it is very unlikely that the Argentine military have
destroyed all copies of valuable documentation.
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repealed by the constitutional government. The deal struck with the
Peronists, whom the military were convinced would win the free elections,
was as follows: in return for restoring the trade union organizations (which
were the real backbone of the Peronist movement) to the same labour
leaders who had been displaced after the coup, and moreover lifting the ban
on the political activities of Isabel Perón and other important members of
the party who had been suspended in 1976, the military received a
satisfactory assuranee from the Peronists that the amnesty law would
remain in force and that no investigations would be undertaken (Vacs 1987:
30- 31).12 These explicit and implicit guarantees made by the Peronists
Moderates to the military soft-liners kept the military fairly happy during
the rest of the election campaign.
The military had never ca1culated that the Peronist would lose the
national elections held on 30 October 1983. In fact, this was the first
election lost by the Peronists since the party was forme d in 1946. The
Radical Civic Union unexpectedly got a substantial majority of 52 per cent
of the national vote against the Justicialist National Movements (the
Peronists) 40 per cent. Raúl Alfonsín was elected president for a six-year
term.13 The Radical' s unpredicted victory had suddenly wiped away the
military' s security ensured by the pact with the Peronists, forcing the
military to leave the political scene without obtaining any guarantees. The
Radicallandslide clearly upset the military' s plan of a carefully negotiated
exit. Why the Radicals, who for a long time had gathered no more than 25
per cent of the vote, won against all odds is an intriguing question seen in
the light of Argentine political history. Basically, the Radicals ran a more
successful electoral campaign than did the Peronists after the regime
collapse following the Malvinas/Falklands disaster. In 1983, both the
presidential candidates centred their campaigns on the necessity for the
construetion of a stable democracy based on popular sovereignty and
constitutionallegality. By launching slogans like "return to the constitution"
and denouncing the military-union pact, the Radicals managed to widen
their traditional base of support. A vast proportion of the electorate
disapproved of the deal struck between the military and the Peronist, and
12 Some Peronista sectors benefitted directly from this deal, because they were dreading the
investigation of Peronist-supported terrorist acts carried out against the opposition before
the coup, as well as investigations into their far from dean record of corruption and
mismanagement.
13 AlfonsÍn was chosen by a 600-member electoral college. The electors in turn were
chosen on the basis of proportional representation so that each electoral district would
have twice as many members of the college as the combined number of senators and
deputies.
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voted for the Radicals simply because they wanted justice, not indemnity
for the military forces. The Radical victory also resulted from popular
rejection of authoritarian tendencies in the Peronist Party and public
memory of the nightmarish administration of Isabel Perón. The Peronist
candidate, Luder, failed at bringing the fragmented Peronist party together.
Alfonsín, on the other hand, successfully exploited several strengths: an
attractive st yle, an emphasis on honesty and firmness, his reputation as a
reformer of intern al workings of the old Radical party, his clear record of
opposition to the military regime, his focus on human rights, his purpose
of restructuring the state, and his condemnation of the military adventure
in the South Atlantic War (Cavarozzi 1986: 47).14
The Radicals began to demand a rapid transfer of power right after the
elections. The military, anxious to buy time so that it could negotiate a deal
guaranteeing that no investigation of human rights violations would take
place, wanted to retain the original schedule of inaugurating the new
administration in March 1984. However, the military was too weakened to
be able to cut such a deal. The hard-liners' threat of staging an internal
coup and nullifying the elections should an agreement not be reached was
not credible and never materialized. The military simply lacked the
cohesion needed for such an action and were forced to accept an
acceleration of the transition proeess. The new constitutional government
was inaugurated on 10 December 1983, without having offered the military
any explicit guarantees. Thus, the weakness of the military at the moment
of regime transfer presumably left the democratically elected government
headed by Raúl Alfonsín quite free to choose its policies on past gross
human rights violations.
3.3 Electoral defeat and negotiated transition in Chile
As opposed to the short and painful transition in Argentina due to military
defeat, the transition proeess in Chile took much longer and was in many
ways more planned, controlled, and democratic. Unlike Argentina, there
was no specific external factor spurring the transition. Rather, it evolved
through a gradual weakening of the military regime, parallelled by a
strengthening of the non-governmental human rights organizations and the
14 Although Alfonsín won the presidency and the majority in the House of Representatives,
the Peronists won the majority in the provincial governorships, as well as a majority in
the Senate. Having two large parties in stead of the traditional one opened up political
space for minority parties, which after the 1983 election had to obey the rules of the
democratic game in order to exercise pressure.
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political parties, which finally led to the democratic victory in the 1988
plebiscite. Whereas the latest democratic transition in Argentina joins neatly
into a historie al pattern of regular alternations between civil and military
governments (see Vacs 1987), the Chile an democratic transition is often
considered a paradox in the Latin American context. Chile is perhaps the
country which has had the historical conditions most favourable to the
restoration of democracy, such as a long tradition of democratic regimes,
a relatively strong nationwide partyapparatus, and broad political
participation with an equally broad civil society associated with it. Still,
compared to many other Southern Cone countries, including Argentina,
Chile seemed to lag behind in the redemocratization proeess. Suggested
reasons for the unexpectedly slow democratization proeess include the deep
crisis preceding the military intervention, the continuous and severe
repression, and the nature of the regime's project of transformation
(Valenzuela 1989). Since Argentina too suffered a deep pre-coup crisis and
repression that was even more cruel and extensive than in Chile, it seems
like the main factor accounting for the different speed of the
democratization proeess has to be sought for in the type or mode of
transition.
The question in the following empirical analysis is not primarily why the
Chilean transition took so long, but rather how the shifting alliances during
the long transition led up to the final power distribution at the presidential
takeover in March 1990, thus setting the framework for the human rights
policy to be outline d by the future Aylwin government. The Chilean
transition may conveniently be divided into two main periods: the
liberalization period from 1980-1988, and the democratization phase from
October 1989 to March 1990. The liberalization process is divided into two
sub-periods, covering the years 1980-1983 and 1983-1988 respectively. In
the initial liberalization 1980-83 phase, the military seemed to have full
control, whereas the national protests starting in mid-1983 marked the onset
of more visible opposition to the authoritarian regime.15 According to our
discussion in Chapter 1.4, Przeworski maintains that the struggle for
democracy always takes place on two main fronts; against the authoritarian
regime for democracy and against other ei vil society actors for the largest
possible influence within a democratic set of institutions (Przeworski 1991:
66). The main focus of the following analysis will therefore be placed on
15 The 1980-83 phase is here included in the transitlOn period because the 1980
Constitution issuedby the Pinochet government marked a decidedly new period in the
government' s policy, lining out the time frame and aims for the transition which
subsequently was to take place.
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the relationship between the military and civil society on the one hand, and
on the splits and factions within the two main blocs on the other hand.
3.3.1 Phase 1. First stage of liberalization: 1980-1983
A new Constitution, approved of by 67 per cent of the voters in a carefully
controlled plebiscite in 1980, marked the beginning of a new period in
Chile an polities. By formally establishing a "period of transition" (Frühling
and Orellana 1991: 31), this political move may be interpreted as the onset
of what I will term the liberalization process in Chile.16 Pinochet, in
reaction to international criticism of his authoritarian regime and an
increasing intern al split within the military, launched the Constitution in
order to strengthen and intensify his personal rule (Garetón 1986a: 108).17
This plebiscitarian "democratic" exercise legalized Pinochet s power; a
move quite in harmony with the strong Chile an legal tradition. Again, this
seems to me a classic example contradicting Przeworski's argument that
liberalization is always initiated from above and is spurred entirely by
intern al splits between hard-liners and soft-liners in the authoritarian power
block. There had been a deepening disagreement between the hard-liners,
who were in favour of an infinite extension of the military regime, and the
soft-liners, who, although accepting the military regime's prolonged
extension, favoured the gradual introduction of democratie elements in
order to overcome the political and economic problems caused by
international isolation. The international isolation of Chile was due to heavy
criticism from the world community following the massive repression after
the onset of military rule in 1973, taking the form of repeated UN
resolutions condemning gross human rights violations, visits to Chile of
international NGOs such as Amnesty Internationai18 and the Interamerican
Commssion of Jurists, and reductions in financial aid from the United
States. One may therefore interpret the fear for further delegitimation of the
military regime as the main underlying cause for the split in the higher
military ranks.
16 Manuel Antonio Garretón disagrees with this view. He dates the onset of the
liberalization process in Chile to the massive public protests starting in 1983 (Garretón
1989: 152).
17 The following discussion is largely based on Garretón's analyses of the Chilean
democratization process (Garretón 1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1989).
18 Amnesty International sent a mission to Chile almost immediately after the coup in 1973.
On the basis of their findings they issued a report which, according to Iain Guest, "was
devastating to Pinochet" (Guest 1990: 79).
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However, the military agreed on one thing: nobody questioned Pinochet s
leadership. The debate was therefore limited to whether it was necessary to
institutionalize the leadership of Pinochet or not, and if yes, what the time
limits should be. Pinochet could no longer put off this decision in 1980,
and chose the soft-liners' proposal of a constitutionally limited presidency.
One may, of course, question the democratic value of a plebiscite held
under strictly controlled conditions, where no alternatives were presented.
Pinochet had announced on 10 August that, if approved, the new
Constitution would enter into force six months later (i.e. on 11 March
1981), and that he would then remain in office for an eight-year period of
"slow and gradual evolution" towards a democratic form of government
(Keesing's 1980: 30619). In particular, the Constitution prescribed that at
the end of the eight-year "transitional" period, in 1989, the junta would
nominate a single presidential candidate. Jf confirmed by plebiscite, this
candidate would remain in power until 1997, when free presidential
elections would take place. However, if the candidate was rejected,
President Pinochet would remain in office for another year and would call
such elections within that time. During the "transitional" period the main
provisions of the Constitution would not enter fully in to force, but 29
"transitional provisions" would be effective.
The 1980 Constitution was thus written so as to secure the objectives of
the national security doctrine while simultaneously formally introducing a
period of transition. On the one hand, the new Constitution increased
presidential authority, reduced the autonomy of legislative bodies, enabled
the president to appoint several members of the Senate, created a National
Security Council, prohibited "totalitarian" groups and the expression of
support for doctrines that are based on "class struggle" or that "violate the
integrity of the family", while allowing some political parties to resume
activities only after the end of the transitional phase. On the other hand,
The Council of State also proposed a number of transitional provisions,
calling for a return to democracy and open presidential elections by 1985;
a proposal Pinochet rejected. They agreed on a compromise whereby the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Carabineros would, in
late 1988 or early 1989, select a presidential candidate who had to be
approved or rejected by the public in a new popular plebiscite.
Pinochet was confident he would win the elections. In other words, the
Constitution guaranteed the continuation of the same power structures and
Pinochets authority till February 1989. In effect, he had prepared the way
for the introduction of a political model which on paper meant the
restoration of a full democracy, but which in fact was intended to be an
authoritarian regime with very restricted political freedoms. Space was
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opened for restricted representation, but the Constitution rendered political
activity almost irrelevant. The 1980 Constitution specifically exempted
Pinochet by name from the provision barring Chilean presidents from
succeeding themselves. It consequently established de jure Pinochet as the
most powerful leader in Chilean history.
The launch of the 1980 Constitution was probably one of the most
important factors contributing to the longevity of the Pinochet regime, as
it temporarily solved the intemal crisis caused by factionalism within the
military ranks and set a framework for further negotiations. The
referendum, in spite of its irregularities, was a success for the military
government, since it confirmed the government' s capacity for social
dislocation and the effectiveness of its propaganda concerning the terrors
and traumas of the past, its continuing ability to raise doubts about the
existence of any viable alternatives, and its skill in manipulating passive
conformism. The tight control of mass media and the physical and
psychological intimidation of opposition groups played a major part in all
this.
Bliss did not last. The 1980 referendum marked the high point of the
Pinochet regime' s political institutionalization, launched as it was at the
height of economic prosperity, resulting from the successful policies of the
so-called "Chicago Boys".19 The regime enjoyed support from large
sectors of Chilean society due to its demonstration of a high degree of
economic success. The favourable impression of the neo-liberal economic
policy was probably strengthened by the failure of the socialist experiment
under Allende. However, the fragility of the regime's economic base
became visible only a few months later. Chile was struck by a severe
economic recession and crisis in 1981, spurred by the collapse in March
1981 of a leading financial group resulting in a speculative wave, which in
turn provoked a general panic among entrepreneurs (Silva 1991). In
response, the military adopted a series of stop-gap policy measures which
turned out to be internally contradictory. The dominant economic groups
19 The "Chicago Boys" (monetarists who were strongly against state intervention), took
over the economic administration in Chile from the end of 1974. They were educated
abroad in the United States under Professor Milton Friedman and on returning, they
introduced the ideas of neo-liberal policies to Chile. When in control of ODEPLAN they
tried "shock treatment" to the Chilean economy. The "Chicago Boys" also played a key
role in the institutionalization of the dictatorship. After a severe economic crisis and
strong reactions to the neo-liberal policies by important sectors of Chile an society which
were affected, Pinochet in 1984 reshuffled his cabinet, and the "Chicago Boys" were
largely out of the game. See Patricio Silva' s article "Technocrats and Politics in Chile:
from the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks" (1991) for a thorough analysis.
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and the military itself disintegrated into several factions. Unconditional
loyalty to the regime evaporated.
The crisis leading to deepening splits within the military regime in mid-
1983 was swiftly followed by relative political liberalization, which
broadened the base for political opposition. Although opposition groups and
parties had been weakened and fragmented by authoritarian rule, they had
survived. The human rights organizations under the protection of the
Catholic Church had been active from the very onset of authoritarian rule,
and little by little civil society had been strengthened by the revival of old
party structures as well as the creation of new organizations taken on by
student groups and popular organizations, such as labour and
neighbourhood associatIons. The beginning of the second stage of
liberalization was marked by the sudden public appearance of these so far
largely latent civil society structures.
3.3.2 Phase 1. Second stage of liberalization: 1983-1988
The water-shed came in mid-1983, when "days of national protest" initiated
by the labour movement and joined by human rights organizations and
other social structures were massivelyand spontaneously organized all over
Chile in response to the economic crisis. Garretón has called this the
beginning of the "emergence of a mass movement" (Garretón 1986a: 113).
O'Donnell and Schmitter would surely refer to this event as a clear
indication of "the resurrection of civil society". The public appearance of
the opposition, its new more rooted groupings, and the massive
manifestation of discontent and protest challenged the stability of the
Pinochet regime. For the first time since 1973, governmental and opposition
forces were operating in the same arena in Chile, and the government was
forced to explicitly respond to the opposition. At the request of the Church,
the regime first tried to open a dialogue with the opposition. When this
careful attempt at political opening failed, the regime initially answered to
continued public protest by imposing a state of emergency and initiating a
new wave of repression. 117 people died in public protests between May
1983 and September 1986, and thousands were arrested during the same
period (Orellana 1989: 1-4). International pressure, especially from the
United States, forced Pinochet to lift the state of emergency in mid- 1985.
This did not stop the continuation of intimidation, terror, and repression,
like cutting the throats of five Communist leaders in 1986 and assassinating
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twelve persons in one day in 1987 (Garretón 1989: 154).20 As we know,
Pinochet regained control, and the regime survived.
One may justifiably pose the question, why didn't the Chile an regime
collapse immediately in 1983, the way it did in Argentina? The Pinochet
regime was so weakened that had circumstances been slightly more
favourable, liberalization might have speeded significantly up and lead the
way to genuin e democratization. The political opposition was too split to
take full advantage of the chaotic economic situation, and Pinochet through
his extensive supportive apparatus gradually regained political control. He
reacted to the crisis by trying to concede some room to the political
opposition, accompanied by new wave of repression when the opposition
took advantage of the newly created political space. He legalized political
parties and convened a Congress. The one and on ly project of the regime
now after the economic failure was pure survival - even at the cost of
making "democratic" concessions to the opposition. Pinochet succeeded in
this due to three main factors: (1) he still benefitted from a degree of
legitimacy within the dominant bloc conferred by the 1980 Constitution and
was determined to retain his power; (2) the armed forces conserved their
unit y and remained loyal to the regime, and (3) the ambivalence of
redemocratization in the political Right sector left no political dass capable
of expressing discontent with the regime and thus pressing for its
dissolution. In the words of Przeworski, there was "an absence of preferable
alternatives" to Pinochets regime (Przeworski 1986: 52).
Why did the opposition fail to grab this golden opportunity to topple the
regime? The human rights organizations and other opposition groups in the
social sector had a great mobilizing effect, but, for obvious reasons, they
presented no political alternative to the authoritarian regime. The political
parties were still disorganized. Broadly stated, the opposition actors to the
military regime had four goals: survival and organization, overthrow of the
regime, elaboration and preparation of an alternative to the military regime,
and introduction of democracy. Until 1980, the Chilean opposition had
given priority to survival, maintenance, and reproduction of its
organizational apparatus, and to the creation of a front which could present
itself as an alternative to the military regime. The goals of overthrowing the
regime and the organization of social movements were played down. This
resulted in the absenee of any real political debate during 1973-80 period.
The parties of the Left, especially those of Popular Unit y, were severely
affected by the repression. Most of their leaders were either killed,
20 The throat-slitting case, or easo degallados caused uproar among the opposition in
Chile. This particular case wil be treated in more detail in the next chapter.
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disappeared, imprisoned, or in exile. Those still free and in Chile lost their
work and were forbidden to carry out political activity.
The crisis in 1983 finally encouraged the opposition to focus on how
they could overthrow the regime and present a viable alternative to military
rule, but they were seriously split on how to achieve their aims. The
political parties now came to the fore. Using O'Donnells terminology. the
Moderates in the opposition block favoured a strategy of defeating the
military by political means, as opposed to the Radicals, who advocated
toppling the regime by, if necessary, violent means. The Moderates
consisted of a highly heterogenous block, dominated by Alianza
Democrática, AD (Democratic Alliance). The alliance was formed in 1984,
when the Christian Democrats decided to cooperate with the moderate wing
of the Socialist Party. The Christian Democrats, who had originally
supported the coup and lent technical assistance to Pinochet s regime, had
mo ved into opposition by mid-1974 (Le. ten years earlier), joining the
parties of the Left in their strong criticism of the regime's human rights
abuses and in redrafting the nation' s institutional structures. By the late
1970s, the Christian Democrats had established a dialogue with the Left.
They also tried to create a broader alliance by including the small groups
of the Right as well in order to structure a proposal for an alternative
government which would force the armed forces to negotiate. The fact that
the Christian Democrats suffered directly from repression and also had a
long tradition of being critical of capitalism, made them wary of any
alliance with regime soft-liners. At the same time, long-standing ideological
differences stood in the way of stable agreements with the Left. After the
1980 referendum, the Christian Democrats realized that they had limited
support. That spurred a lengthy debate about the party' s leadership and
structure, resulting in the formation of the mentioned Democratic Alliance.
Its goal was to turn the 1980 Constitution's limited politicalliberalization
into full-fledged democratization, demanding free competitive elections with
full citizen participation and civil guarantees by 1985. That again, in the
words of Silva, meant stripping Pinochet of his power, abrogating the
perpetual state of emergency, rescinding the restrictions on political party
activity, allowing exiles to return, and restoring political rights to Marxist
parties (Silva 1992/1993: 85).
The Radicals within the opposition block, called the Movimiento
Democrático Popular, MDP (Popular Democratie Movement), was made
up of more radical parties of the Left, mainly the Communist Party and a
faction of the Socialist Party. Both the Communists and the Socialists were
deeply internally divided, making a united front difficult. The Communist
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Party, strongly supported by exiled Communist Party leaders, was chief
among those who opted for armed struggle.
Although both the Moderates and the Radicals participated in the
monthly protests starting in May 1983 as a direct response to the economic
crisis, the Democratic Alliance distanced itself from the Popular Democratie
Movement and at the outset refused all offers of working together. This
serious split within the opposition played directly into the hands of the
military regime, constituting another important reason why the opposition
failed in 1983. The Democratie Alliance gradually realized that the only
way to a smooth, rapid transition to democratie rule would be through
negotiating with the military and with the conservatives, i.e. enter a form
of pact-making. To achieve a broadened social base, they needed to ally
with parts of the business or landowning elite, convincing the military and
the entrepreneurial class that they would stick to the framework of the 1980
Constitution and not return to the kind of socialism associated with the
Popular Unit y government. In the course of 1983 the Democratic Alliance
publicly commtted itself to the capitalist road to development. The alliance
of Moderates believed that by mitigating its economic position it could
attract the support necessary to negotiate a transition from Pinochet s
authoritarian regime to a regime more democratic than permitted under the
1980 Constitution. To sum up, regime opponents decided to concentrate on
political change (democratization) rather than economic change. One
dominant reason for this was the belief that in order to achieve any change
at all, whether justiee in the issue of human rights violations, economic
redistribution, or changes in the 1980 Constitution, one first needed to
construet a political framework for negotiation acceptable to the military so
as to avoid reversals in the democratization proeess. The gradual softening
of the position of the Democratic Alliancewas also a tactical move to gain
increasing support from the middle class, who now no longer saw the
ideology of the Left as threatening to their economic interests.
Important sectors of the Right consequently joined with the centre and
moderate Left in signing the Acuerdo Democrático Nacional ADENA
(National Accord for the Transition to Democracy) in 1985, whereby they
called for free elections and significant modifications to the 1980
Constitution. This fragile alliance failed (Valenzuela 1989: 195).21 Some
21 "The Group of Eight", consisting of Democrácia Radical, Movimiento Avanzada
Nacional, Movimiento Social Cristiano, P ADENA, Partido Nacional, Talleres Socialistas
Democráticos, Unión Demócrata Independiente, and Unión Nacional, was formed in
1984. They proposed to approve of democratic laws in 1984, carry out a plebiscite in
1985, and elect a National Congress in 1986. They lost strength when ADENA (Acuerdo
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groups accused the Right of trying to halt mobilization in Pinochet s
favour; others accused the Left of trying to undermine possible negotiations
with the armed forces while alienating middle-class support for the
opposition. Anti-democrats on both sides (strong Marxist Left and the
Rejuvenated Right) made it difficult for centrist forces to pursue concerted
policies. Moderate Socialists feared that too many concessions to the
regime would lead to a loss of support from those who might be more
attracted by the militant line of the Communist Party or socialist groups
affiliated with them. The democratic Right feared that they would be
isolated and outflanked by Pinochet supporters who argued that compromise
with the opposition amounted to extending the influence of the Communist
Party. The Christian Democrats were immobilized by sharp intern al
divisions over fears that the party might move too close to either the right
or the left. In short, intern al divisions within the opposition blocks slowed
down the transition proeess.
In 1986, the military regime speeded up the proeess of liberalization by
passing a series of laws aiming at normalizing political life in Chile by
restoring some democratic rights and thereby pacifying the opposition. The
Law of Electoral Registration was passed at the end of September 1986.22
The following year the government authorized political parties to eng age
in public activities.23 Soon after, in July 1988, Pinochet announced that a
plebiscite on whether he should serve another term was scheduled for 5
October 1988. Having been split for so long, the entire opposition front,
except the Communist Party, finally agreed to try to confront the military
regime electorally by forming the Concertación por el NO (Party Agree-
ment to Vote "No") in February 1988 (Garretón 1989: 205). The
Communist Party, although first strongly objecting to "participate in the
legality of the regime", changed its position and join growing ranks of
those advocating the "no". A series of smaller and larger political parties
of the Left and the Centre- Left had banded together to form the multiparty
Democrático Nacional) was formed, as UDI, PN, and PADENA refused to cooperate
with ADENA (Garretón and Contreras 1987: 343).
22 Other laws were Ley 18.460 del Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones, Ley 18.556 de
Inscripciones Electorales, and Ley 18.700 de Votaciones Populares a la oposición
(Garretón and Contreras 1987: 354).23 Decree Law No. 18.606, published in Diario Oficial de la República de Chile, Santiago,
23 March 1987. Although political activity was now permtted, there were several strings
attached, such as various obligations and restrictions imposed on the political parties; the
right of the military junta to suspend parties for not complying with the law; and trade
union leaders not being allowed party affiliation.
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alliance Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia.24 The effort to
defeat Pinochet pulled the opposition in the direction of centrist, moderate
policies, modifying its economic program. It publicly accepted the
neoliberal model and declared that distributional issues would be addressed
solely within its confines. The Concertación also stressed the need for
social and political reconciliation in a deeply divided and traumatized
polit y, rather than press for redress of the abuses commtted during the
military dictatorship. To be able to do anything at all in the field of human
rights, the opposition needed to assure that the military would actually sit
down at the negotiation table with them. They knew that their ability to
push through changes was limited to how far the military was prepared to
go. The P olitic al centre therefore dominated in the political struggle
culminating in the 1988 referendum promised by Pinochet in the 1980
Constitution, though the opposition' s social backing came mainly from left-
wing sectors.
In a massive voters turnout in the plebiscite on 5 October 1988, the "no"
unexpectedly gained 54.7 per cent as opposed to 43 per cent voting "yes"
to Pinochet in the virtually fraud-proof elections.25 There is a curious
paralleI between Pinochet s disbelief at loosing an electIon masterminded
by himself and the Argentinean military' s surprise at having their carefully
planned pact with the Peronists destroyed by the Radicals' unexpected
victory in the 1983 elections. The "no" victory in Chile was partly due to
a fantastie mobilization through effective use of the media and door-to-door
campaigns one month before the election.26 Also, elements in the military
and the political Right expected a fair contest and would not have tolerated
any disruption of the proeess, as "legality" was still prevailing over loyalty
to the Commander-in-Chief. Finally, the opposition leaders were successful
in persuading voters to abstain from engaging in violence while awaiting
24 The Concertacžón was a Centre-Left multi-party allance dominated by the Christian
Democrats, but supported by the Socialists and a broad range of smaller parties, like the
Radicals, MAPU, and the Christian Left. The Communist Party and MIR did not take
part (Garretón and Contreras 1987: 360).
25 97 per cent of the registered voters representing 92 per cent of the eligible population
went to the polls. The opposition won in all but two of the country' s twelve regions.
26 "No" came to symbolize bright future, while "yes" held connotations of a troublesome
past. The "no" command received considerable international support, particularly through
the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, channelled through the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, which contributed important resources for
the media campaign and for the computer system designed to monitor the electoral
count.
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the election results, and to celebrate peacefully the next day. The
Communist Party played an important role by insisting that its own
militants resist organizing street demonstrations, thus refraining from giving
the police and military an excuse for violent reaction. The vote of "no-con-
fidence" marked the beginning of the second period of the Chilean transit -
ion. Presidential and congressional elections were scheduled for 14
December 1989, and the transfer of office was set for March 1990.
3.3.3 Phase 2. October 1988 - March 1990. Democratization
The year that passed between the "no" plebiscite and the Presidential
elections was a period of intense diplomacy and hectic negotiations.
Although the democratic fore es had won the plebiscite and were formally
in a position to demand changes in the 1980 Constitution, they could not
risk putting forward demands which by the military would be perceived as
so unreasonable that they would withdraw from the negotiations. The
democratic forces therefore planned and discussed every move in great
detaiL. During the summer of 1989, Minister of Interior Carlos Cáceres
negotiated a package of 54 constitutional changes with Aylwin and the
leaders of the two pro-Pinochet parties. The result was a long list of
compromises. The most significant change in favour of the democratic
forces made the Constitution easier to amend: the earlier requirement that
3/5 of the members of both houses of the legislature, in two consecutive
Congresses, must approve of any amendment, was replaced by a ne ed ed
majority of 2/3 of the legislature for making many changes. It was also
important that Article 8 of the Constitution, aimed at restricting the activity
of Marxist parties, was altere d to prohibit the activity only of groups that
employed, or incited, violence. In the area of civil-military relations,
changes were made to down-play the role of the National Security Council,
making it primarily advisory and expanding its board to include another
civil member, so that the total number of civilians (4, including the
President) now balanced the number of military. Furthermore, the
presidential term was reduced from 8 to 4 years. The negotiators also
agreed to reduce the number of appointed senators from 12 to 9, and
increase the number of elected senators from 26 to 38. After the reforms,
though, Pinochet was to remain the Head of the Armed Forces till 1997.
It was the human rights issue which worried the military most. Still
holding the formal position as Head of the Armed Forces in addition to his
title as the President of Chile, Pinochet spent his time well. He passed a
series of "tying-up" laws (leyes de amarre) which ensured that it would be
difficult for the next government to change the Constitution or to influence
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the behaviour of the military. Pinochet safeguarded his own position
through the Organic Law of the Armed Forces (Ley Organica de las
Fuerzas Armadas), which guaranteed his remaining Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, and also made the arme d forces virtually independent
of civilian control. Pinochet s main aims were to secure his own personal
power as the Commander-in-Chief, strengthen the position of the military
in the pyramid of power, secure impunity for the military, limit the
democratic institutions' controlover the military, and secure for himself a
personal influence in civilian matters. Przeworski lists ten points summng
up the price extorted by Pinochet for his consent to free elections:
* permanent office for the current commanders in chief of the armed forces
and the police;
* protection of the "pre stige of members of the military and the police";
* an "energetie struggle against terrorism";
* respect for the opinions of a national security council to be forme d by
four military representatives and four civilians;
* maintenance of the amnesty covering political crimes committed between
1973 and 1978;
* abstention by the political authorities from intervening in the definition
and application of defense policies, including not modifying the powers
of military courts, the command structure, and the military budget and
not interfering in the promotion of generals (normally a presidential
prerogative );
* the right to name nine members of the Senate;
* autonomy of the central bank, the president of which was chosen by the
military;
* acceptance of privatization conducted during the last months of the
military regime without investigation of how they were conducted; and
* automatie allocation of 20 per cent of copper revenues for the military
budget (Przeworski 1991: 78).
All ten points directly or indirectly strengthened the position of the military
vis-à-vis the civil government, thus decreasing the chances of the military
being held responsible for the human rights violations commtted under
authoritarian rule. Furthermore, Pinochet depended on the Supreme Court
to uphold the legality of the amnesty, and on the Senate, where the
"institutional senators" were likely to form a majority together with those
elected from the Right, thus blocking any political initiative to overturn
Pinochet s carefully negotiated terms of ensuring military indemnity. These
terms were submitted to the voters on 30 July 1989, in which 85.7 per cent
voted for the changes in an extremely high electoral turn out. In order to
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strengthen the position of his supporters in the forthcoming elections,
Pinochet had a new electorallaw passed in early 1989, which introduced
an electoral system favouring the candidates from the Right. 27 After
intense negotiation between the opposition parties, Patricio Aylwin from the
Christian Democratic Party was chosen as the presidential candidate of the
multi-party alliance Concertación. Various parties of the Left agreed to
support his candidacy, resulting in a strong Centre-Left coalition.28
In the March 1990 elections Aylwin received 55.2 per cent of the vote
to the representative for the coalition of conservative parties, Hernán
Büchi's 29.4 per cent, and Francisco Javier Errázuriz' 15.4 per cent,
campaigning on an independent ticket.29 Although the Concertación had
been able to bring about a few reforms, their majority in the elections was
not great enough to neutralize the power of the Right in the legislature.3o
Stated broadly, the democratic opposition traded away economic reform in
return for political democratization. At the heart of this implicit "pact" was
the commtment of the reformist political parties (representing the middle
class and some sectors of labour) to pragmatic neoliberalism in return for
a promise from the businessmen, landowners, and conservative political
parties accepting limited political change. Aylwin knew that to gain a
majority over the Right, the parties of the Centre and the Left had to assure
some support of Centre-Right wing forces. There were other important
trade-offs too, particularly affecting the human rights issue. Before
proceeding to the success and failures of the human rights policies of
Alfonsín and Aylwin in the following chapter, it is in its place to again
27 The traditional proportional representative system was replaced by the "binomial"
system, and district lines were redrawn. See Rabkin 1992 for a fuller account of the new
electoral law which was to be used in forthcoming presidential elections.
28 One should keep in mind that the two largest parties of the Concertación, the Christian
Democrats and the Socialists, were subject to their own intern al political factionalism;
the Christian Democrats due to disagreements on presidential candidate, and the
Socialists were divided on ideological differences (Rabkin 1992).
29 The coalition of conservative parties, Democracia Progresa, included Renovación
Nacional (RN) and Unión Demócrata Independiente (UD I).
30 Out of 120 seats in the lower house the Concertación gained 55 and the right-wing
allance, the Democracy and Progress Party (Democracia y Progresa) gained 40. The
Concertación gained 17 out of 38 seats in the Senate to the Right' s 8, plus 4
independents. The Right' s majority was strengthened by the presence of 9 non-elected
senators designated by Pinochet, and obviously sympathetic to the incumbent regime.
Four of these were ex-commanders of each of the branches of the armed forces and the
Carabineros (de Brito 1992: 32).
87
stress the main differences between the transition processes of Chile and
Argentina.
3.4 Comparing the two transitions
The transition from "bureaucratic-authoritarian rule" to constitutional
democracy in Argentina and Chile differ on at least two central dimensions:
the duration of the transition and the way regime change came about.
Although the two transitions to democratic rule started at about the same
time, i.e. early 1980s, the Argentine transition was of remarkably shorter
duration; barely three years as compared with Chile's nine. Due to its
speed, the Argentinean transition proeess was distinguished by overlapping
stages of liberalization and democratizatIon. In Chile, the two stages were
clearly identifiable. It is of particular relevance that the Argentine arme d .
forces had less than two months from the presidential elections until the
formal presidential inauguration in which to take measures to secure their
own interests and influence the new civilian government regarding its
prospective human rights policy. By contrast, the time span of sixteen
months from Pinochet lost the plebiscite until Aylwin actually received the
presidential insignia, gave the military in Chile ample opportunity to
carefully prepare its departure by securing its interests through various legal
and constitutional measures.
This closely links up with the different manner in which the military
government handed over its power to the civilian government. In Argentina,
the military government was more or less forced out of power by an
increasingly discontented and massive opposition, who were weary of brutal
repression and economic mismanagement over time, and spurred into action
by the total disillusion after the crushing defeat suffered by the military in
the Malvinas/Falklands war. The Argentine military failed to strike a deal
with the Peronists and were to a large extent forced to leave their future
position at the mercy of the democratically elected government. The
Chilean transition was much more lengthy and accordingly also more
controlled. Pinochet thought he had the Chilean situation totally in his hand,
until he unexpectedly lost the plebiscite in 1988. Ironically, the Chilean
transition to civilian government was an unintended consequence of
Pinochet s attempt at institutionalizing personal power by searching
plebiscitarian ratification of the 1980 Constitution. Since he had set the
rules (i.e. promising presidential elections in 1988), it was practically
impossible for him to refuse the transfer to constitutional government after
the plebiscite. Pinochet did, however, retain one of the most important post
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in the Chilean power game: that of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces.
To sum up, we are dealing with two clearly distinet modes of transition.
Neither fits any of the ideal modes given by Karl and Schmitter in Figure
1, section 1.4. The main features of the Argentine transition were the speed
of the proeess, the overlapping stages of liberalization and democratization,
the high lev el of mass mobilization during the transition, and the absence
of pacts between civilian authority and the armed forces (Karl 1991: 179).
Argentina accordingly contains elements of several modes of transition, but
may be aptly summarized as a transition by collapse. Chile is characterized
by a slow and carefully negotiated transition with clear stages of
liberalization and democratization, a lower level of mass mobilization
during the transition, and the presenee of a number of agreements between
the outgoing military and the incoming democratically elected elites,
although there was no formal pact of the type Club Naval in Uruguay.31
Chile may be best described as an mixture of pact-making and imposition,
where the latter dominates. To use Karl and Schmitter' s terminology: Chile
constitutes an example of extrication.
What were the outcomes of these two so different transitions? The
Argentine military' s failure to strike a pact with the Peronists gave them
few opportunities to influence the rules of the new democratic game or
secure that they would not be prosecuted for gross human rights violations
committed during their rule. The weakness of the military at the moment
of transition should therefore theoretically speaking leave the new civil
government quite free to choose its policies on past human rights
violations, thus standing a good chanee of bringing the military under
civilian control and ensuring democratic consolidation. Internally split and
divided into countless competing factions, the Argentine military initially
represented a feeble opposition to the Alfonsín government. In Chile, on the
other hand, the democratically elected government inherited a political
system full of constitutional and judicial constraints legalized by the 1980
Constitution. Moreover, the democratie government knew it would have to
deal with a still highly potent and coherent military, with Pinochet as its
31 Acuerdo del Club Naval of November 1984 was an explicit political pact signed by
representatives of the armed forces and most of the opposition parties. The pact was
never implemented (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead VoL. 2, 1986: 6). It may be
added that this so-called Naval Pact made the Uruguayan transition to democracy one
of the most clear-cut cases of pact-making, using Karl and Schmitter's definition as
outlined in Chapter 1.4.
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top leader and many of his men in important governing positions within the
state, the judicial, and the administrative apparatus.
Ergo, our analysis of Chile and Argentina' s transitions lends support to
both of the hypotheses we set out to test at the beginning of this chapter.
We may conclude then that different modes of transition do lead to
different types of democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 269), and that the
form of the Argentine transition supports O' Donnell' s hypothesis that "the
case of transition by regime collapse is the one most likely to lead to a
fuller, less restricted type of political democracy" (O'Donnell 1986: 8-9).
At least, this is true for the moment of transition to democratic rule, but
what happens when taking one step further to the consolidation phase? Is
it still true that regime collapse bodes better for a full and less restrictive
type of democracy? The immediate conclusion to be drawn from the above
discussion would lead one to think that the newly established democracy
in Argentina would stand a better chanee in bringing about democratic
consolidation than Chile. We may agree that the modes of transition indeed
do set the framework for democratic consolidation, in that the
democratically elected government inherits a smaller or larger amount of
judicial, constitutional, and political constraints from the outgoing military
government. Nevertheless, as I will argue in the following chapter, the
proeess does not stop there. In order to determine what type of democracy
will follow after a transition, one has to take into account the policies
pursued by the new democratic governments, as well as what kind of
support these policies are given by civil society. Regarding the role of civil
society, I will assert that human rights organizations and political parties
played a more pragmatic and coordinated role in Chile than in Argentina,
as the defeat in the Malvinas literally brought people to the streets in tens
of thousands. In the long run the electoral victory won by the civilian
opposition in Chile came to favour democratic consolidation, whereas the
total military defeat suffered by the Argentine military brought civilian rule
back in alright, but left behind a split and largely uncoordinated opposition.
Moreover, I will argue that one has to take into account revers als in power
distribution and political alliances posterior to the reintroduction of
democratie rule when accounting for the proeess of democratic
consolidation in Chile and Argentina. Perhaps the connection between the
mode of transition and democratie consolidation is not as straight-forward
as predicted by Karl, Schmitter, and O' Donnell.
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4. Consolidation? Moral idealism versus
political realism
4.1 "Truth" , "justiee" , and "reconciliation"
Does transition by regime collapse favour civilian controlover the military
in the long run? It has repeatedly been mentioned that the pending variable
in establishing a consolidated democracy in the Latin American context is
to ensure civilian controlover the military. Furthermore, it has been argued
that the issue causing the greatest strain in civil-military relations in the
cases of Chile and Argentina has been the legacy of past gross human
rights violations. This brings us over to the central dilemma faced by
democratically elected governments: the paradox of democratie
consolidation is, on the one hand, to press for a fuller democracy by
bringing the military under civilian rule, which inherently involves
resolving the legacy of past gross human rights violations, and, on the other
hand, to refrain from provoking the military into staging authoritarian
reversals. 1 Pursuing these arguments, the main objective of this chapter is
to account for how this dilemma has been resolved in the cases of Chile
and Argentina by analyzing the policies followed in the field of human
rights after the reintroduction of democratic rule.
So far, we have focused mainly on the form, i.e. the mode, of transition.
It is time to turn to the substance of the transition, meaning those matters
mostly affecting the balance of power and alliances made between different
groups in society in the process of reconstructing democracy. As argued in
the previous chapter, the rules or framework for the human rights policies
to be followed were largely set at the transition from one regime type to
another through agreements, or the lack of such, between outgoing military
and incoming civilian elites. Evaluating the relative strength of the military
The essence of this problématique has been briliantly captured by Manuel Antonio
Garretón in his article "Human Rights in Processes of Democratization", where he
sketches the conflcting aims between the "ethical-symbolical logic" proposing a radical
solution to the legacy of past human rights violations on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, the "political-state logic" in which avoiding authoritarian regression is the main
objective of the post-transitional government (Garretón 1994: 223-24).
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forces versus the civilian authorities in a transition situation does indeed
bear on the form of the transition, but it fails to point out the reason why
these positions of relative strength should be studied.
Both the Argentinean and Chile an democratically elected governments
were under intense pressure from the civilian population to confront the
legacy of past gross human rights violations. The issue was first raised by
human rights organizations, and later taken on by the political parties. How
can a country overcome a legacy of a dictatorial rule and massive human
rights violations if the new government is subject to significant institutional
and political constraints? How may a country under such circumstances
succeed in harmonizing the. conflicting objectives of justiee and social
peace? (Zalaquett 1990).
Linked to this ethical-political dilemma there are three emotionally laden
concepts which have been salient in the human rights debate in both Chile
and Argentina, namely "truth", "justice", and "reconciliation" .When
discussing an emotive issue like human rights violations, it is clearly
difficult to remain neutral. Obviously, there is no such thing as an objective
"truth", as all facts are open to interpretation. Nevertheless, "truth" was
actively us ed in the human rights debate to mean the revealing of facts
about human rights violations commtted by the outgoing military regimes.
The public had two main claims. The first was to know what had actually
taken place; how many people had been victims of violence and to what
type of violence, as well as learn the fate of thousands who had
disappeared. Disappearance had, as we know, been systematically denied
by the military governments in both countries. Moreover, people demanded
to have the names of the perpetrators revealed. The attainment of both these
aims will henceforth be referred to as "complete truth" . The term "justice"
refers to holding the violaters of human rights responsible for their crimes
by taking them to court and having them convicted, i.e. ensuring legal
justice. Closely linked to "truth" and "justice" is the term "reconciliation".
Strictly speaking, the term "reconciliation" has no precise meaning, but has
been frequently employed in the human rights debate to denote the spirit
of unit y and cooperation, i.e. bring both a split civilian population together
and harmonize civil-military relations in an effort to ensure democratic
consolidation. To a large ex tent, the possibility of reconciliation has rested
on the measures Jaken to establish the facts about past gross human rights
violations and secure justiee in the form of criminal punishment. It should
be added that the Church has advocated yet another way to obtain
reconciliation: through forgiveness and pardon.
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4.1.1 Policy measures in the field of human rights
An efficient human rights policy should have two main functions: prevent
similar crimes from taking place in the future and rep air the wrongs
committed in the past (Zalaquett 1991: 151).2 All three terms discussed
above form part of preventiv e and reparational measures. The two main
criteria for revealing facts about past human rights violations are
thoroughness and public disclosure in order to take just action and insure
against arbitrariness or mere revenge, and also to pre vent further abuses
from happening. Furthermore, knowing the facts is also an imperative for
promoting national unit y , which is to a large extent based upon a common
understanding of the past. Disclosing the "truth" is in itself a measure of
reparation, in that the victims and their families are taken seriously by the
new government and thereby have their dignity publicly restored. Finally ,
publicizing the "truth" represents an attempt to restore a sense of national
dignity and faith in democratic government and institutions, largely
destroyed by the authoritarian government, and essential to the survival of
political democracy (de Brito 1992: 1).
Once the facts about the human rights violations commtted in the past
have been established, the new democratic government may move on to
deal with other measures seeking the objectives of prevention and
reparation. In many cases, such as those of murder or disappearance, total
reparation is obviously an impossibility, since one cannot restore life to the
dead. Neither can one erase years of uncertainty and fear. However, the
democratie government may take economic, legal, and medical measures
to compensate the victims and their families for crimes committed against
them in the past, thereby facilitating the resolution of some legal,
administrative, and practical matters, such as remariage or inheritance.
Apart from material or legal benefits, symbolical gestures may also serve
the purpose of reparation. The most controversial issue related to the
objective of prevention is that of ensuring justice. Punishing perpetrators for
their crimes is a necessary part of the proeess of reconciliation and restores
confidence in democratic mechanisms, especially the judicial system. When
dealing with the sensitive issue of gross human rights violations, it is
particularly important to take the following points into consideration in
order to minimize military protest: (1) criminal responsibility is individual,
not institutional or collective; (2) nobody should be tried by special
2 The following largely theoretical discussion draws heavily on Zalaquetts (1991b) article
"Derechos Humanos y Limitaciones Políticas en las Transiciones Democráticas del Cono
Sur".
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commssions, but by previously established tribunals; and (3) the trial
should be in accordance with accepted rules of justiee (presumption of
innocence, right to defence, public process etc.). Moreover, one should
ensure the respect of internationallaw (Zalaquett 1991b: 156-57).
Zalaquett claims that clemency (in the form of amnesty laws, pardons,
or reduction of jail sentences) may also have a preventive function in
situations where pacification through political stability is conducive to an
increased respect for human rights, rather than running the risk of upsetting
the democratization process through pressing for punishment of the
criminals. However, the long-term historical effects of clemency cannot be
foreseen. In cases where there are measures of clemency, one should check
whether the content of the human rights policy is in accordance with
International Law. 3 The problem of individual responsibility may be posed
in the following question: when soldiers or police, obeying superior orders,
commit atrocities in times of war or violate human rights, can they be held
responsible for their actions? The principal international norm for guidance
in these matters is the hotly debated fourth principle of the Nuremberg,
which affirms that obeying orders does not necessarily constitute a
foundation for exempting criminal responsibility.4 However, the inter-
pretation of this inter-national principle of obediencia debida, or "due
obedience", has on many occas-ions proved to be difficult, as will be seen
when discussing the Argentinean case.
To sum up, the two most central points in the above discussion is that
disclosing the facts about past human rights violations is a necessary first
step in obtaining other measures of reparation or prevention, and that
reaching justice in the form of criminal punishment is perhaps the most
3 In December 1946, the V.N. General Assembly asked the International Law Commission
to draft a set of legal principles based on Nuremberg; an initiative which materialized
in 1950. The sixth principle contains three separate categories of "international crime":
crimes against peace; war crimes; and crimes against humanity (Guest 1990: 473; Conot
1983: 520).
4 The debate over the principle of "due obedience" dates back to the Nuremberg trials
after the Second World War, when the guilt of under-officers and subordinates in the
Holocost was disputed. In the verdict of the generals it was concluded that "due
obedience" was no reason for mitigation and that "the defense of superior orders can be
valid only when a person has no volition to refuse, or no capability of forming an
independent judgment" (Co not 1 983: 5 1 3). Goebbels himself is reported to have said the
following: "It is not provided in any military law that a soldier in the case of a
despicable crime is exempt from punishment because he passes the responsibility to his
superior, especially if the orders of the latter are in evident contradiction to all human
morality and every international usage of warfare" (Conot 1983: 513).
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controversial issue that newly elected democratic govemments have to deal
with. After an authoritarian period of systematic human rights violations,
a new democratically elected government is usually faced with the
expectation of fulfilling one or more of the following goals: (1) reach a
certain degree of national unit y and reconciliation; (2) create or reconstruct
institutions conducive to a stable and just political system; and (3) secure
an economic policy which will sustain the two first objectives, as
experience shows that economic prosperity markedly contributes to political
stability. The following analysis of the consolidation processes in Argentina
and Chile will focus on primarilyon the first point, that of reconciliation,
and the preventive and reparational measures taken to obtain this goal.
Other policy goals outside the field of human rights will be dealt with only
briefly. The aims, on the one hand, of promoting truth and justice and, on
the other, outlining a policy which does not upset civil-military relations so
much that the military can find an pretext for staging another coup, may to
some degree be incompatible. To what extent have AlfonsÍn and Aylwin
been able to successfully cope with this dilemma?
4.2 Moralobligations and presidential prornises
Truth, justice, and reconciliation were all central concepts in the election
campaigns of Aylwin and Alfonsín, whose stances on human rights issues
accounted for the large support they mobilized. The massive claim for truth
and justiee presented by the Church, the human rights organizations,
numerous individuals, and the international community forced the two
presidents to place the human rights issue on top of their political agendas.
The presidents were, perhaps more than anything else, set on achieving
reconciliation, since they saw this as vital to democratic stability and hence
to their own position in power. To quote Burns, "...months before Alfonsín
came to power, human rights had become the issue in Argentine polities" ,
and "...by the end of the military regime human rights were a source of
public debate in Argentina which could no longer be ignored" (Burns 1987:
158-60). In Chile too, the human rights question had been a unifying issue
for the opposition after 1978 (Orellana 1991c: 118). The two presidents had
to walk a very fine line between satisfying the demands of the people for
truth and justice, and at the same time not go so far in their concessions as
to provoke a reaction from the military. The strategies opted for by
Alfonsín and Aylwin show that what was actually achievable in terms of
truth and justiee was severely limited by a series of judicial, constitutional,
and political constraints.
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AlfonsÍn devoted much of his election campaign to political issues related
to human rights, political democratization, and the consolidation of
democracy.5 He wanted to recreate faith in the democratie institutions,
which had been severely eroded during authoritarian rule, and establish "the
rules of the game". As previously argued, it is the universal acceptance of
these rules that forms the basis for a functioning democracy (Przeworski
1991: 26). In order to achieve his aims, it was of crucial importance to
AlfonsÍn to gain the support of the political opposition parties and the
sceptical economic interest groups, as well as that of his adherents; not an
easy task in a party system as polarized as the Argentinean. AlfonsÍn
cautiously tried to include the opposition in the policy-making proeess in
order to ensure respect for the rules and so as not to encourage the
opposition to once again turn to the military if things turne d out not to ga
their way. One element in AlfonsÍn's strategy was to promise to restore to
Congress its importance in the discussion of political matters, which would
increase the opposition's say in the political process. The lawyer AlfonsÍn
further promised to respect the independence of the judiciary and to abide
by the rule of law. This meant that those military men and terrorists guilty
of human rights violations would be brought to justice. AlfonsÍn
specifically called for an assessment of the excesses commtted in the dirty
war to establish "the responsibility if those who made the political
decisions, the responsibility of those who in that struggle went beyond the
orders received, and the responsibility of those who in that struggle found
themselves subject to orders that led them to believe that their actions were
legitimate".6
In the field of civil-military relations, AlfonsÍn made several promises.
Jf elected, he would repeal the amnesty law passed by the military, reform
the armed forces, and, once and for all, bring them under civilian control.
In his address to the Radical Party (UCR) on 31 July 1983, he declared that
he would abolish compulsory military service; curb military spending to
within 2 per cent of the gross national product as opposed to its then
5 In the field of economics, AlfonsÍn promised to revitalize the economy by putting
emphasis on economicgrowth and making a tough stand on the renegotiation of the
foreign debt with the International Monetary Fund and the foreign banks, and bring
down inflation to tolerable levels by adopting stabilization measures whose cost would
be equitably shared by everyone. The Argentine president also promised to reform the
statute regulating the internal organization of the unions and their rights befare the state,
including their right to strike, unions' intern al elections, and the control of unions' dues
and welfare benefits. See Snow and Manzetti 1993 for AlfonsÍn's policy on labour
unions.
6 Speech given by AlfonsÍn on 28 lune 1983 (Keesing's 1983: 32554).
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present level of about 10 per cent; reform the code of military justice to
bring it more in line with civil justice; and create a special body to make
available "privileg ed information" to organizations dedicated to the defence
of human rights (Keesing's 1983: 32555). AlfonsÍn was prepared to walk
the political tightrope. Human rights would not be ignored, but the
President also had to take into account the seemingly irreconcilable
positions of the two extremes of the political spectrum. In the words of
Burns, "to govern and survive would require some political fine-tuning: a
sense of ethics but also a good dose of pragmatism" (Burns 1987: 163).
Compromise and bargaining were thus indispensable, but AlfonsÍn still tried
to stick as closely as possible to his original policy program.
In Chile considerable social conflict and political instability was
anticipated to accompany the return to democracy. The need to confront
human rights abuses during the military government was a potentially
explosive political issue. Few people believed that the multiparty coalition
Concertación, headed by president elect Aylwin, would hold together well
enough to govern (Rabkin 1992: 119-20). Aylwin therefore had to be
careful with his promises to the nation. The parties of the Left and Centre-
Left who supported his candidacy were actively involved in setting up a
human rights agenda already during the presidential campaign (de Brito
1993: 586). Many of the party members of the Concertación had
experienced political repression, which made them prone to consider human
rights and democratic institutions as indispensable in a democratic system.
Shortly after the presidential inauguration, Aylwin consulted human rights
organizations, relatives of victims of human rights violations, and
representatives from a broad range of political parties for their
recommendations. Rather than pursuingjustice through full-fledged military
trials, Aylwin advocated a strategy of constitutional reform as a way to
gradually re-establish a return to democratic self-government. The President
stated two main objectives: to repair the damage caused by human rights
violations, both to individual victims and to society as a whole, and to
prevent such atrocities from ever happening again (Zalaquett 1990: 1).
Because he needed support from the party leaders of either of the two
right-wing parties closely associated with Pinochet (RN and UDI) for his
policy in the legislature, once in office, Aylwin chose to concentrate on
labour law reform, tax reform, and municipal democratization, postponing
such difficult issues as increasing presidential power to dismiss military
service chiefs, eliminating designated Senators, and reintroducing
proportional representation. This was clearly a pragmatie political
manoeuvre. In the field of human rights, Aylwin had given promises of
reparation and prevention, chiefly through giving "the whole truth, and
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justice to the extent possible". The difficult part was how to achieve these
goals. Aylwin, in implementing his policy, had to take several important
factors into consideration. The nature and extent of human rights violations
would influence the investigation proeess. Further, the restrictions imposed
byexisting laws and institutions had to be taken into account when
assessing what was feasible to attain in the form of legal measures. The
likely reaction of the military forces had to be reckoned with. Chile had the
experiences of its two neighbouring countries, Argentina and Uruguay, to
draw on. Argentina had emphasized truth-telling through the issuing of a
thorough report on disappearances. The report was accompanied by the
trials of a handful military generaIs, but the verdict was later reversed,
setting the generals free. In Uruguay some measures of reparation were
taken. However, since forgiveness was the main Uruguayan policy line, no
substantial governmental fact-finding reports were issued and no
prosecutions held.7 When dissatisfied citizens pressed for a referendum on
the issue of repealing the law which precluded prosecutions, the outcome
was negative, leaving a bitterly divided society. The Aylwin administration
was therefore more realistic - and pragmatic - in its choice of policy. It
should be a policy that could be sustained.
To what degree was it possible to keep promises of "truth, justice, and
reconciliation" in a political reality full of constraints? How did the two
presidents deal specifically with the issues of truth and justice, which
together were aimed at contributing towards national reconciliation and to
the consolidation of democracy? Political reality and presidential
performance is the central topic of the discussion to follow, starting with
the attempts at establishing the facts regarding gross human rights violation
caried out by the preceding military regimes.
4.3 "Truth": Nunca Más and Informe Rettig
The "truth-telling", or fact-finding, projects in Argentina and Chile were
initiated after the restoration of civil rule, when hopes for justice and
reconciliation were at a peak. Two weeks after coming to power, AlfonsÍn
announced that the Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desaparición de Personas,
CONADEP (National Commssion on Disappeared Persons) would be set
7 Latin American Weekly Report reported that amnesty was chosen "as a lesser evil" in
Uruguay when an amnesty bil for the military and police officers implicated in human
rights crimes was passed on 22 December 1987 (Latin American Weekly Report, WR-87-
1: 8).
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Up.8 He appointed a thirteen member fact-finding commttee.9 Headed by
the writer Ernesto Sábato, the committee was to be assisted by a staff of
sixty. They worked for nine months to complete the 500 pages of the so-
called Nunca Más report, which was published in November 1984.10 It
was the first report of its kind and came to serve as a model for other Latin
American countries, as similar reports were soon issued in Uruguay, Brazil,
and finally Chile in 1991.11 Aylwin copied the Argentine model by
appointing the eight-member Rettig Commission, named after its president
Raúl Rettig.12 A six-month limit, later expanded to nine months, was
initially set for the Rettig Commssion to present its findings. The so-called
Informe Rettig was issued in February 1991.13 The well-defined and
8 The CONADEP was created by Decree Law 187/83 on 15 December 1983, ordered by
the National Executive, as part of the two-fold strategy of "truth-telling" and justice.
9 Alfonsín asked the two Houses to send three representatives to integrate the Commssion,
but only the House of Deputies did. Deputies Santiago Marcelino López, Hugo Diogenes
Piucil, and Horacio Hugo Huarte, all from the Radical Party, were sent on 6 March
1984. Members of the Peronist Party and central representatives of human rights
organizations, such as Adolfo Pérez Esquivel and Augusto Conte McDonnell, refused
to join the CONADEP. Dr. Emilio Mignone (head of CELS) turned down a request to
give legal advice.
10 The official name of the report is Argentina Nunca Más: ElInforme de la Comisión
Nacional de Desaparición de Personas. 1984. Buenos Aires: Editorial Universidad de
Buenos Aires.
l l In Chile Supreme Decree Law 355 of 25 April 1990 ordered the creation of Comisión
Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (National Commssion for Truth and
Reconciliation), as the key element in the governments' human rights policy. Different
from the report projects in Uruguay and Brazil, the report projects in Argentina and
Chile were directed by government appointed committees of notables working together
with human rights non-governmental groups and specialists. In general, the reports of
Chile and Argentina differ considerably from those of Brazil and Uruguay in terms of
who took the initiative, when the reports were worked out (during or after the military
regime), how long the projects to ok, what their aims were, who supported the projects,
funding, staff, whether the commissions had. access to military archives or not, the
context of publication etc. (de Brito 1992).
12 Alfonsín was careful to invite people from other political persuasions than his own. The
Right sympathetic to the Pinochet regime were represented in the Commission by Cea
Engana, Novoa Vasquez, Gonzalo Vial, and Martin Diaz, who had been a Minister of
the Supreme Court under Pinochet. Some people from the political right, such as the
Renovación Nacional members Ricardo Rivadeneira and Fransisco Bulnes, refused
Aylwin's invitation.
13 The full name of the report is Informe Rettig: Informe de la Comisión Nacional de
Verdad y Reconcilación. Volurnes 1 and 2. 1991. Santiago: Talleres de la Nación.
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relatively brief time limit set for the completion of both reports showed the
governments' intentions of taking the human rights matter seriously, while
at the same time giving itself a grace period before it had to deal with the
results of the reports and giv e recommendations for further action.
4.3.1 Support
The birth of the CONADEP was opposed by members of the democratic
opposition and several of the human rights organizations, since many
Argentineans wanted an independent commission. Two of the eight human
rights organizations, the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo and the Liga, positively
refused to cooperate with the Sábato Commssion in making the report. The
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo accused the commttee appointed by AlfonsÍn
of being partial and marched on Congress on 3 J anuary 1984 to protest the
passing of the military code reform and to demand the setting up of a bi-
cameral investigating commission into the fate of the disappeared. The
centrality of the Mothers in the human rights movement made their
radicalization colour the relationship between the government and the
human rights organizations in general (de Brito 1991: 42) There was no
ro om for conciliatory politics in Argentina since many of the human rights
organizations, led by the Mothers, believed in the institutional guilt of the
armed forces; a point I will return to in the final chapter.
The Rettig Commssion in Chile, unlike its Argentinean counterpart, was
not faced with a vocal and activist democratic opposition from the Left.
Without exception, all the human rights organizations supported the
commssion and offered their cooperation. Informe Rettig was based on the
same fundamental principles as the Nunca Más report, but in many ways
greatly improved on it, since the Commssion had learned from the
mistakes of its role model. The fact that four of its eight appointed
members were representatives of the right-wing parties, made the end
product more credible, because people knew it was not an entirely one-
sided report. In his strategic move of insisting on an even-numbered
commttee with representativ es from all sides of the political spectrm,
Aylwin assured that it took the cooperation of more than half of its
members to get anything done. This gave the commssion a quality of
legitimacy from the very start.
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4.3.2 Aims
The aims of these reports were quite similar, expressing a common hope
for justice and a renewed commtment to democracy after the regime
transition. Most importantly, the reports stated in their introductions and
concluding remarks the wish to contribute to the prevention of repetition of
history by not allowing the past to be forgotten. 14 They aimed to
counteract the silenee of the military regimes by disclosing the facts about
their crimes. More specifically, the Chilean Commsion's task was to
establish the most complete picture of the most serious violations of
human rights resulting in death and disappearances perpetrated by agents
of the state or by private citizens with political motives; gather
information that would permit the identification of the victims and
establish their fate and whereabouts; recommend just reparation measures;
and (outline) those rules which should be adopted to prevent and deter the
commssion of new violations (Summary of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Report 1992: 11).
The Nunca Más stressed that its mission was not to investigate the crimes
of the military regime, but to strictly investigate the fate of the disappeared,
indicating the main concern in the field of human rights in Argentina. 
15
As mentioned in section 2.4 when presenting the "repressive map" of Chile,
the Chile an report interestingly included violations commtted by private
non-state individuals "for political reasons or pretexts", considered terrorist
acts when "theyare acts against indiscriminate victims, as well as selective
attacks, when these involve no risk, against agents of governments"
(Summa ry of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report 1992: 15).
Strictlyspeakng, these do not qualify as human rights violations according
to our working definition, but Aylwin felt it was necessary to include
"terrorist acts" in the report in order to make the picture of violation as
complete as possible. Public concem with terrorism was high in Chile, and
this tactical move was probably an attempt to distribute guilt between the
Right and the Left, in order to avoid being criticized as one-sided.16
14 This is particularly reflected in the tide of the Argentine report, which similarly to its
Brazilian and Uruguayan counterparts, bears the name Nunca Más, or "Never Again".
Ropes for truth and reconciliation are embedded in the tide of the Chilean report.
15 "Nuestra misión no era la de investigar sus crímenes sino estrictamente la su erte corrido
por los desaparecidos..." (Nunca Más 1991: 11).
16 The assassination attempts of General Leigh and General Enrique Ruiz on 21 March
1990, only ten days after Aylwin had taken office, show ed that the new president had
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Finally, both reports aimed at playing a positive role in the proeess of
social healing and national reconciliation.
4.3.3 The findings of the reports
The commssions received documents from human rights organizations and
testimonies at central offices which were set up all around the country in
order to give all people a fair chanee to present their complaints. Requests
for information were sent to national and international public bodies,
including the military, ministries, and embassies. Members of the
commissions also travelled abroad in order to receive testimony from
foreigners and nationals in exileo Given the financial and moral state
sponsorship, the two commissions enjoyed a high degree of credibility and
were able to work efficiently, as documented by their voluminous findings.
The majority of the details of the findings of the two reports as far as
victims are concerned, are presented in Chapter 2 in the section outlining
the repressive maps of the two countries. To avoid repetition, I will
therefore only give a brief account of the contents of the reports, so as to
indicate their central elements.
The Sábato Commssion in Argentina had focused especially on the issue
of detained-disappeared. The first part of the report gave an overall picture
of the repression taking place under military rule. It focused on the
sequence kidnapping-disappearance-torture by giving a detailed account of
how kidnapping was carried out; what kind of torture was employed; and
where the torture took place.17 A large section was devoted to a detail ed
description of the 340 detention centres spread all over Argentina. The first
part of the report also touche d upon the attitude of certain members of the
Catholic Church towards governmental repression and placed the repression
in a Latin American context. Based on thousands of witnesses' reports
(many of them cited in the report) and official documentation from most
human rights organizations, the second part of the Nunca Más report
to lead a "balancing act between moral commitment and political prudence" on the issue
which was "potentially the most de-stabilizing for a successful transition" (de Brito 1992:
35-36).
17 In the introduction of the report the authors state that "...nos autorizan aaseverar que
existió una metología represiva concebida para producir actos y situaciones como los que
en adelante se informarán, cuya sequencia secuestro-desaparición-tortura, será analizada
en los capítulos siguientes" (Nunca Más 1991: 15).
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documented the disappearance of 8,960 people.18 Among the disappeared
were people of all ages, from all sectors of society, and from a diversity of
occupational backgrounds: pregnant women, children, youth, religious
people, conscripts, journalists, workers, just to mention some of the groups
that were attributed special treatment in the report. The third part of Nunca
Más was devoted to the ro le of the judicial power in period of forced
disappearances. It covered such aspects as habeas corpus; the treatment of
detained persons by the courts; and the forced disappearance of lawyers and
other people taking active part in the defence of victims of gross human
rights violations. There were also some brief remarks on the attitude of the
international community. Finally , there was a section on the creation and
organization of the CONADEP, the doctrine of national security, and a few
pages on recommendations to reparative measures.
The Informe Rettig was, as earlier mentioned, modelled on the Nunca
Más report. Learning from the shortcomings of its predecessor, the Informe
Rettig was in many respects an improved product. It covered a greater
spectrum of gross human rights violations by including victims that died as
a result of execution, torture, disappearance, and political violence. In
addition to the widely accepted types of gross human rights abuses, the
Rettig Commission investigated cases where people had been killed by non-
statal agents for political reasons. Ninety such deaths were recorded and
documented. In all, the Rettig Commssion investigated a total of 2,920
cases of deaths and disappearances. 2,115 cases were recorded as victims
of gross human rights violations, and 164 cases were recorded as victims
of political violence. No conclusions were reached in the remaining 641
cases, due to insufficient sources of documentation. The names, ages,
occupation, and political affiliation of all victims were registered and
painstakingly listed case by case in the third volume of the Informe Rettig.
Besides this thorough documentation of individual victims, large parts of
the two first volumes of the report were devoted to giving a picture of the
political context of the coup; the different stages of repression; the types of
repression; who the repression was aimed at; and the reaction to the
repression by various actors, such as political parties, the human rights
18 The figure indicates the number of people who were stil missing when the report was
written in 1984. The names of all the victims belonging to the category of detained-
disappeared whose cases have not been resolved are listed in a separate annex to the
Nunca Más report. It is stated in the report that the list of names is not exhaustive, as
the Commssion assumes that many cases of disappearance were never reported: "Es ta
cifra no puede considerarse definitiva, toda vez que la CONADEP ha comprobado que
son muchos los casos de desapariciones que no fueron denunciados" (Nunca Más 1991:
479).
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organizations, the Catholic Church etc. Informe Rettig also included a
substantial section on recommendations for financial recompensation, on
which all the human rights organizations were invited to give their opinion.
In Argentina, as well as in Chile, people who had not dared to giv e
testimony during the dictatorship were offered a new opportunity by the
commssions set up by AlfonsÍn and Aylwin. One may argue that ignorance
of the existence of these commssions, fear, or the lack of confidence in the
new government and hence in the purpose of the commission, kept people
from testifying, hence the big variance in accepted figures on the
disappeared. The discussion of who is right and who is wrong is not a
subject here. Arguments on both sides are included to give an impression
of how difficult it is to operate with cold numbers on an emotional topic
such as the inhuman policy of disappearances.
4.3.4 Reactions to the reports
AlfonsÍn' s support of the CONADEP increased public awareness of the
report. The publication of military crimes in Argentina shocked large parts
of the middle and upper classes, who had mistakenly believed that the "war
against subversion" had only been targeted at Marxists and terrorists. On
the day of the launching of the Nunca Más report, an estimated 30,000
people from all major political groups and human rights organizations
marched outside the Casa Rosada (the Pink Palace, where the President
held residence, close to the Plaza de Mayo) in support of the report. The
situation became polarized in that important groups, such as the Mothers
of Plaza de Mayo and the General Confederation of Labour, refused to
participate in the march. The human rights organizations were not satisfied
with the Nunca Más report, but the dissatisfaction was less over the report' s
quality than over its inadequacy. The more radical groups criticized the
report for being a biased product revealing only half-truths; a report issued
by a government obviously interested in placating the military . Anything
less than total justice was felt to be an affront to the victims of repression.
The claims of the Mothers continued: aparición con v ida, castigo a los
culpables (appearance with life, punish the guilty). Most organizations
questioned the figures for victims. Many claimed the real number was
double or triple those officially recognized by the AlfonsÍn government. 19
19 José Zalaquett believes this is not particular for the Argentinean case. In all situations
where there have been massive abuses, there is a tendency to inflate the number on both
sides. The perpetrators try to diminish the numbers, and the public and the human rights
organizations heighten the numbers in order to gain sympathy. The numbers are of ten
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However, in spite of its deficiencies, most human rights organizations saw
the Nunca Más report as a symbol of triumph over the lies propagated by
the military regime.
The report was universally rejected by the military, who saw it as an
attack on the honour of the arme d forces. Convinced as they were of simply
having done their duty in saving the nation from subversion, they did not
think they were guilty of any crimes. In the words of General Luciano B.
Menéndez (in charge of the Córdoba region under the juntas), the nation
should be grateful to the military rather than vilifying it because "we acted
in defence of society, meeting our obligations as soldiers" (Rock 1993:
232). Just five days after the release of the report, the Supreme Military
Tribunal supported the military' s not-guilty claim, as it refused to admit
that the junta had done anything beyond the bounds of decency.20
Regarding the political parties in Argentina, the human rights agenda
resulted in increased polarization between the Right and the government,
who had not succeeded in reaching an agreement on the contents of the
report. The radical position taken by the Mothers intensified the criticism
of the right-wing parties, especially the Peronists. The report was well
received by the Left, most of which participated in the march. Only the
Trotskyists (MAS) and the terrorist Left (who were inactive and under
prosecution by AlfonsÍn), sided with the Mothers in opting out. Pressure
and expectations increased during the nine months in which CONADEP
carried out its work. The disappointments it caused made "the report appear
not as a step towards reconciliation, but as the beginning of a long period
of conflict" (de Brito 1992: 46). The Nunca Más report was only the
beginning of a long proeess in search for justice, culminating not in the
releasing of the report itself, but later with the holding of trials.
In contrast to what happened in Argentina, the time span of nine months
in Chile functioned as a safety valve, "giving the new government a period
of grace in which tempers could cool on both sides before the terrible truth
was publicly recognized and announced by the government" (de Brito 1992:
genuinely believed. However, it is beside the point whether the actual number is twice
as high as that given in the report, as it magnifies the scale of the brutality, but does not
change the fact that an extensive and centrally organized crime actually had taken place.
"W e are not counting beans, but human beings, you know", said Zalaquett in an
interview with the author in Santiago 7 July 1993.
20 Only the CEMIDA (Centro de Militares para la Democracia en Argentina) offered any
positive respons e to Alfonsín' s human rights policy by approving of the trials, but felt
there should be no violation of the principle of obediencia debida (de Brito 1992: 57-
58).
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39). In this period, tension was well managed by the president. When the
commission finally presented its findings, the number of victIms
documented in the Informe Rettig was accepted by all the human rights
organizations as well as by the political parties and the public in general.
This was very much due to the prestige of the Vicaría de la Solidaridad
(the largest and most prestigious human rights organization in Chile), who
had lent the commission its full support from the very start and let the
commssion use its archive and documentation section, which is considered
among the best and most complete in all of Latin America. The fact that
human rights abuses had been recorded from the very beginning of the
dictatorship in Chile, made the numbers presented in the Informe Rettig
probably more accurate, and certainly more credible, than the number of
cases presented in the Nunca Más report.
Some of the more radical groups voiced their disappointment with the
Informe Rettig because the report did not include all the victims of
repression (only those who had die d as a result of it), and because it did not
list the names of the perpetrators. Unlike Argentina, however, there were
no political parties willing to mobilize under the banner of "total justice".
The democratic Left were faced with a dilemma: on the one hand they had
to please their natural constituency, the human rights activists, and on the
other hand, they were committed to the rule of the law and had to
recognize the problem of adopting a morally-based intransigent position.
The Communist Party was the only political party that adopted a critical
stance, but it had little impact. The renewed terrorism further strengthened
the Right' s criticism that there was an undue concern with human rights
violations. Although the political Right in Chile had the strongest position
in the Southern Cone, the Informe Rettig was still successful in establishing
some kind of recognition of the facts, in that it forced the Right to meet
with the opposition on the issue. The retire d military generals released a
public statement questioning the validity and truth of the Informe Rettig,
but on the whole, the military saw the report as less life-threatening than
public trials (Análisis, 18-24 March 1991). The Informe Rettig accordingly
provoked a more mixed re action from the military than had the Nunca Más
report in Argentina. Some within the Chilean armed forces were forced to
face up to the crimes, but like the Argentine military, they defended their
critical role in saving their country from totalitarianism (Análisis, 18-24
March 1991). The Army was the least repentant section of the three
military branches. It showed no signs of regret.
The general impact of the Informe Rettig on Chilean society may be
summed up in the words of de Brito: "The launching stood out as the
single most important governmental gesture of reparation and reconciliation,
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and the end of the ceremony was both a relief and an anti-climax" (de Brito
1992: 48). However, the positive impact of the report was, regrettably, soon
to be overshadowed by the assassination of one of the most brilliant leaders
of the Right, who had collaborated with the Pinochet regime. Ex-Senator
J aime Guzmán was murdered on 1 April 1991 in Santiago, less than a
month after Aylwin's public speech on the Rettig report. This shifted the
focus to left - wing terrorism and further weakened the position of the
extreme Left. 21
4.3.5 Evaluating the importanee of the reports
The issuing of Nunca Más and Informe Rettig were attempts at political
catharsis through "global truth telling" in the transition to democracy. They
were projects designed to reve al the truth about military-led state terrorism.
The act of giving testimony was for many people an absolutionary
experience; for the first time they were taken seriously by government
representatives. The reports were a form of emotional and political
recompense, and no doubt marked some form of symbolic watershed in the
transition to democracy. Furthermore, the reports were accompanied by
measures of social and financial compensation to the victims and their
families (fnforme Rettig 1990: 823-26; Nunca Más 1991: 477-78). To start
with their positive achievements, both reports were successes in terms of
informing the general public on the facts of repression. The facts were
publicly established and disseminated, as the reports rapidly became
bestsellers in both countries and were given widespread media coverage.
The "truth-telling" marked a positive break with the repressive past, and
those of the Left were given an opportunity of clearing themselves of the
accusation by the military and the Right of having been responsible for the
breakdown of the democratie order. But to what extent were the reports'
stated aims of "global truth telling" and impartiality fulfilled?
Neither report succeeded in establishing all of the facts. The reports
consciously listed the names of the victims of gross human rights
violations, but failed to account for a large number of other serious
violations, such as torture and exile, which affected large parts of the
population. Even more importantly, the reports failed to reve al the names
of the perpetrators. There were three reasons for this omission: the military
21 Perpetual jail sentences have been proposed by the "fiscal" of the Court of Appeal in
Santiago, René Clavería, for the two members of the FPMR, Ricardo Palma Salamanca
and Mauricio Hernández Norambuena, who have been accused of being responsible for
the terrorist assassination of Guzmán (La Tercera, 17 November 1993, p. 5).
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in both countries refused to give the commssions access to their files, and
the military personnel systematically failed to give testimony. Secondly,
even though the commssions received documentation sufficient to attribute
guilt to specific persons, they had no judicial mandate to publicize their
names.22 Even if the commissions would have had the data and the
judicial mandate to make the names of the avowed criminals public, it is
still doubtful whether Aylwin or AlfonsÍn would have been willing to run
the political risk of accusing the military publicly of gross, systematic, and
large-scale human rights violations without first giv ing the military a
chance to clean up their act. The reports thus effectively established
political and ethical, but not juridical, responsibilities for acts of repression.
The Nunca Más report received more severe criticism for being partial
to the military than did its Chilean counterpart. This may be accounted for
by the fact that the Rettig Commssion, due to its politically more
heterogeneous composition, enjoyed a higher degree of legitimacy than did
the CONADEP. Also, the greater severeness of the repression in Argentina
and the tense political climate which existed at the time of transition
created higher expectations among the public than the Informe Rettig did
in Chile, where people knew the military was controlling the transition,
hence leaving Aylwin with less room for manoeuvre. This, I believe is a
very important point. Due to their, perhaps unrealistically high,
expectations, the Argentineans were all the more disappointed with the
limited achievements of the report. The absence of groups demanding "total
justice" in Chile made Informe Rettig politically more successful in
contributing to the healing process of the transition. Aylwin has repeatedly
been praised for his political craftsmanship, probably very much due to the
fact that Aylwin was more successful at expectation management than
AlfonsÍn.
It should be emphasised again that the various forms of judicial,
constitutional, and political constraints resulting from the form of transition
in the two countries did to a large extent impose limits on the initial
choices available to the two presidents after the formal restoration of
democracy. However, it should be equally stressed that these structural
constraints were not permanent. Each president had a certain degree of
22 The commissions were executive, not judiciaL. In spite of CONADEP having no judicial
mandate to publish the names of those presumed guilty, this was actually discussed as
a possibility in Argentina up til five days before the publishing of the report. A list with
the names of 1351 alleged perpetrators of gross human rights violations made it to
Argentinean newspapers in September 1984, causing strong reactions from the military
(Página 12, 20 August 1991, p. 17).
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political space in which to carry out his policy. As will be seen in the
further discussion, the initial constraints were open to challenge and
therefore also to change. The response the two presidents got from their
respective societies was crucial for their further policy choices in the field
of human rights. As concluded in the previous chapter, the limitations
imposed on Aylwin were in many ways stronger and more numerous than
those imposed on AlfonsÍn. Perhaps precisely for that reason did people
expect more in Argentina. And where expectations are high, the
possibilities of becoming disappointed are also high. The hope of achieving
less in Chile may have had another positive effect; namely that people
agreed to achieve whatever was possible within the limits. Where the stakes
are higher, there is also a L arg er tendency towards squabbling, as the
Argentinean case clearly shows. It was crucial that Aylwin enjoyed
unanimous support from the human rights organizations, while the
Argentine president was challenged from all sides of the political spectrum.
AlfonsÍn was not only pressed by the military , but also by important parts
of civil society, who were split in their support for the new president and
his policies in the field of human rights. It is not sufficient, then, to look
only at the limitations of choice imposed by the mode of transition when
accounting for the success or failure of a human rights policy. I will
maintain that it is of equal importanee to look at the consequences human
rights policies produee in a society, and why. It may well be that factors
which at the outset seem favourable to the process of reconciliation in fact
may act as impediments in given situations.
To sum up, the two governments of Argentina and Chile chose basically
the same strategy of "truth-telling", but the strategies rendered significantly
different results. The government' s attempt at revealing the facts about past
gross human rights violations had a largely positive (reconciling effect) in
Chile, and the opposite effect (increasing the divisions in the opposition)
in Argentina. 
23 Analyzing the position of civil society is crucial in
understanding these effects. Because of the tight military control of the
Chilean transition, the human rights movement and the political parties set
their hopes to the publishing of the Informe Rettig, and gave the
commssion their full support. In Argentina, in contrast, the Nunca Más was
only seen as a step on the road to "total justice". The publication of the
names of the disappeared was therefore perceived as an insufficient
23 Rabkin disagrees with this view, claiming that the practical effect of the historical
reexamination brought about by the Informe Rettig "was not to promote reconciliation
but, instead, to renew recriminations and (even worse from a political point of view)
highlight historical divisions within the governing coalition" (Rabkin 1992: 148).
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measure. People had hoped for much more, they had been promised much
more, and they were determined not to let the proeess end with the
publishing of the Nunca Más.
In many ways the publication of the reports formed only a small part of
the proeesses of re-democratization. Nonetheless, the human rights issue
should not be down-played, as this was the one issue political parties and
human rights organizations of different orientations were able to unite
around in their struggle against authoritarianism. I may well be argued that
both the governmental initiatives to issue the reports as well as the
diffusion of the actual findings of the two commissions were highly
significant in staking out the line the presidents were to follow in the field
of human rights. The diametrically different rèactions given to the reports
in the two countries were an indication of the unit y of civil society
achieved so far, and an omen of how AlfonsÍn and Aylwin were to fare in
their subsequent attempts at achieving reconciliation. The short-term
function of the Informe Rettig was to give people a feeling of finally being
taken seriously by the government. In this it contributed to the restoration
of faith in democratie institutions. In Argentina, in contrast, the Nunca Más
report seemed to produee the immediate effect of general dissatisfaction and
demands for further action. These short-term effects would come to be
counterbalanced as other issues gained predominance. The long-term effect
of the reports is probably their most important function. In line with
Zalaquett s arguments, the reports are historie al records which form a
valuable part of the history archives of these countries for the use of future
generations. Although the reports became surrogates for legal justice, they
did represent an important symbolic turning point in the "resurrection of
civil society" and in the commitment to democracy. We shall now proceed
to see how the quest for justiee in Argentina took a decisive step forward
with the holding of the military trials.
I
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4.4 "Justiee": the road from military trials to impuiiity in
Argentina
ti One of the most difficult dilemmas confronted by the first transitional
government of Argentina was whether to bring to trial miltary and police
officers suspected of perpetrating human rights violations during the
dictatorship, or to declare a blanket amnesty for the purpose of achieving
what many perceived as a necessary and prompt reconciliation between
civilians and the military (Garro 1993: 9). f
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The dilemma embedded in democratic consolidation became explicit in
Argentina with the holding of military trials. Since principled commitment
to the rule of law had been one of AlfonsÍn' s major electoral appeals,
investigation and punishment of the gross human rights violations
committed by the military were ethically required. Aylwin knew that the
prosecution of military personneI was likely to unleash political confliet; a
dangerous situation in an extremely fragile democracy. On the other hand,
failure to ensure justiee would place the military above the law, with strong
implications for the legitimacy of future democracy. Punishment would
demonstrate that similar crimes would not be tolerated in the future.
AlfonsÍn concluded he could not embark on a wide purge of the military ,
or use his authority as a Commander-in-Chief to force the disclosure of
secret information (Zalaquett 1985: 21). He was, however, determined to
curb the influence and power of the military. The Code of Military Justiee
was rewritten in February 1984, and with the support of the opposition,
Congress passed the Law for the Defense of Constitutional Order, which
introduced stiff penalties against military and civilians plotting against the
government. AlfonsÍn' s administration cut the defense budget by half;
carried out drastic reductions in the size of the armed forces (two-thirds of
the army generals and one-third of the navy admirals were forced to retire);
and discharged three-quarters of the conscripts, due to lack of funding.
Most of the high-ranking officers deeply involved in el Proceso' s policies
were among the retired. Many military officers were also dismissed from
state enterprises. The overall reduction of the armed forces' numerical and
economic strength, together with forced internal reorganization of the armed
forces, resulted in growing resistance to AlfonsÍn' s policies within the
military.
Already before forming the fact-finding commssion CONADEP,
AlfonsÍn had ordered the trial of nine generals heading the three first juntas.
At the same time, he also ordered the arrest of seven members of left-wing
guerrilla organizations. As touched upon earlier, terror and counter-terror
had been controversial issues in Argentina since long before the military
coup in 1976, and Alfonsín wanted to give the impression of being "fair".
The message given to the public was that terrorism was to be punished
along the same lines as state crime. The re action of the military juntas to
this move was not favourable. They resented being grouped together with
"terrorists", their enemies in the dirty war, and saw the whole CONADEP
initiative as partiaL.
Initially, AlfonsÍn offered the military a chanee to try their own people
for human rights violations; yet another attempt at being fair. After
repealing the national security doctrine and the military' s self-amnesty law
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of September 1983, AlfonsÍn ordered the prosecution of military generals
by presidential decree.24 The government responded to public pressure by
leaving it to the military to prosecute its alleged criminals in military
courts, headed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The
military was given six months to complete this, but nothing happened. The
term was extended another six months, again without results. The military
tribunal declared its inability and unwillingness to complete the proceedings
against the junta leaders, and added that the orders issued by the junta
during el Proceso to combat terrorism were unobjectionable (Snow and
Manzetti 1993: 42). Increasing pressure on the government from the public,
as well as from the international community, finally forced the government
to recognize the failure of the military to complete its mission, and on 4
October 1984 the government handed the cases over to civilian courts.
Many human rights organizations criticized this delay, since it meant that
the case was losing its initial momentum. On their part, the former
commanders complained that this was violating their constitutional rights
to be tried exclusively by a military tribunaL. The Supreme Court dismissed
the complaint and upheld the civilian court' s assumption of jurisdietion.
The world famous trial that followed in April-December 1985 of the nine
junta generals who had governed Argentina between 1976 and 1981 had the
tri al of the Greek generals in 1975 as its only role model, although the
precedents of the principle of these kind of trials go as far back as the
Nuremberg trials.25 The Greek case was still different from that of
Argentina in that the risk of trying the generals was less in Greece due to
the lack of a tradition of military intervention in civilian politics, and hence
the new democratie government had a freer hand in the matter (Bums 1987:
156). The Nuremberg trials constituted a different case altogether in that
they were not organized by the Germans, but by the victorious Allies. As
the internationally defeated military had lost both power and their weapons,
24 Law No. 22924 issued 22 September 1983, providing for an amnesty for abuses
committed in the battle against domestic terrorism, was counteracted by Law. No. 23040
27 December 1983, prescribing that the military governments self-amnesty law was
absolutely "null and void". The prosecution of military generals was ordered by Decree
No. 158/83 on 13 December 1983, A.D.L.A. (Garro 1993: 13).
25 A full account of the Argentine trials is to be found in the Texto Completo de la
Sentencia: Camara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Criminal y Correcional de la Capital
Federal. 1987. Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nación. During the trial, the
proceedings were recorded verbatim in a publication called El Diario del Juicio.
Editorial Perfi, March 1985 to January 1986 (de Brito 1992: 2). See also Amnesty
International' s report on the trial of the former junta members, Argentina. The Military
Juntas and Human Rights (1987).
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it meant that the victorious powers did not have to worry too much about
the intern al effects of a trial on the defeated nation.26 The Argentine trials
would have been analogous to those of Nuremberg only if the British Navy
had pursued the Argentineans all the way home to the Argentine mainland
and defeated them there, whereupon the British had imposed a treaty of
Peace ordering the trial of Argentine military personneI. In Argentina the
military had lost a war outside its territory, but they still controlled the
arms, meaning that "the government was certainly not in a political position
of a victorious power investigating and trying the crimes of authorities
whose military power might have been destroyed" (Zalaquett 1985: 21-22).
Moreover , they were being confronted with the alleged crimes by the
government of their own country, rather than that of a foreign power.
AlfonsÍn correctly considered it an impossibility to purge all those involved
in human rights abuses during the rule of the juntas, as that would have
involved the dismantling of the entire military institution altogether. This
was not desirable for several reasons, the main one being Argentina' s need
for a national army to protect itself against traditional external enemies,
such as Chile and Peru. Furthermore, the armed forces had traditionally
enjoyed the position of being considered the guarantor of democracy when
civilian governments lost control - as they had done repeatedly this
century. Finally, the military had always been considered a source of
national pride. For these and several other reasons, AlfonsÍn ruled out the
option of massive military purges.27 Regardless, he did have to satisfy the
widespread popular demand for justice, so he settled for a sec ond-best
option: selective trials.
Based on about 700 cases, only five out of the nine prosecuted generals
were finally convicted of crimes ranging from "aggravated homicide to
robbery" , while they were acquitted of charges for which there was not
sufficient evidence. The remaining four generals were found not guilty on
these charges, but were tried and convicted by a military court for
26 For a detailed and comprehensive account of the entire Nuremberg trials, see Conot
1983.
27 There are few historical examples of deep-ploughing revision of the armed forces
following a transition to democracy. The replacement of Somoza-supported Armed
Forces by new FSLN Armed Forces in Nicaragua after the Sandinista Revolution offers
one example. Another case is that of Cuba in 1959, when Fidel Castro c1eansed the
existing military system, replacing Batista personneI by his own supporters. However,
these are both examples of transitions "from below", i.e. revolutions initiated by the
people, rather than elite-dominated transitions, which form the focus of this analysis.
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mismanagement of the war against Great Britain.28 The sentencing of
General Ramón Camps (former chief of Buenos Aires police) to 25 years
of imprisonment and shorter terms given to three other army and police
officers in December 1986, marked a sec ond stage of the trials (Latin
American Weekly Report, 8 January 1987, p. 8).
Following the trials was an outburst of optimism, resulting in the filing
of new complaints against hundreds of middle-ranking officers. The threats
of prosecution made the military set aside their previous splits and close
ranks. Universal military discontent forced the AlfonsÍn government to
follow an exceedingly conciliatory policy line. By the end of 1986,
AlfonsÍn had Congress push through a statute setting a sixty-day period for
the submission of new complaints of crimes commtted during the "dirty
war"; the so-called Ley de Punto Final ("full-stop law").29 El Punto Final
prove d unsuccessful, because well-organized human rights organizations
and in di viduals managed to issue thousands of complaints in spite of the
short time limit. 30 Some 400 officers were indicted. The Radical
administration tried to calm an increasingly alarmed military by arguing
that few officers would be convicted and sent to prison, and that in most
cases the only crime that could be proved was kidnapping, for which there
was a maximum sentenee of six years.
Military dissatisfaction over the prosecutions that followed manifested
itself in a barracks uprising during the Easter Week of 1987 (Semana Santa,
28 The generals of the three first juntas, Jorge Rafael Videla, Emilio Eduardo Massera, and
Orlando Ramón Agosti, were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. Roberto Eduardo Vi ola and Armando Lambruschini were also given life
sentences, whereas Leopoldo Galtieri and Omar Rubens Graffigna were given fifteen
years each; Jorge Isaac Anaya twelve years; and Basilio Lami Dozo ten years (Garro
1993; Zalaquett 1985).
29 Law No. 23492, 23 December 1986, A.D.L.A. 192 (1986). The law was not conc1usive,
meaning that it set a time-limit on filng charges against militar officers for human
rights violations, but it did not stop human rights trials (Latin American Weekly Report,
18 December 1986, p. 4).
30 According to the lawyer Alicia Oliveira, el Punto Final was enforced at the most
inconvenient moment, namely at the beginning of December, when the Argentinean
courts are c10sed for holidays, thus leaving very few lawyers available for receiving
complaints. In spite of this, as she sees it, tactical move by the government, human
rights activists managed to mobilize a stunning support and public interest for the matter.
Information was given in a private interview with the author in Buenos Aires, 21 lune
1993.
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15-22 April), headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Aldo Rico.31 The so-called
carapintadas (named because of the face paint they wore) were later the
same year and the following year responsible for three similar revolts,
spurred by discontent with the development in human rights matters, cuts
in military spending, and the critique brought against the military . Each
protest, as it turned out, gave way to new concessions. The Semana Santa
mutiny led a highly pressed AlfonsÍn to ask Congress for a drastie
reduction in the prosecutions. AlfonsÍn now had to exploit the principle of
accountability in an attempt to cool down military-civilian tension.
Congress immediately passed Ley de Obediencia Debida, or "due obedience
law" on 4 June 1987, eliminating all pending indictments against junior
officers, but not stopping the prosecution of the colonels and generals of the
military regime (Latin American Weekly Report, 28 May 1987, p. 4).32
The new law presumed that, with some exceptions, military officers who
followed orders, carried them out under a state of coercion without any
possibility to inspect, oppose, or resist such orders (Garro 1993: 16). That
meant that the fourth principle of Nuremberg could not be applied, i.e.
criminal responsibility was being exempted on the grounds that those
obeying orders had no moral option to refuse. The passage of Ley de
Obediencia Debida was hoped to appease the new army high command,
whose members were junior officers during the dirty war, thus easing
tension within the baracks. However, it failed to calm the senior retire d
officers who still faced prosecution. Although Ley de Punto Final and Ley
de Obediencia Debida were largely felt to be unconstitutional interference
in judicial matters, it was perhaps the only way AlfonsÍn could hope to ease
civil-military tensions and thereby avoid a serious military threat of
interference with constitutional rule. Caught between his sense of moral
obligation and a political reality full of demands from all sides, AlfonsÍn
put higher priority on retaining political stability by appeasing the military
than on keeping his promise of justice by pressing for large-scale
punishment of the alleged human rights violators.
The issuing of the Due Obedience Law did not cure AlfonsÍn' s headache.
Instead, the President' s move to placate the military provoked tens of
thousands of people all over Argentina to protest, for several days, the
military's rebellion and AlfonsÍn's concessions to their demands for
31 Aldo Rico, a decorated veteran of the Malvinas war, was known as "a sympathizer of
the extreme right" and is known to have had dose links with a national terrorist group,
Alerta Nacional (National Alert), who the police cracked down on in April 1988 (Rock
1993: 235).
32 Law No. 23521, 4 lune 1987, A.D.L.A. 1548 (1987).
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amnesty (Clarín, 25 June 1987; Página 12, 25 June 1987). In other words,
the President lost much of the initial support he had enjoyed among the
civilian population, leaving him with increased opposition from large parts
of the civil population as well as from the military, who were both
dissatisfied with the turn of events in human rights matters. "The
combination of the proliferation of civilian lawsuits against junior officers,
low salaries, lack of new equipment, and an unclear governmental policy
about the armed fore es ' new mission, all contributed to creating unrest in
the army" (Snow and Manzetti 1993: 42), resulting in two new military
mutinies; one in December 1987 (led by the mentioned Aldo Rico), and the
sec ond a year later in December 1988 (led by Colonel Mohamed Ali
SeineldÍn).33 The uprisings were settled through AlfonsÍn's careful
negotiation, but they showed the discontent spreading within the army.
Economic development was yet another important factor contributing to
AlfonsÍn's growing unpopularity. Hyper-inflation exploded from February
1989 onward. As a counter-measure, AlfonsÍn launched the so-called Spring
Plan and made a last attempt to schedule the presidential elections for May
1989, when, according to the Spring Plan, inflation would have been
brought to its lowest.34 The plan fell apart well before mid-May, when the
Argentines went to the polIs once again. The Peronist Party' s candidate,
Carlos Menem, got 47 per cent of the vote, as compared with the Radical
Party' s candidate Angeloz' 37 per cent. AlfonsÍn received heavy criticism
for the way he had handled the elections, which coincided with
skyrocketing inflation followed by food riots and shop looting. The
government was force d to impose a thirty-day state of siege. Order was
restored by 16 June, leaving several people dead, hundreds injured, and
over 2,000 under arrest (Snow and Manzetti 1993: 47). AlfonsÍn had lost
his final hope of becoming the first president since 1928 to complete his
term in office, and agreed - albeit reluctantly - to step down in July and
allow Menem to take office six months early. The inauguration of Menem
33 The December 1987 mutiny was a direct response to the government's reluctance to
promote Navy Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz on recommendation from the Navy. The federal
court had a year earlier acquitted Astiz on charges of the kidnapping and disappearance
of the Swedish-Argentine girl Dagmar Hagelin in 1976; a case which drew widespread
international attention. The passage of the Due Obedience law blocked proceedings
against Astiz for involvement in the abduction and torture of two Prench nuns. A number
of military generals threatened to resign if Astiz' promotion was refused (Latin American
Weekly Report, 25 November 1993).
34 See Snow and Manzetti 1993 for detaIls regarding AlfonsÍn's last and desperate attempt
to stabilize the Argentine economy.
116
on 8 July 1989 marked Argentina' s first constitutional transfer of power
since 1916 from one democratically elected president to another. 35
Only three months after taking office, Menem conveniently "closed the
matter" of human rights on 10 October 1989 by issuing sweeping
presidential pardons which released from pris on practically all the officers
who were still serving jail terms for human rights abuses, including Videla,
Viola, Massera, and Camps. In order to placate the Left, Menem also
pardoned 60 Montoneros in j ail for "terrorism" o One of the arguments
Menem used was that it was necessary to forgive past trespasses - he
himself had been a prisoner of the military junta for two years - and look
to the future. The end result was that the generals were set free, and
AlfonsÍn' s human rights at ensuring justice was brought back to square one.
Constitutionally, Menem' s move was suspect. Nevertheless, in spite of the
reversal of AlfonsÍn' s policy, the holding of the trials had in itself a
positive effect in that the policy carried out during the dirty war was once
and for all officially condemned. Menem was heavily criticized for his
decision to let the convicted generals off the hook. More than a hundred
thousand people marched in the capital in protest against the presidential
pardons (Página 12, 9 September 1989). Elements within the military were
also not completely satisfied. In December 1990 Menem was faced with a
new coup attempt organized by many of the same carapintadas officers
who had earlier revolted against AlfonsÍn. However, Menem, retained the
loyalty of the bulk of the armed forces and succeeded in crushing the
military uprising. Twenty-six days after the rebellion, Menem pardoned the
remaining twelve military officers who were serving sentences for human
rights violations. A civilian court tried and convicted the leaders of the
uprising in 1991. Menem thus gave the impression of being tougher on the
military than AlfonsÍn. Many people who had felt betrayed by AlfonsÍn' s
wavering policy line were even more disappointed with Menem' s pardons.
On the whole, however, Menem has not been offered much opposition, in
spite of a number of widely unpopular measures and controversial policies.
35 Menem took over during a grave economic crisis. Re ruled the country by presidential
decree to sidestep Congress with his economic program of privatization, which
succeeded to stop hyperinflation and introduce a certain degree of economic stability and
growth. The negative side effects were an increased level of governmental corruption,
a badly discredited judicial system, and an increasing distrust of the administration' s
genuine commitment to the rule of law. Menem's conservative policy line concentrated
on economic issues and labour, downplaying the issue of human rights (Garro 1993).
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The Argentine people seem disillusioned with politics in general, and with
human rights policies in particular. 36
4.5 Why the lack of justice?
As the above discussion has shown, the classic dilemma faced by the
transitional governments in Argentina and Chile has been, on the ane hand,
placating the military by not prosecuting those responsible for commtting
crimes of human rights violations, while simultaneously risking continuous
deep splits in the civilian population, and, on the other hand, bringing the
criminals to justice and thereby risking military protests and political
instability. Dealing with the planners and commanders of gross human
rights violations does not necessarily ensure legal justice or political
stability , as the initial approach chosen in Argentina shows. People were
not satisfied with having only the top generaIs, the cúpula, punished. When
the public pressed for trials to be extended to those directly responsible for
the abuses, the military reacted very strongly. The magnitude of the abuses
shows the impossibility of punishing all those in volve d in gross human
rights violations without the risk of destroying the military as an institution.
To what extent has the consolidation of democracy in Argentina and Chile
been limited by political reality? Slightly rephrased, the questions are: why
did the attempt at justice fail in Argentina, and why was there not even an
attempt at holding trials in Chile? What were the specific legal,
constitutional, and political constraints limiting the quest for "truth" ,
"justiee", and reconciliation in the two countries? To what extent have the
transitional governments tried to press further for justiee - or altered their
originally staked-out policies?
4.6 The failed quest for truth and justiee in Argentina
The political situation at the moment of regime transition in Argentina
favoured the implementation of fact-finding and legal justice in at least one
respect: given the defeat of the Argentine military in the Falklands/
Malvinas war, the democratic government did not have to pay too strong
attention to the wishes of a fractured and uncoordinated military. AlfonsÍn' s
36 An SIP survey carred out in Argentinean urban centres in the time period May 1984-
June 1988 shows a general downward trend in people's satisfaction with government
policies and future expectations. Few people expressed hope of solving the legacy of
human rights violations. For details, see Catterberg 1991.
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limited success in ensuring justice through military trials therefore poses the
intriguing question: why didn't he play his hand better, given the
favourable situation of military collapse? In essence, AlfonsÍn failed
because he promised much more in his presidential campaign than he was
able to deliver. Given the initial weak position of the military, expectations
were heightened by the President' s promises that were out of proportion to
what proved realistically possible to achieve. Whether due to mis-
management, or cowardice, or the lack of political support to carry out his
policies; AlfonsÍn failed repeatedly. His economic policy failed. The party
system, the Congress, and the judiciary remained relatively weak compared
to the interest groups which continued to exercise a substantial degree of
influence on political decisions. To make the situation worse, the return of
democracy had coincided with the worst economic recession in Argentine
history. However, the economic failure cannot entirely be attributed to
AlfonsÍn' s economic mismanagement alone, since the large foreign debt
was not created by his administration.37 Most importantly, the "military
problem" remained unresolved. Why?
4.6.1 Judicial constraints
In Argentina the outgoing military government, headed by General
Reynaldo Bignone, had, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, taken three
specific measures to avoid accountability for human rights abuses. The
Final Document on the War Against Subversion and Terrorism stated that
all human rights abuses which had occurred under military rule were
"errors commtted in all wars", and that the disappeared should be
considered dead "for all legal and administrative purposes" (Zalaquett 1985:
20). Through the Law of National Pacification the armed forces granted
themselves amnesty for all crimes commtted during the period of 25 May
1973 to 17 June 1982. There were also unverified rumours that Bignone
had issued a secret decree ordering the destruction of the documentation
related to military repression (Zalaquett 1985: 20). One of AlfonsÍn's first
37 On the positive side, under President AlfonsÍn Argentina rejoined the international
community after having suffered a decade of isolation due to its human rights violations
and the military experiment under el Proceso. Progress was made in the field of human
rights by the signing of several international treaties. AlfonsÍn also strengthened regional
ties with traditional rivaIs, such as Brazil, and settled a territorial dispute over three
islands in the Beagle Channel with Chile. Relations with the United States and the
European Economic Community were improved, although relations with the United
Kingdom remained cool after the Malvinas/Falklands war.
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moves in the field of legal matters after coming to power was to have
Congress annul this self-imposed amnesty law.38 The end result was that
the milItary did not succeed in judicially guaranteeing that they would not
be held responsible for human rights abuses commtted during the rule of
the juntas. The military's failed attempt at judicially disclaiming
responsibility may principally be attributed to their initial weak position vis-
à-vis the civilian government, due to the mode of the Argentinean
transition. Thus, there remained no legal obstacles at the outset that
prevented AlfonsÍn from prosecuting the military for their crimes. Were
constitutional impediments to AlfonsÍn' s policy equally absent?
4.6.2 Constitutional constraints
First, it deserves mentioning that the constitutions taken over by AlfonsÍn
and Aylwin respectively were of a very different character. Argentina is
still ruled by its Constitution from 1853, which has not undergone any
serious revision beyond a string of minor amendments. During the period
of military rule, the 1853 Constitution was simply replaced by the "Statute
for the Proeess of National Organization" (el Proceso), promulgated 31
March 1976 (Guest 1990: 456, Note 11), but it was rescinded at the
moment of regime transition in 1983. Although the military passed around
1,500 new laws and decrees during its rule from 1976-83, due to the mode
of transition, the military did not take specific measures to guarantee the
future position of the armed forces, or indeed their impunity. Hence, there
were no constitutional restraints as such to the prosecution of alleged
perpetrators of gross human rights violations. In the political field, though,
the AlfonsÍn government faced several obstacles in the implementation of
its proposed human rights policy.
4.6.3 Political constraints
AlfonsÍn had many political opponents at the time of his inauguration. The
labour movement, traditionally Argentina' s strongest political movement,
remained under the control of the Peronists, who were long-standing rivals
of the Radicals, and therefore naturally opposed to the new government.
Also, the business community and the Church were not particularly friendly
towards the Radicals. In the field of economics, the International Monetary
38 Law No. 23040, 27 December 1983, prescribed that the military government's self-
amnesty law was "absolutely null and void" (Garro 1983: 13).
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Fund prescribed economic policies that left the AlfonsÍn government with
little room for manoeuvre.Most importantly, the military, although defeated
at sea, kept their forces intact on the main land (Zalaquett 1985: 17).
Due to the initially weak position of the military, the main obstacle to
ensuring justice in Argentina seems to have been political, as there were
few judicial or constitutional restraints. This may be explained by the
strengthening of the military forces after the return to civilian rule, mainly
in reaction to the government' s giving in to public pressure of widening
prosecution of the military beyond the generals already put on trial in 1985.
The military answered by closing ranks and staging an uprising, to which
the civilian government immediately responded byeneoding in law new
limits upon its own scope of action. This was done through the issuing of,
first, Ley de Punto Final, soon to be followed by Ley de Obediencia
Debida, as already mentioned. Further attempts to press for justice were
met with another uprising in 1990, which resulted in Menem granting the
famous amnesty through Ley de Impunidad. At present, therefore, there
exists a set of judicial constraints which make the process of ensuring
justice almost ireversible. It is of crucial importanee that these laws have
been created by the civilian government over time after the formal
transition to democracy, and must therefore mainly be attributed to the
post-transitional shift in the balance of power between the military and the
civilian forces. The AlfonsÍn government's acceptance of clemency,
followed by Menem' s final gran ting of total pardon, shows that there has
beena steady drift away from implementing the promises made in the
election campaign in 1983 of establishing the "truth" and ensuring "justice"
to the nation. Before discussing how this has affected the reconciliation and
consolidation proeesses in Argentina, let us turn to the post-coup politics
in Chile.
4.7 Why no mass-trials in Chile?
Although the programme drawn up by the multiparty alliance Concertación
had explicitly called for the derogation of the 1978 amnesty law and
prosecution of those responsible for atrocious crimes against lives, liberty,
and personal integrity, it soon became apparent that Aylwin would adopt
a strategy of reconciliation, mixing ethical obligations with political
pragmatism. Aylwin never seems to have considered the possibility of
holding large-scale military trials. This may be largely due to the civilian
government' s limited control of the transition process. According to Rhoda
Rabkin, "Pinoehet' s main political value was his ability to intimidate
civilian politicians from instigating Argentine-style trials", promised as he
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had that "the day any of my men are touched, the state of law is over"
(Rabkin 1992: 144). Most scholars, Rabkin included, believe that it was
highly unlikely that the political parties of the Right would have supported
the military in a new coup, but the fact that Pinochet still controlled the
armed forces left the civilian government insecure. Aside from the indirect
threat from the military, there is a purely practical obstacle to staging mass-
trials in Chile in that 90 per cent of today's military personneI have at some
stage passed through the security service DINA; the institution in charge
during the worst period of repression in Chile. As argued by Przeworski,
one cannot purge the entire military without simultaneously destroying the
institution altogether (Przeworski 1991: 77). Another practical reason for
the unfeasibility of staging massive purges of the military is that Aylwin
did not have the legal, constitutional, or political means to do so.
The absence of large-scale military trials in Chile can therefore be
attributed to several factors. There has hardly been political space in Chile
for that kind of manoeuvre, given the looming presenee of Pinochet and the
institutional strength of the armed forces. Secondly, Aylwin has had the
advantage of learning from AlfonsÍn's mistakes.39 Jf Argentina failed to
bring justice to the people through trials, Chile was no more likely to
succeed in adopting a similar strategy. Moreover, there has been a series of
judicial, constitutional, and political restraints in Chile, absent in Argentina,
which is our nest topic.
4.7.1 Judicial constraints
The main legal obstacle to prosecuting the perpetrators of human rights
violations in Chile has been the above-mentioned Amnesty Law of 1978,
which granted amnesty for criminal offenses (including disappearances,
extrajudicial executions, and torture ) commtted by uniformed agents
between 11 September 1973 and 10 March 1978.40 Criminal justice
therefore had to be limited to offenses commtted after 1978 and to the only
pre-1978 crime which was exempted from the amnesty; the Letelier case
(details to folIow). Given that the vast majority of human rights violations
39 According to Chile's ambassador to Great Britain, Jorge Heine, the learning experience
of Chile from its neighbour Argentina is the single factor having the largest explanatory
power in accounting for the Chilean "success story" . Lecture given during the Annual
Conference of the Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS) in Liverpool, 25-27
March 1994.
40 The Chilean Government Junta issued the wide-reaching amnesty through Decree-Law
No. 2191, published in Diario Oficial No. 30042, 19 April 1978 (Garro 1993: 12).
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took place in the period covered by the amnesty, it has been almost
impossible to bring any of the alleged criminals to justice. Some attempts
have been made at prosecuting military or police personneI alleged to have
committed crimes after 1978, but the military has persistently refused to
open their files. Thus, the lack of evidence has aborted these efforts. Even
if evidence proving the guilt of the military personal had been presented,
the Amnesty Law would prevent the prosecution of human rights violators.
Due to the judicial restrictions outlined above, Aylwin made a special
effort in pressing for the solution of the single case which has permitted
open investigation. The assassination of ex-Cancilier Orlando Letelier,
former Foreign Minister in the Allende government, together with his
secretary Ronni Moffitt, has be en a cause for strain in U.S.-Chilean
relations ever since the crime took place in Washington on 21 September
1976. After two years and four months of investigations, General Manuel
Contreras (ex-chief of the DINA) and Brigadier Espinoza were in
November 1993 sentenced to seven and six years of pris on respectively for
being responsible for the assassinations (El Mercurio, 14 November 1993,
C2). In many ways, the Letelier-Moffit assassination has become a
symbolic case in Chile's efforts to come to terms with the past. The
successful trial is therefore considered a victory of the judicial system in
Chile, and an important contribution to the issue of justice as well as to the
process of reconciliation.41 The government has repeatedly asserted that
the sentences do not imply the complicity of the army, solely the individual
guilt of the two condemned, who have enjoyed the right to legal defense.
The rules of the democratic game have been respected. It is therefore not
believed that this case is going to affect civil-military relations in the sense
that it poses a threat to political stability. Both President Aylwin, the
Minister of the Interior, Enrique Krauss, and the convicted General
Contreras expressed agreement on this. Whether or not the Supreme Court
will uphold the sentenee after the appeal, which started in March 1994,
remains to be seen.
Returning to the more generaljudicial constraints involved in establishing
criminal justice, there would, hypothetically speaking, be still another legal
41 Eduardo Frei, then presidential candidate for the Concertacžón, was quoted saying that
"there is a justice which, when functioning, protects the security of the country, and this
is very important for the democratic system". The presidential candidate for the
Democratic Movement of the Allendista Left (Movimiento Democrático de Izquierda
Allendista), Eugenio Pizarro, on the other hand maintains that "in Chile there is no
justice", and that the sentences meted out in the Letelier case "is a farce and treason to
the people" (El Mercurio, 14 November 1993, C2).
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obstacle to prosecuting alleged perpetrators of crimes commtted between
1973 and 1978 in Chile. According to Chilean law, one cannot open cases
against a suspect if twenty or more years have passed since the crime was
committed. That means that the crimes committed at the height of the
repression, Le. between September and December 1973, have now passed
the twenty year limit. As long as Pinochet stays in power, which he will do
at least till 1997, there is little hope of changing the Amnesty Law. Jf there
is a change in the Amnesty Law in 1997, most of the crImes protected by
the law will have surpassed the time limit for opening cases. This is with
the exception of the crime of disappearance, as some human rights lawyers
argue that this crime can be exempted from the general twenty year-rule on
the grounds that the date for the crime cannot be set as long as the
evidence - the body - is missing.42 This is a purely hypothetical situation,
however, because it would require major changes in the legal and
constitutional structures, as well as a military willing to cooperate by giving
access to archives in order to accomplish this.43
Aylwin has made a tactical mo ve to bypass the amnesty law. His
proposed new bill of 3 August 1993, the so-called "Ley Aylwin", was an
attempt at speeding up the judicial proeesses concerning murder, torture,
and disappearances during the toughest years of repression under
Pinochet.44 In short, Aylwin tried to strike a deal with the military by
offering them complete immunity (in the form of total secrecy of witness
reports as well as promising no punishment) in return for granting
information which could lead to the clarification of cases of gross human
rights violations (Article 3 of the proposal). Aylwin suggested the
appointment of 15 new judges to work specifically with these cases for a
period of two years. Article 3 in particular caused much debate in all
42 Information given by lawyers Hugo O'Campo and Hector A. Salazar in interviews with
the author in Santiago, 28 May 1993 and 9 July 1993 respectively.
43 The facts forming the basis for this discussion were given to the author in an interview
with lawyer Hector A. Salazar in Santiago, 9 July 1993.
44 Opinion polls show that 74 per cent of Santiago's citizens agreed with Aylwin's proposal
regarding human rights. In an investigation carried out through telephone interviews by
the Asimerc on 4 August 1993, two hours after Aylwin's official proposal on television
and in radio, 12 per cent of those asked were against the proposal and 14 per cent did
not answer. To the question "who has yielded more in the field of human rights", 54.31
per cent responded the government, 8.63 per cent responded the military, and 35.03
answered both. To a question regarding whether civil-military relations had improved,
57.36 per cent thought yes, 30.46 per cent thought no, and 12.18 per cent of those asked
did not respond (La Epoca, 5 August 1993).
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sectors of Chilean society. The left-wing of the Concertación, PS and PPD,
together with the Communist Party and several of the human rights
organizations, were opposed to the proposal on the grounds that it was yet
another extension of the immunity already granted to the military by the
1978 Amnesty Law. Sola Sierra from the Association of Families of
Detained Disappeared Persons (AFFDD) went as far as calling the
attempted compromise with the military a deliberate pact between the
Christian Democrats and the right-wing forces which left no hope for truth,
justice, or reconciliation (La Nación, 19 August 1993). After much debate
and serious fears of a split Concertación, Article 3 of the proposed "Ley
Aylwin" was voted down in the Chamber of Deputies on 19 August 1993.
The paradoxical alliance between PS-PPD and the Right (who also voted
against the proposal, but for diametrically opposed reasons), gave the no-
vote 56, versus 38 for, and 4 abstentions (La Nación, 19 August 1993).
Even if the proposal had been accepted by the deputies, it might have been
rejected by the Senate, where the Right, as mentioned before, has the
majority. Aylwin in any case failed to please either side. The final result
was that the proposed "Ley Aylwin" was withdrawn on 2 September
(Dagens Næringsliv, 10 September 1993). Yet another opportunity was lost
to introduce ameasure which might have resolved at least some cases of
human rights violations.
Pinochet s reform of the Supreme Court before he handed over
presidential powers to Aylwin constitutes yet another factor restrieting the
meting out just punishment. Pinochet simply offered all nine supreme
judges large monetary compensation for stepping down in favour of
younger judges (El Mercurio, 14 November 1993, C2). Five of the judges
accepted the offer, ensuring that the highest judicial office in Chile will
most likely be dominated by Pinochet-friendly judges for many years to
come. It is therefore difficult to consider the highest judicial organ in Chile
independent.
The only realistic hope for human rights lawyers in Chile today is to
achieve a limited kind of justiee by trying to put on tri al state agents
responsible for crimes committed after the Amnesty Law was passed. There
has been a positive development in this field lately. After almost ni ne years
of investigation, the Chilean lawyer, Milton Juica, on 28 September 1993
raised a case against seventeen former policemen for the killing of three
human rights defendants and professional Communists in 1985.45 Six of
45 The three were Manuel Parada (then head of the Department of Analysis of the Catholic
human rights organization Vicaría de la Solidaridad), Manuel Guerrero, and Santiago
Nattino, all assassinated by Carabinero officials on 30 March 1985.
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the policemen were accused of kidnapping and murder, while the remaining
eleven persons were accused of kidnapping and conspiracy (Aftenposten, 30
September 1993). The Chilean press reported on 1 April 1994 that the so-
called "Caso Degollados" (the "Throat-slitting Case", due to the way the
victims were killed) had been brought to court. Three of those accused
received life sentences; three more received long sentences; and the
remaining ten received shorter sentences.46 Carabineros, in a public notice
on 1 April 1994, informed the Chilean nation that they had no comments
on the ruling of the court, and that they as an institution had offered all
possible help during the proeess of the investigation (La Nación, 1 April
1994) .
This has been considered a test of the Chile an judicial system' s ability
and will to condemn those responsible for violations of human rights under
the military rule of Pinochet. After the sentencing of Contreras and
Espinoza for the Letelier murder, this is the second time in Chilean post-
coup history that members of the security forces have been jailed for the
violations commtted between 1973 and 1990. Hector Salazár, the principal
lawyer working on the "Caso Degollados", expressed in an interview the
hope that this case will encourage human rights activists and lawyers to
press for the resolution of similar cases (La Nación, 1 April 1994). There
has already been a lot of pressure on the courts as well as on the President
himself, to prosecute the general director of the Carabineros, Rodolfo
Stange, together with four other high officials, for giving orders and hiding
information in the mentioned "Caso Degollados", which has been assigned
a lot of symbolical value. The secretary publisher of one of Chile's leading
newspapers notes that the case will "turn into a compulsory point of
reference in Chilean judicial history" (La Nación, 1 April 1994). The
successful court rulings in the "Caso Degollados" proves that the Chile an
judicial system, so carefully designed by Pinochet to protect the military,
is not impermeable, after all. However, in spite of the recent positive
developments, Argentine-style prosecutions of the military cupula remains
highly unlikely.
46 Those receiving life sentences were major Guilermo González Betancourt, captain
Patricio Zamora, and Alejandro Sáez. Miguel Estay Reyno and José Fuentes Castro
received sentences of 18 years each, and Claudio Salazar was sentenced to ten years of
imprisonment. The remàining ten were given shorter sentences, ranging from forty-one
days to five years of imprisonment (El Mercurio, 3 April 1993, D4). All were
Carabineros, except Miguel Estay Reyno; a civilian ex-Communist who changed sides
in the conflict and became an informant for the "ilegitimate terrorist organization which
was created within the ranks of the Carabineros" (La Nación, 1 April 1994, p. 2).
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4.7.2 Constitutional constraints
The Chilean Constitution, in contrast to Argentina' s, has gone through
several changes; the last one in 1980 with Pinochet issuing a totally new
Constitution. Through a number of laws, the 1980 Constitution strengthened
the position of the military in general and that of the Commander-in-Chief
(Pinochet) in particular. The constitutional restraints against implementing
a tough human rights policy were therefore much stronger in Chile than in
Argentina. It should be stressed again that Pinochet had a year to make
amendments and constitutional changes in the period between losing the
plebiscite and handing over power to Aylwin. The political parties in the
Concertación de los Partídos para la Democracia, headed by Patricio
Aylwin, tried to negotiate on several points in the 1980 Constitution. No
major changes were made. In spite of the democratic forces' limited victory
in reducing the number of designated senators from twelve to eight,
Pinochet still controls the Senate because his eight appointed senators,
along with the elected senators from the right-wing parties, constitute a
majority. The right-wing bloc in the Senate has therefore been able to veto
any constitutional reform proposal which threats to erode their privileged
position. Within this category fall all attempts at annulling or changing the
Amnesty Law from 1978 and legal reforms designed to ease the prosecut-
ion of perpetrators of crimes during the dictatorship.
4.7.3 Political constraints
The political situation in Chile at the time of return to constitutional rule
was very different from that of Argentina. The Chilean military had been
defeated in elections for which they had themselves made the rules. As a
result, the military was very much intact, and with Pinochet-friendly forces
controlling the Senate, the Supreme Court, the regional governments, and
the top position in the military, one may at best be able to call the
transition government in Chile a "limited democracy", although free and
fair elections were held. Obviously, the political constraints were at the
outset much stronger than in Argentina. Furthermore, as outlined in the
preceding chapter, the strong role of the military in forming the transition
proeess and the rules of the game after the transition, ensured considerable
legal and constitutional constraints for the implementation of a successful
human rights policy.
Acting within the constraints outline d above, Aylwin opted for an
approach he called "possible justiee" (Rabkin 1992: 149), placing the main
emphasis of his human rights policy on the fact - fin ding aspect by the
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launching of the Informe Rettig and implementing a much L arg er number
of reparational measures than in Argentina in the form of economic and
legal recompensation. His main aim has apparently been to keep the
military happy to the extent that they are not given any explicit reason for
opting out of the rules of the new democratie game. The rules of the game
have to be firmly set to make sure that all parts are willing to abide by
them before one challenges the most important part of the opposition: the
military forces.
With this, it seems less likely that significant progress will be made in
the quest for "total truth" , meaning, revealing the identity of the
perpetrators of past gross human rights violations - let alone ensuring legal
justice, which is equally unrealistic. The recent attempts to confront the
military forces with crimes carried out under its jurisdiction has proved that
the democracy in Chile is still not fully consolidated. The military five-day
display of power starting on 28 May 1993 while President Aylwin was
vi si ting the Scandinavian countries was partly a result of lawyers trying to
speed up court cases against the military (La Nación, 30 May 1993). This
"sable-rattling" incidence was a follow-up of the first display of military
discontent on 19 December 1990, when Pinochet declared a state of alert
and ordered the army to its barracks.47 In spite of these two incidences,
however, Chile has enjoyed an unexpectedly high degree of political
stability after the regime change.
Aylwin successfully managed to calm down civil-military tension. He has
later c1aimed that this military "sable-rattling" never amounted to more than
noise, since the military failed to strike any cord of support in the public
and the government refused to give in to any of the military' sdemands.
Aylwin also said that, in spite of democratic institutional deficiencies, he
considered Chile to be as stable as any European democracy (El País, 4
May 1994). The high degree of stability in Chile's political climate was
underlined by the re cent March 1994 elections, when Chile underwent its
first peaceful post-coup presidential change. The fact that Eduardo Frei
from the Concertación has taken over the new presidency is an indication
of both general public satisfaction with Aylwin' s policy as a whole, as well
as a willingness to gi ve green light to the new government to pursue the
same kind of policy line.48 Frei, in a speech said he would "fight to
47 For an account of this 1990 incident, the so-called enlace, see Rabkin 1992.
48 Eduardo Frei gained 58 per cent of the vote in the presidential elections on 11 December
1993 against right-wing candidate Arturo Allessandri's 24 per cent. Frei took office on
11 March 1994. His centre-Ieft Coalition for Democracy, Concertación, controls the
House of Deputies, but the Right kept control of the Senate (International Herald
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restore full presidential authority over the military" (International HeraZd
Tribune, 13 December 1993). Aylwin's last move in the field of human
rights before formally handing over the presidential insignia to Frei in
Valparaiso on 3 March 1994 was to keep his promise of emptying Chilean
prisons of political prisoners from the Pinochet period. There were 284
political prisoners in Chile an jails when Aylwin took office in March 1990
(La Nación, 4 June 1993). The release of these prisoners had previously
been protested by the military on the grounds that if so-called terrorists
were set free, those military personneI under prosecution for human rights
violations should also be exempted from being brought to court Aylwin
therefore offered a choice between exile and continued imprisonment to the
remaining forty-two political prisoners; all chose exile.49 This gesture was
his last attempt to set the tone for further reconciliation. It is up to the
current president, Eduardo Frei, to continue the reconciliatory policy line.
The court' s rulings in the "Caso Degollados", as previously mentioned,
may be seen as a good omen, but at the time when this is being written it
is too early to predict what may follow. As Aylwin said in arecent
interview: "La democracia en Chile es aún imperfecta" - democracy in
Chile is still imperfect (El País, 4 May 1994). One may, however, sum up
the conclusions drawn on the basis of the first post-military governments
in Chile and Argentina respectively.
4.8 The outeornes of the Chilean and Argentinean transitions:
a paradox
The hypotheses we set out to test at the beginning of this chapter predicted
that Argentina had a higher chance of becoming consolidated than Chile.
What has in fact happened? From a formal point of view, president Aylwin
and AlfonsÍn coincided in their human rights policy on two points: they
issued governmental reports listing the names of victims of human rights
abuses, and the reports were accompanied by the introduction of measures
of economic compensation to the surviving victims and their families.
Tribune, 13 December 1993; Klassekampen, 13 December 1993; Aftenposten, 13
December 1993).
49 This includes five persons who were sentenced to life imprisonment for an attempt on
Pinochets life in 1985, where five of his body-guards were killed. Two of the political
ptIsoners, Marcos Mardones and Jorge Escobar, sentenced to 25 and 30 years of exile
respectively by the Aylwin administration, have received political asylum in Norway,
whereas the other three are currently living in the Netherlands (Klassekampen, 15 April
1994).
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However, the measures of reparation were more extensive in Chile than in
Argentina. The presidents' strategies diverge on the matter of legal justice.
Trials in Chile have been limited to the Letelier case, four years after the
restoration of formal democracy, and the "Caso Degollados" after eight
years of investigation, in spite of considerable pressure from various
segments of society to condemn the alleged criminals. In Argentina the
proeess took a decisive step forward with the holding of the military trials
in 1985, but with Menem issuing sweeping pardons only five years later,
the end result was the same in the two countries: very limited legal justice.
In spite of the presence of many more legal, constitutional, and political
constraints at the moment of regime change in Chile than in Argentina, it
seems like the final results of the human rights policies in the two countries
have not been all that different when measured in technical terms.
Nevertheless, Chile has frequently been cited as a more successful case of
consolidation than Argentina, i.e. quite opposite of what was predicted.50
What accounts for this apparent paradox?
The question is not only what the presidents actually did, but how they
did it, and what effects the various measures have had on the two societies
regarding reconciliation. As has been argued in this chapter, there was a
close interaction between the initial policy embarked on by each president,
the reactions each measure evoked in the public, and the way these
reactions in turn influenced - encouraged or discouraged - the presidents'
further line of action. A central point here is therefore the political skilIs of
the two presidents. I have concluded earlier that the attempt at "truth-
telling" had a much more positive effect in Chile than in Argentina,
although the strategies regarding the issuing of the governmental reports
were almost identical in the two countries. I have also argued that the
disillusionment in Argentina was all the higher because people had
genuinely believed that the military would be punished for their crimes.
This may be closely linked to the promises the two presidents made to the
public during and after the election campaigns. AlfonsÍn's victory in the
1983 elections has been referred to as "a stunning success" (Snow and
Manzetti 1993: 41), and can be attributed mainly to his stanee on human
rights matters along with his non-involvement in the Falklands/Malvinas
war. AlfonsÍn has been portrayed as a "strong and charismatic politician"
(Snow and Manzetti 1993: 41), a man of great personal appeal (Snow and
Manzetti 1993: 61), as a politician with a "dynamic leadership" (Vacs
1987: 32), and his line of policy as one characterized by "boldness" and
50 This view is supported by practically all the people I interviewed in Buenos Aires and
Santiago in the period March-July 1993.
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"toughness" (Burns 1987: 181). Nevertheless, the AlfonsÍn administration
tumed out to be one of many promises and few accomplishments. When
AlfonsÍn prematurely left office, he left behind an economy crippled by
hyper-inflation. In the field of human rights, many promises had been
broken. Most importantly, AlfonsÍn failed to ful fil his promise of full-
fledged justice.
Due to the more controlled transition in Chile and the consequently
stronger position of the military, Aylwin made a point out of not promising
more than he thought could be sustained in the field of human rights. He
embarked upon "a serious, carefully thought-out policy" (Zalaquett 1990:
1), commtted to truth while down-playing the prospects for justice.
Accordingly, no intense hopes of the Argentinean kind were created, and
therefore it was possibly easier for the Chilean nation to accept the absenee
of legal justice. The time factor is also very important. The worst human
rights violations in Chile had taken place fifteen years prior to the
transition, allowing time for the blunting of feelings and the partial healing
of wounds. By contrast, in Argentina the wounds were still wide open, as
large-scale violations were fresh in most people' s memories. The extra
pressure from the Grandmothers in Argentina to find their lost grand-
children has presented the authorities with an ongoing problem which has
been absent in Chile. Moreover, President AlfonsÍn faced much more
opposition from non-military actors (a point which will be elaborated on in
the next chapter) than did President Aylwin. This indicates that one ought
to take into account the position of civil society as well as the position of
the military when judging the results or effects of human rights policies.
Jf one looks strictly at the structural framework imposed on the new
democracies, the weak position of the Argentinean military at the end of
the transition period should have made it easier for the new government to
stake out a human rights policy which would both disclose the facts of
human rights violations and bring legal justiee and reconciliation. It did not
happen that way. As I see it, not because the military initially posed a big
threat to AlfonsÍn's human rights policy, but because he lacked adequate
backing from those who should have supported him, namely the human
rights organizations and the political parties of the Left, to carry his policy
through. This offered the military an opportunity to close ranks and
strengthen their position, which in turn forced AlfonsÍn to employ measures
which made him increasingly unpopular with the public. One may always
speculate whether events would have taken a different course if AlfonsÍn
had immediately ordered the trials of the generals by civilian courts, instead
of first passing the cases on to the military tribunals. What we know is that
the year of non-activity on the military' s side before the cases were handed
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over to civilian courts had two main effects: it gave the military time and
opportunity to close ranks and strengthen their position vis-à-vis the civilian
government, and secondly, civilian opposition against AlfonsÍn' s
government increased due to discontent with the slowness of the process.
One may reformulate this and say that the dual effect of AlfonsÍn' s
unfortunate choice was that due to the split opposition, the military
managed to close ranks and gradually restore a measure of their former
prominenee the power game. Drawing on the Argentinean experience,
Aylwin embarked on a sustainable policy regarding past human rights
violations. His policy line was less ambitious; created less hopes for total
justice; and precisely because of its modest y, people were positively
surprised at its achievements and subsequently offered the President the
support he needed to press for other measures where he saw it feasible,
such as in the Letelier case. All in all, the outcomes of the human rights
policies implemented in Argentina and Chile with respect to dealing with
the legacy of past gross human rights violations after the formal
reintroduction to democracy may schematically be synthesized in the
following manner:
Table 3
Degree of "success" regarding human rights policy
Focus of human Degree of success Argentina Chile
rights policy of policy
implementation
-complete
- partial
-complete
-partial
"Reconciliation" -low
-medium
-high
"Truth"
* *
"Justiee"
* *
*
*
As indicated in the above tab le, neither the AlfonsÍn government in
Argentina, nor the Aylwin government in Chile score positivelyon the two
first variables, since neither government succeeded in establishing all the
facts about past gross human rights violations carried out under military
rule (i.e. giv ing the names of victims, the names of victimizers, and the
destiny of the detained-disappeared), or ensure justice in the form of
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bringing to court all those responsible for the violations. The attempt at
bringing the top generals to justiee in Argentina was at best a partial
failure, and in Chile attainments within the field of legal justice has also
been limited. As previously argued, reconciliation does to a large extent rest
on the implementation of fact-finding and justice. It is on this latter
dimension I believe that Argentina differs from Chile. My claim is that
Chile has unexpectedly reached a higher degree of reconciliation than has
Argentina because of the way the policy in the two other areas was carried
out, and the reactions this produced in the two societies. Aylwin seems to
have been more successful than AlfonsÍn at expectation management. The
Chilean president has proved himself as a cautious politician who gets
things done through compromise and bargaining, not making promises
without being confident of gaining substantial support by various important
sectors of society. AlfonsÍn, on the other hand - partly due to external
pressure and partly due to personal miscalculations - chose a policy line in
the field of human rights which proved impossible to sustain and therefore
discredited him both in the eyes of his initial supporters and his opponents.
This, I believe, has been contributive to consolidating the Chilean
democracy at a faster rate than in neighbouring Argentina. 
51
On the basis of the above discussion, I will therefore claim that the
reactions to the fact-finding reports as well as to the presenee or absence
of military trials were very much conditioned by the political situation at
the time of regime change, as well as by the political development in the
first few years of democratie rule. The form of transition partly accounts
for the range of policy choices available to the two presidents. Argentina
was initially a fuller, less restricted type of political democracy at the
moment of regime change than Chile in the sense that there were fewer
judicial, constitutional, and political constraints baked into the Argentinean
51 I am, of course, fully aware of the fact that the outstandingly positive economic
development over the last few years in Chile has largely boosted peoples' moral and
support for the Aylwin government, and possibly also had the side-effect to shift
peoples' focus from the troublesome past on to a brighter future. Chile's GDP for 1993
grew by 5.7 per cent, according to figures released on 27 January 1994 by INE, the
Chile an national statistical institute. According to the same source, the high economic
growth has been accompanied by an increase in employment by 5.7 per cent, reducing
the unemployment rate to 4.4. per cent; the lowest level since 1974 (Latin American
Weekly Report, 10 February 1994, p. 9). It is, perhaps, easier to live with your former
dictator as part of the political system if the economy is going well and you notice an
improvement in your standard of living. In Argentina, in contrast, Alfonsín enjoyed no
such advantages. Fighting a many-sided battle against erratic inflation rates and a
rebellious military, he ended up facing opposition from all sides, leaving behind a split
nation when he handed power over to Menem.
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democratic system, thus preventing the implementation of a sustainable
human rights policy, which would effectively bring the military under
civilian control and ensure consensus on the rules of the democratic
political game. So far, the empirical facts support O'Donnell and Karl and
Schmitter's hypotheses. However, the mode of transition does not account
for the actual choices made by the presidents. Nor does it account for the
subsequent changes in power distribution during the consolidatIon proeess,
which, as far as I can see, are essential for understanding the discrepancies
between moral idealism and the political reality developing over time in the
two countries.
In my opinion, one therefore has to look for other factors than the form
of transition focused on in elite-based transition theory in order to explain
the paradox of the Argentinean and Chilean transition. The aim of the next
and final chapter is to explore my postulate that civil society actors matter
too. This will be done by analyzing the role of some of the civil society
actors holding a high profile in the human rights debate, to see to what
extent they contributed to the transition to and consolidation of democracy.
I will argue that their position during the transition proeess as well as in the
consolidation phase after the regime transition contributes decisively to the
understanding of the human rights policies followed by AlfonsÍn and
Aylwin and hence also to the paradoxical outcomes of democratic
consolidation in post-coup Chile and Argentina.
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5. From transition to consolidation: Does
civil society matter too?
5.1 Tying together the discussion
It is time to sum up the discussion so far, and to also introduce some
alternative perspectives on the subject of democratic transition and
consolidation. To sum up, the two foregoing chapters have largely tried to
test some prominent hypotheses derived from the elite-focused approach
when examining the transition and consolidation proeesses of Chile and
Argentina. It was concluded that elite-focused theory correctly predicted the
immediate outcomes of these two transitions. However, when extending the
analysis to the consolidation phase, the theory does not seem to account for
the paradox that Chile, under continuous auspices of the military headed by
a watchful Pinochet, has in many ways reached a higher degree of
consolidation than has Argentina. This conclusion is true at least in so far
as consolidation is measured in policy consensus and public support for the
government policies, particularly in the field of human rights, which has
decidedly been the most controversial issue in the entire transition and
consolidation proeesses in both countries.l Chile' s more successful
handling of the human rights issue has in turn favoured a higher degree of
stability in civil-military relations in that country than in Argentina. In other
words, the framework set by the mode of transition cannot account very
well for the ensuing development in democratic consolidation in our two
cases of analysis. What then, accounts for such consolidation?
I would like again to draw attention to a couple of statements made at
the very beginning of this study: that the issues in transition, not only the
form, matter, and that ei vil society should be taken into account when
studying the proeess of shifting elite alliances. The two preceding chapters
Public opinion polls carried out in Chile in 1991 and 1992 showed strong approval for
the government and for President Aylwin (Rabkin 1992: 120). The continuous support
for Aylwin's policy is reflected in the fact that Eduardo Frei, the Concertacžón's
candidate, won the presidential elections in March 1994, thus continuing Aylwin's policy
line. By contrast, President AlfonsÍn suffered a gradual decline in support and was forced
to step down in favor of Carlos Menem before his presidential term was completed
(Snow and Manzetti 1983: 45).
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have illustrated that the human rights issue was indeed a major topic of
concern and controversy throughout the transition and consolidation phases
in both Chile and Argentina; first by provoking voiced opposition from
civIl society, then by spurring the military to safeguard their position at the
time of regime change once they discovered that they had failed to secure
perpetual power. Finally, this touchy issue caused headaehes for the
democratically elected presidents who felt, on the one hand, ethically and
morally obliged to deal with the legacy of past gross human rights
violations, and were, on the other hand, reluctant to push the issue too far
and thereby risk provoking the military into opting out of the rules of the
yet so fragile democratie game. Thus, the matter of human rights cannot be
ignored in an analysis of the transitions of Chile and Argentina if one wants
to understand why the transitions came about, why the elites acted the way
they did, and why the finaloutcomes of democratic consolidation seem to
contradict the predictions put forward by re cent transition theory.
My general proposition is, therefore, that those theories seeking to
explain the outcomes of democratie transitions by exclusively focusing on
the form of elite interaction fail on two important counts: they fail to
explain why transition to democracy started in the first place, i.e. what
caused the initial split between hard-liners and soft-liners. Furthermore, the
predictive power of this kind of approach may be questioned, as show n in
the cases of Chile and Argentina - which moreover are two of the cases on
which this kind of theory is modelled. I believe these shortcomings can be
attributed to a faIlure to capture what the elites negotiated about in the first
place, and also to a neglect of civil society' s response to such elite
negotiations. This latter point is particularly important, because civil society
response may either encourage or discourage the elites from their preferred
course of action. We have already dealt with the issue of human rights in
some detail, but who placed this topic on the political agenda?
5.2 Introducing new actors
The simple st answer to the above question would be "the human rights
organizations did". Who were they, how did they come into being, what did
they do, how can they account for the indicated weaknesses of elite-focused
transition theory, and more specifically, how can they contribute to our
understanding of the differences between the Chilean and Argentinean
outcomes regarding democratie consolidation?
All these questions will be answered successively in the course of this
final chapter. The following analysis operates at two leveIs: at the more
generallevel, I develop a perspective which is complementary to elite-
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centred transition theory; at the more specific leveL, I account empirically
for the differences in origin, development, and importance of the human
rights movements in Chile and Argentina in order to explain what caused
consolidation to reach further in Chile. Before giving a detail ed account of
the organizations, it may be useful to place them within a broader frame-
work of civil society actors. The word new should be stressed. The non-
governmental human rights organizations in post-coup Chile and Argentina
in the 1970s were formed as a specific emergency reaction to a profound
socio-political crisis; a re action to gross human rights violations and general
climate of repression (FfÜhling 1986; Hutchison 1991; Orellana 1991).
Hence, they were generated by historical conditions very different from
those that inspired the beginnings of the human rights movement2 in the
developed world. As touched upon in Chapter 3, the Argentine and Chilean
military , although advocating the ideas imbedded in the national security
doctrine, did not succeed in breaking down all social structures. They failed
to do so in spite of banning political parties and imposing heavy censorship
and minute controlover most aspects of social activity, which was brought
about by large-scale repression targeted at all those who dared voice
opposition to the regime, or sympathized with those who did. Ironically, it
was precisely the massive repression which caused civil society to react and
take up the democratie struggle against the authoritarian governments.
Obviously, the human rights organizations were not the only civIl society
actors responding to repression, but they were the first in the public arena,
compensating for the absence of other civil society actors one normally
would expect to raise their voices against individual and structural
repression. Left partly, although temporarily, paralysed by banning and
repression, political parties on ly came to the foreground much later. Other
organizations, such as labour unions, were largely absent from the scene of
democratic struggle in both Chile and Argentina. It is worth mentioning
that the Peronist-dominated trade union movement in Argentina never took
a formal stand against the military government. Collectively, it never
condemned the practice of gross human rights violations, although roughly
30 per cent of the victims were workers, and a large proportion of these
were Peronists. In consequence, one good reason for focusing on the role
of the human rights organizations is that they were the protagonists of
political change, thus being present from the very onset of transition.
2 The term "movement" is here used as a collective entity for several individual human
rights organizations in the same sense as women's movement, religious movement,
ecological movement etc. For a discussion on whether the Chile an human rights groups
constitute a New SocIal Movement, see Orellana and Hutchison 1991.
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A second reason for seleeting human rights organizations for further
analysis is that it was they who placed the issue of human rights violations
on the political agenda, and made sure the topic was kept hot and alive
throughout the transition and ensuing consolidation phase. They were the
only group in society to focus exclusively on the human rights issue, and
encouraged and pressured the political parties into raising this issue during
the electoral campaigns. The claim to universality embodied in the idea of
human rights made it a party-politically "neutral" alternative around which
all opposition to the regime could join forces (Frühling 1986: 18). Without
the work of this civil society group, the alliances and attempts at
negotiation between outgoing military and incoming democratic elites might
have taken on a very different character. Leaving all speculation aside, the
human rights organizations have made it clear that one of the duties of a
government wishing to call itself democratic is not only to refrain from
committing human rights violations, but also to settle past accounts in order
to create a climate where democracy can be developed and consolidated.
Those are my reasons for focusing on the role of human rights
organizations in the transition to democracy in Chile and Argentina in the
rest of this chapter. Towards the end of the chapter, references will be
made in some detail to other civil society actors, more specifically the
Church and the political parties, since this is deemed necessary to account
for the differences in achievement between the Chilean and Argentinean
human rights movements, which again relates to the opposing outcomes in
democratic consolidation.
What type of organizations constituted the human rights movement? As
an antecedent to the discussion proper on the role and importanee of the
human rights organizations, an overview of the organizations in both
countries will be given, giving attention primarily to their different
organizational structure.3
3 It should be noted that this wil be done in a very summary manner, as the intention is
not to give a detailed description of each individual organization, but rather construct an
impression of the main organizational differences between the human rights movement
in Chile and Argentina. For a detailed description of the origins and workings of
individual organizations, see Frühling 1986; Orellana and Hutchison 1991; and Veiga
1985.
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I5.3 The human rights organizations in Chile: VicarÍa paves
the way
In the subsequent, largely descriptive, analysis of the Chile an human rights
organizations, only those devoted primarily and specifically to the
protection of human rights will be included; 15 of them in aii.4 First a
couple of comments on conceptual clarification. There are several ways of
c1assifying human rights organizations; either according to type, by their
chronological appearance, or by their political-religious affiliation. The
organizations in Chile working in the field of human rights may be divided
in two main groups: the non-governmental human rights organizations
(NGOs) and the human rights movements.5 The first group is characterized
by members having the defence of human rights as their main objective,
without the personal motivation of having been a victim or a member of a
victim's family. They are usually organizations with at least a limited
bureaucratic structure, clearly defined aims, and a high degree of
professionalism. In some cases, the origin of the organization's authority
may lie outside the organization itself. The aim of the NGOs is to denounce
human rights violations and offer legal, medieal, social, and financial
assistance to the people affected by state repression. NGOs often carry out
programmes of investigation or education, and their investigations are
usually of a non-academic character.
In contrast to NGO members, the activists of the human rights move-
ments are as a rule motivated in to action by their close relationships with
victims of human rights violations. The movements have a non-hierarchical
4 It should be noted that there was a wide range of organizations dealing with the matter
of human rights in some form. According to Orellana, there were 52 such institutions
registered in 1988, 10 of which are classified as NGOs (Orellana 1991b: 207). For
practical and analytical purposes, only those organizations which have the protection of
human rights as their main activity and which persisted over a long period of time will
be dealt with here. The ensuing discussion is largely based on Orellana' s analysis of the
human rights movement in Chile, "Los organismos de derechos humanos en Chile hacía
1985", which is the most complete and comprehensive analysis of its kind (Orellana
1991b).
5 The terminology dealing with non-governmental human rights organizations is at best
blurred. For the practical purpose of makng the ensuing discussion as clear as possible,
I wil take the term human rights organizations to include both human rights movements
(pL.) and human rights NGOs (see details below). However, when referring to all entities
as a group, I wil occasionally use the term the human rights movement (sg.). For a more
detailed discussion of the mixed usage of these three key terms, as well as expressions
such as human rights entities and human rights organisms, see Frühling 1986; Orellana
and Hutchison 1991.
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leader structure, and their predominant fields of action are denunciation,
organizing public events, instigating action, and organizing groups of
solidarity and help. Many human rights movements have their origin in, or
are strongly supported by, NGOs.
In the Chilean case, these two groups of human rights organizations may
be further classified into four "generations", depending on when and by
whom they were founded. Those belonging to the first generation of
organizations were founded by churches and were originally of an
ecumenical character. Vicaría de la Solidaridad is the largest and most
prestigious of the Chilean human rights organizations, under the protection
of the Archbishop of Santiago. It was not formally founded until 1976, but
was for all practical purposes at work from the very beginning after the
military coup, albeit under another name: COP ACHI (Comité de
Cooperación para la Paz en Chile; Commttee for Peace in Chile), also
called Committee 2. The so-called Commttee 1, also founded immediately
after the coup, gave origins to Fundación de Ayuda SociaZ de las Iglesias
Cristianas, FASIC (Christian Churches' Social Assistance Foundation).6
Committee 1 (including COMAR, CONAR, and CALEX) was primarily
founded to offer humanitarian assistance to those Latin American refugees
and Chileans who needed to seek exIle by helping them leave the country.
The main function of Commttee 2 (later Vicaría) was to take on judicial
defense of the victims of gross human rights violations. Together the two
Committees marked a trend in the Chilean human rights movement
characterized by diversity and division of labour; those organizations openly
confronting the military by demanding justice, and those working silently
by offering various kinds of direct assistance to victims of repression
(Orellana 1991b). Another ecumenical Christian organization, Servicio de
Paz y Justicia, SERP AJ (Service for Peace and Justiee ), was founded in
August 1977. The fourth and last institution in this category is of an
academic character; the Programa de Dereehos Humanos de la Academia
6 It should be emphasized that COPACHI (Comité de Cooperación para la Paz en Chile)
from day one enjoyed wide-spread support from practically all the churches in Chile: the
Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, Methodist and other protestant churches, as well as the
Israel Community (Comunidad Israelita) under its Rabbi. Only the Pentecostal Methodist
Church, which constitutes the large majority of the protestants in Chile, refrained from
collective participation in COP ACHI. Its ecumenical character helped COP ACHI draw
a lot of support from the Wodd Council of Churches. F ASIC has representatives from
the Methodist, Catholic, Catholic Orthodox, Evangelical Lutheran, and the Methodist
Pentecostal churches (Orellana 1991b: 24).
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de Humanismo Cristiano, PDHAHC (Human Rights Program of the
Academy of Humanism and Chri sti anity ) 7, founded in 1979.
Human rights organizations belonging to the sec ond generation were
founded on the initiatives of family members of the victims and constitute
the so-called human rights movements. They include Agrupación de
Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos, AFDD (Association of Families
of Detained Disappeared Persons, 1974), Agrupación de Familiares de
Presos Políticos, AFPP (Association of Families of Political Prisoners,
1976), Agrupación de Familiares de Ejecutados Políticos, AFEP
(Association of Families of Executed Political Activists, 1978), Comité Pro
Retorno de Exiliados, CPRE (Commttee on the Return of Exiled Persons,
1978), Protección a la Infancia Dañada por los Estados de Emergencia,
PIDEE (Protection ofChildren Damaged under States of Emergency, 1979),
and Agrupación de Familiares de Relegados y Ex-Relegados, ARAREL
(Association of Families of Displaced and former Displaced Persons, 1980).
As their names indicate, these family-based organizations all had a very
specific work field as they principally concentrated their action on behalf
of a particular group of victims: detained-disappeared, political prisoners,
executed political activists, exiled, children, or displaced persons. Their
numbers indicate a high degree of specialization.
Third generation organizations devoted to human rights are characterized
by being founded as a result of formal political agreements between
personalities and political organizations. Several years after the coup, the
political parties finally started to assume responsibility for the defence of
human rights, a field which until then had been dominated by the churches
as the only civil institution, aided by volunteers from the organizations of
families. The most important of these third generation organizations is the
Comisión Chilena de Dereehos Humanos, CCDH (Chilean Commssion on
Human Rights), founded in 1978 by lawyers and headed by persons of
varying ideological backgrounds who had held high political positions in
the past. Comisión Nacional Pro Dereehos Juveniles, CODEJU; a pluralist
conglomeration of young people of varying political persuasions, founded
in 1978, Comité de Defensa de los Dereehos del Pueblo, CODEPU;
devoted to the popular defense of the people - pueblo, founded 1980,
together with Comisión Nacional Contra la Tortura (National Commssion
on Torture), founded 1983, constitute the rest of the third generation
organizations. It should be noted that although these are the most political
organizations, with many of their members linked to political parties, the
7 The English translation is my own. To make the presentation simpler, the unofficial
acronym PDHAHC shall henceforth be used.
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organizations are of a very pluralist character and should not be regarded
as a mere projection of political parties.
To the fourth generation belongs only one organization: Movimiento
Contra la Tortura HSebastián Acevedo", MCTSA (Movement Against
Torture "Sebastián Acevedo"), founded in response to the renewed wave of
repression following the aforementioned upsurge of civil society protest in
1983. It differs from the other organizations by being a pluralist
organization of individual c1ergy and lay men, strongly devoted to the fight
against torture by non-violent means only.
Due to the high number of human rights organizations and their relatively
high degree of diversity and specialization, a move to coordinate all these
organizations started in Chile in 1980 and solidified in 1984 in three
coordinating groups: (1) Plenario de Entidades de Dereehos Humanos
(Human Rights Plenary), covering nine organizations, (2) Comisión
Coordinadora Problema Exilio-Retorno (Coordinating Commttee on the
Problem of Returned Exiled Persons), covering six organizations), and (3)
Coordinación de Agrupaciones Especiales (Coordination of Special
Groups), covering five organizations; mainly those of the families of the
victims of repression. These three coordinating commttees aimed at making
the human rights movement more efficient by strengthening the effect of
their work through coordinated action, and has had a positive unifying
effect on the Chile an human rights movement. 8 The Human Rights Plenary
in particular led numerous national campaigns for "truth and justiee" from
1984 onwards (de Brito 1993: 585).
5.4 The human rights organizations in Argentina: The
Mothers take the lead
The Madres de Plaza de Mayo, or Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, attracted the
world' s attention through their non- failing marehes around the monument
on the Plaza de Mayo in front of the presidential palace. Every Thursday
afternoon for the past seventeen years, these brave, combative mothers have
been observed with their white head scarfs demanding the return of their
disappeared children. The Mothers have become a concept in Argentina as
well as outside this country's borders. Their non-violent protest against the
military dictatorship in Argentina formed the core of the human rights
movement, contras ting with the Chilean situation where bureaucratic
8 For a more detailed account of the structure of these three collective entities, see
Orellana (1991b: 57-58).
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Vicaría under auspices of the influential Catholic Church led the way. The
Argentinean human rights organizations also differ from their Chile an
counterparts on a number of other points, which may be summed up as
follows: the existence or absenee of human rights organizations prior to the
coups; the emergence of generations of organizations; the types and number
of organizations; the importanee of the family-based movements vis-à-vis
the bureaucratic NGOs in general, and finally, their field of action or
specialization.
Unlike Chile, where all the human rights organizations emerged in direct
response to the governmental repression after the coup in 1973, two human
rights organizations already existed prior to the 1976 coup in Argentina; a
fact which is obviously related to differences in the political history of the
two countries.9 The Liga Argentina por los Dereehos del Hombre
(Argentinean League for the Rights of Man), henceforth referred to as the
Liga, could boast an almost fifty year existence. It was founded in 1937 in
response to the prosecution of Communists under the military regime of
U riburu. The Liga kept a low profil e during the first years after the coup
due to its affiliations with the Communist Party (Orellana 1991c: 152;
Veiga 1985); a point we will get back to in section 5.9. The Liga remained
the lone advocate of human rights in Argentina till the upsurge of violence,
effected by left-wing terrorist groups as well as the Triple A under Isabel
Perón's government, gave rise to the Asamblea Permanente de los
Dereehos Humanos, APDH (Permanent Assembly on Human Rights), on
18 December 1975, i.e. shortly before the military coup. It may be worth
reiterating that two of the co-founders of APDH were president-elect Raúl
AlfonsÍn and Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, who was rewarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1980.
The remaining human rights organizations in Argentina emerged during
the dictatorship. According to Orellana, they did not really gain momentum
till Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, CELS (Centre for Legal and
Social Studies) was formally established in 1979, due to the heavy
prosecution of lawyers taking on the defense of victims of human rights
violations (Orellana 1991c: 152).10 To the extent that one may speak of
generations of organizations in Argentina, the ones bearing political
9
There is only one exception in the Chilean case, namely the establishment of the
Commttee of the Defense of Human Rights, CODEHS (Comité de Defensa de los
Dereehos Humanos) in 1972, headed by trade union leader Clotario Blest. However, this
organization was small and relatively insignificant and ceased to function in 1976. It has
therefore not been included in the above analysis.
10 For non-exclusive list over disappeared lawyers, consult Nunca Más (1991: 431-34).
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affiliations were founded prior to the coup. Then came the family-based
movements, and lastly the organizations linked to various churches. The
Catholic Church is notorious for its absence in the matter of human rights
in Argentina. It therefore fell on the families of the victims of repression
to first mobilize, which is also why the family-based movements in
Argentina gained much greater relative importance than their Chilean
counterparts. There were three central movements in Argentina, all forming
in explicit response to the practice of abduction followed by disappearance.
Familiares de Desaparecidos y Detenidos por Razones Políticas y
Gremiales, FDDRPG (Association of Families of Disappeared and Detained
for Political and Trade Union Activity)ll was forme d at the end of 1976.
The Madres de Plaza de Mayo has been previously mentioned. The group,
counting only 13 women at first, expanded into an organization of some
3,000 women, constituting the back bone of the human rights movement in
Argentina. The Abuelas de PZaza de Mayo (Grandmothers of Plaza de
Mayo) started informally as an offspring of the Mothers, already in 1977,
but was publicly registered as a separate organization only in 1983. As its
name indicates, this organization was specifically devoted to the search of
disappeared grand-children; a unique Argentine phenomenon.12 The
practice of abducting children has presented an ongoing problem in
Argentina as the issue has been and will be kept alive as lon g as the search
for the disappeared children continues. The international media' s focus on
every new case, makes it hard for the nation to close its past.
Out of the third group of organizations, the bureaucratie NGOs,
Movimiento Ecumenico por los Dereehos Humanos, MEDH (Ecumenical
Movement for Human Rights) was the first to come to the fore.13 Based
l l The English translation is my own. So is the abbreviation FDDRPG, which wil be
henceforth be used to avoid the frequent use of long and cumbersome names.
12 The Grandmothers have worked in dose cooperation with Equipo Argentina de
Antropología Forense (Argentine Forensic Anthropological Team), a group of young
medical forensic doctors under the leadership of Clyde C. Snow, who has developed a
new genetic method of identifying the family of a dead person. Through careful and
painstakingly slow work, this team has helped the Grandmothers to identify in all 51 of
the 217 grandchildren reported detained-disappeared. 25 have been returned to their
maternal grandparents (Amnesty Nytt, No. 1, Feb. 1993, p. 4). For a detail ed account of
the work of the Forensic Team, see Salama 1992.
13 MEDH had its basis in the Methodist Church, but was soon joined by the Argentine
Evangelical Methodist Church, the Catholic Diocesis of Quilmes, the Argentine
Reformed Church, the Evangelical Church of Río de la Plata, the Valdense Evangelical
Church, the Evangelical Disciples of Christ, the Church of God, and the Lutheran
Unitary Church (Veiga 1985: 102).
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on the model of Chile's Vicaría, it was formed in 1976 by people of
various denominations, uniting to offer legal assistance and social and
economic help to the families of political prisoners and disappeared,
together with the Liga. In 1979, Centro de Estudios Legales y SociaZes,
CELS (Centre for Legal and Social Studies) was formed by a group from
the APDH in order to take charge of one particular task the APDH did not
have the capacity to deal with, namely the filing of individual complaints
'of disappearances and presentation of the cases to the military tribunals.
CELS gained formal status as an NGO in 1980. One more organization
merits notice, although it is not a specifically Argentinean NGO, but rather
a branch of a larger Latin American peace movement; Servicio para la Paz
y Justicia en América Latina, SERP AJ (Service for Peace and Justice in
Latin America). It was coordinated by Esquivel who, due to his inter-
national fame and the organization' s branches in many Latin American
countries, was able to draw the world' s attention to Argentina. There was
no specific coordinating organ for the human rights movement in
Argentina, although the organizations grouped together according to line of
action and ideology. The Liga cooperated closely with MEDH and APDH,
whereas the Mothers and CELS constituted the other main block (Veiga
1985: 22). The lack of coordinated action and unit y of the Argentine human
rights movement had a negative impact on President Aylwin' s human rights
policy, as touched upon in the previous chapter, and which will be further
commented on in section 5.7.
5.5 Comparing and contrasting the NGOs and movements
The presentation above has inevitably been overloaded with acronyms. In
order to facilitate the overview of the human rights entities in Chile and
Argentina, I have therefore made an effort to draw a schematic comparison
between the organizational structure of the two countries' human rights
movements. While comparing and contras ting, focus has been placed on
such aspects as type of organization (NGO versus movement), origin/
affiliation (religious, family, political party), and special characteristics or
work areas.
The following important points should be noted in this overview: there
exist organizations of all three categories in both countries, founded by
churches or families, or bearing close ties to political parties. The Chilean
bureaucratic NGOs have Argentinean counterparts, with one notable
exception: the absence of a Catholic-based NGO in Argentina, i.e. there is
no Argentinean equivalent to Chile's Vicaría. Also, the Chile an human
rights movements are more numerous and more diversified than their
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Argentinean counterparts. Just a brief comment on their specialization: all
the Argentine human rights organizations, without a single exception, had
the problem of the disappeared as one of their principal work areas,
whereas only ni ne out of the fifteen organizations in Chile listed
disappearance as one of its main themes of action (see Appendix D). This
is perhaps not surprising when taking into account the different forms of
repression in the two countries; the method of detained-disappearance being
employed on a much larger scale in Argentina than in Chile. 
14
Table 4
Human rights organizations in Chile (1976-1990) and Argentina
(1976-1983)
Type of Basis for Special CHILE ARGENTINA
organization organization characteristics/
work areas
Catholic VicarÍa
Non- Religious EcumenIcal F ASIC MEDH
governmental PDHAHC CELS
organization SERP AJ SERPAJ
(bureaucratic )
Non-religious Political CODEJU Liga
CODEPU
N on- political CCDH APDH
Detained- AFDD Madres PL.M.
disappeared FDDRPG
Political AFPP
prisoners
Exiled CPRE
Movement Family Executed AFEP
( non- politicians
bureaucratic) Children PIDEE Abuelas
PLMayo
Relegation AFAREL
Torture CNCT
MCTSA
Sources: Frühling 1986; Orellana 1991; Veiga 1986.
Note: The most important organization in each country is emphasized.
14 For a summary of the classification of the human rights organizations in Chile and
Argentina according to generations, year of foundation, origin and type of organization,
plus a specific reference on the concentration of detained-disappearance, consult
Appendix D.
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After this summary presentation of the two human rights movements, we
will now proceed to the actual working and achievements of these new civil
society actors. Again, the analysis operates on two leveIs; on the one hand
to empirically show that civil society, exemplified by the human rights
organizations, did indeed have a say in the transition to democracy, and on
the other hand, to point out the difference in achievements between the two
countries. Because the analysis operates on severalleveIs and with several
sets of actors, the study has for purposes of clarity been organized in the
following manner: the role of human rights organizations in the transition
phase is the topic for the next section, whereas a treatment of the
consolidation phase is left for section 5.7. Although cutting across the two
phases, I reserve until the end a closer treatment of the Catholic Church and
the political parties, because I believe the relationship the human rights
organizations bore to these two groups of civil society actors influenced
their different achievements, which again is relevant for the theoretical
points of our discussion.15
The main argument to be pursued in the following section is that the
importanee of the human rights organizations in the transition proeess of
Argentina and Chile rests with their accomplishment of building up new
while simultaneously strengthening existing social structures suppressed by
the military government, thereby contributing to the mobilization of civil
society as a counterweight to authoritarian rule, and furthermore placing the
issue of human rights violations explicitly on the political agenda. This may
be summed up in two words: mobilization and delegitimation.
5.6 The role of human rights organizations in transitions to
democracy
What has been the role of human rights organizations in political activity
under the rnlitary regime, and what role have these groups played in the
reconstruction of the soeial and political system during the transition to
political democracy? (Hutchison 1991: 71).
15 It should be mentioned that various scholars, such as Stepan, have drawn a line between
institutions of civil society (religious groupings, women' s associations, cultural and
ethnic organizations) and institutions of political society (political parties, elections,
legislatures), in which the polit Y contests for state power (Stepan 1988: 3-4). In this
thesis no distinction wil be made between the two groups. Human rights organizations
and political parties wil for practical purposes be treated as part of civil society in the
analysis of reactions to state repression.
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The discussion will be structured in three parts: the cause for mobilization,
the way the mobilization was carried out, and the effects this work had on
further mobilization and eventually on the delegitimation of the
authoritarian regimes. What interests us is not so much the work of the
human rights organizations per se, as what effect or importance their
various functions had in the political and social processes we are dealing
with. Has the work of the human rights organizations in Chile and
Argentina been of a purely symbolic value, or have the organizations also
had a more direct political impact?16
"The human rights movement is...a re action of civil society in order to
compensate for the lack of justice, which the State, for political reasons,
fails to provide" (Orellana 1991c: 151). In other words, spurred by the
inefficiency of the tribunals of justice to secure the respect of individual
rights guaranteed by the State, the initial and final aim of the human rights
organizations emerging in response to the brutality of the military regimes
was to restore the right of law and the state of law. By reacting to injustice
- an instantaneous reaction in Chile as opposed to slower reaction in
Argentina - the human rights organizations achieved two things: on the
individuallevel, they repaired some of the damage caused by repression
directed at individuals; and on the structural level, they repaired and
strengthened a social fabric marred by institutional state repression. The
ultimate combined effect of these two achievements was to facilitate the
delegitimation of the authoritarian regime by spurring mobilization against
the military rulers, thus causing splits in the top leadership; i.e. the classic
hard-liner/soft-liner problématique.
The most important immediate role of the human rights organizations
was to augment the opening up of space for the reconstruction of political
and social forces, which marked the onset of the transition itself. As
discussed in the fourth chapter, the onset of the Chilean political transition
has been dated to the national protests in 1983, and that of Argentina to
1981, when General Viola's taking office marked a significant change in
the military junta' s policies vis-à-vis civil society. I have earlier maintained
that the apertura initiated from above is likely to have come in response to
perceived opposition. What is c1ear is that the human rights organizations
16 Since there is an inherent danger that human rights activist may be inclined to attribute
undue importance to the role of human rights organizations in the democratization
process, I have tried to balance the ensuing discussion by including information from
written sources in addition to the information conveyed by my informants through
interviews. Among the writers not specifically devoted to the human rights cause are
Bums 1987; Guest 1990; and Sikknk 1993.
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in both Chile and Argentina, joined gradually by members of the banned
political parties, were actively voicing opposition prior to what has been
called the formal onset of transition. For instance, international attention
was first drawn to the Argentinean situation with the visit of Amnesty
International in 1976, and the subsequent publishing of Report of an
Amnesty International Mission to Argentina, which influenced international
funding for the human rights organizations, thereby facilitating and
encouraging their work. Another event having a profound impact on
international, and particularly U.S., opinion was the release by Argentine
authorities of the journalist Jacobo Timerman in 1979 - conveniently
coinciding with the visit of the Pope to Argentina - and his publication of
the book Prisoner Without a name, Cell Without a Number, which became
an international bestseller (Sikknk 1993: 424-25).
The work of the human rights organizations was, however, surrounded
by a high degree of uncertainty, as the military juntas counted on the
virtual silenee of the political parties and the trade unions till 1979
(Sondereguer 1986: 84). The visit of the Interamerican Commission for
Human Rights in 1979 was therefore a great encouragement to the human
rights movement, as was the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to human
rights activist Esquivel in 1980; another decisive victory for the human
rights movement in Argentina. The Mothers had also been nominated for
the same prize. In spite of the courageous work of the Mothers, however,
"until the final run-up to the Falklands War, human rights had been largely
a taboo issue... (and) those who dared protest publicly were numbered in
hundreds rather than in thousands, and the political impact of their efforts
was restricted because of the self-censorship imposed by the media" (Burns
1987: 111). Although the domestie short-term political impact may not have
been all that great, international attention was drawn to the matter, and the
issue could no longer be effectively ignored by the military junta. The
situation in Chile was similar: the massive roundups of people to football
stadiums and bodies floating in rivers drew the world' s attention to
Pinochet s regime within weeks of its installation.
There was another more immediate effect of swift mobilization in Chile.
Because Commttee 1 and Commttee 2 started their work right after the
coup, the Chilean human rights organizations were able to mobilize at an
earlier stage than their Argentinean counterparts. This was significant in
that the military in Chile was forced to deal with opposition from the very
onset of its regime, whereas the military juntas in Argentina enjoyed a
period of grace before the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo began to become
troublesome a couple of years after the coup, by which time the most
intensive period of massive repression was coming to a close. The
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immediate protest in Chile, although very small at first, gained momentum
rapidly. The open, visible repression in Chile, which contrasted with the
practice of secret large-scale detained-disappearance in Argentina' s dirty
war, encouraged protest. The fact that protest was spontaneous and
immediate in Chile may be a partial explanation to why there was a
remarkable decrease in repression in Chile only three months after the coup.
In Argentina the practice of detained-disappearance was maintained at a
high leve! for the first three years of military rule.
A second important point related to the instant reaction of civil society
in Chile, was the military' s decision to introduce the practice of forced
exile rather than execution or massive disappearance, which the government
felt would be much more damaging to its reputation in the international
community. The unintended side-effect of the large-scale exile of perceived
opponents was, of course, the active organization of Chileans abroad at a
very early stage after the coup, which contributed to the drawing of
international attention as well as strengthening the internal opposition in
Chile. The Argentine juntas, learning from Pinochet smistake, kept the
number of exiled and executed to an absolute minimum, thereby also
weakening the potential for protest (Burns 1987: 156). Mobilization of
opposition in Argentina was as aresult much slower than in Chile.17 The
significance of the different position taken by the Catholic Church has been
reserved for later treatment; suffice it to say here that the Chilean human
rights movement greatly benefitted from the pro-human rights attitude of
its church, whereas the Argentinean human rights movement had to fight
the battle against repression very much on its own, particularly during the
first few years after the coup.
Once the human rights organizations had gained some political space and
public acceptance, the military regimes found their chances of applying
unrestricted repression limited. With large segments of the society in
explicit opposition to the regime, the military was forced to tread more
carefully in order to avoid further delegitimation. Pressure from the HROs
may thus be said to have had a preventiv e effect in that repression would
probably have been more extensive and severe without the moral and legal
criticism of human rights violations. This, of course, is hard to prove; it is
a purely hypothetical question whether the situation would have been any
L 7 It should be noted, however, that the first public demonstration against the military
regime in Argentina was carried out already in October 1977, the year after the coup.
It was organized by the Association of Families of Disappeared and Detained for
Political and Trade Union Activity, received a minimum of local press coverage, and
resulted in the detention of 350 demonstrators (Veiga 1985: 75).
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differenthad not the HROs been there. What we do know is that the
information spread through various HRO programmes gained national
attention and raised international concern, to which the military
governments were forced to respond. It is worth noting that the birth and
growth of human rights movements in Chile and Argentina in the 1970s
benefitted greatly from world-wide strengthening of human rights
movements in a number of other countries and a general international
c1imate of growing concern for human rights.18
It has been pointed out that authoritarian governments are not immune
to criticism, as they wish to retain a certain sense of legality in the
international community. According to Sikknk, the Argentine military
government was "extremely concerned about international human rights
pressures and condemnations" (Sikknk 1993: 426). Any information
indicating that they were violating internationallaw with respect to human
rights was therefore damaging to their reputation. The Mothers of Plaza de
Mayo have to be awarded the main honour of drawing international
attention to the fate of the disappeared and securing funding for their own
work as well as that of other HROs.19 Once they had attracted the
attention of foreign journalists, it became harder for the military juntas to
ignore them - and also much more costly to silenee them. The military
junta made the fatal mistake of allowing them to organize in the first place.
Once the organization was a fact, and the attention was won by the foreign
press, the Mothers toured Europe and the United States on the invitation
from numerous governments and NGOs in other countries. Likewise,
extemal pressure on the Chilean military government was largely due to the
objective documentation of gross human rights violations published by the
NGOs, which cooperated quite effectively with Chileans living in exile and
non-governmental human rights organizations in other countries.
ParalleI to drawing international attention to their cause, the human rights
organizations, by being present and active long before the formal onset of
the transition, silently prepared the groundwork for more explicit
18 The International Declaration of Civil and Political Rights and the International
Declaration of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, both of 1976, are indicators of the
rising concern for human rights and the growing interest in making it a world rather than
a national matter. Both Chile and Argentina have signed the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
19 Much of the funding of the domestic human rights organizations in Argentina has come
from European and U.S.-based foundations (Sikkink 1993: 425). The Mothers of Plaza
de Mayo received grants from Dutch churches and the Norwegian Parliament, and the
Ford Foundation provided funds for CELS and the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo.
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mobilization. More specifically, this was achieved through the various pro-
grams the human rights organizations carried out; programs that were
gradually expanded and tolerated, and which, little by little, won influence
on state policies. Of prime importanee was the human rights organizations'
contribution to strengthening the judicial system, whose dealings had taken
on an increasingly farcical tone during the dictatorship in both countries.
Legal assistance programmes became crucial. Most of the professional
organizations had lawyers working for them, preparing and presenting
thousands of habeas corpus to the tribunals. The absenee of a functioning
judicial systems in both countries meant that the human rights organizations
was the only body providing a rneans of guaranteeing the rights of the
individual citizen. In addition to making the government aware that there
was a reaction to repression, the practice of assistance strengthened those
individuals deprived of protection from the state and helped them organize
and mobilize.
It is of utmost importance that the human rights organizations in both
countries played a crucial ro le in the mobilization phase by contributing
actively to the rebuilding of individual and collective strength through the
various aspects of their work. The registration of human rights violations
by means of accepting reports from victims and family members, had two
principal effects, one psychological and one purely practical. Those filing
their complaints received compassion and sympathy, and through contact
with other victims or family members their ability to protest was
strengthened. The formation of human rights organizations, especially those
classified as movements, thus contributed to solidarity among the victims
and their families by strengthening their position vis-à-vis the military
governments through joint action. Legal defence programmes offered the
chance for defendants to communicate with the out side world. Psychologi-
cal assistance programmes helped reintegrate victims into social life and
hence to reassume their political and social roles. Education programmes
helped revitalize democratic ideals. In short, the human rights organizations
provided the opportunity for professionals, politicians, and family members
of victims of repression to unite their forces in mobilizing against the
regime in circumstances where political activities were forbidden.
The early establishment of church-affiliated human rights organizations
in Chile subsequently paved the way for other human rights organizations,
including those having a clear political profile: CODEPU and CODEJU.
The formation of a large human rights movement served as a broad base
for the training of political leaders, who transferred their efforts to the
political parties once these started to gain ground. This was of particular
benefit to the Chilean political parties of the Left. The Christian Democratic
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Party enjoyed a higher degree of tolerance from the regime than did the
other parties. It is significant that the formally recognized opposition in
Chile, including the political parties as well as the HROs, was firmly
established in 1983, i.e. seven years before the formal reintroduction of
democratic rule. In Argentina, by contrast, liberalIzation largely overlapped
with the democratization phase, leaving a very short space of time for the
opposition forces to organize and agree on a political programme. The
speed of the transition favoured the Argentine democratic forces in that the
military failed to obtain favourable terms for their exit from political power,
but the other side of the coin was that the opposition forces were left highly
unorganized and uncoordinated. This in turn came to have an unfavourable
impact on consolidation and reconciliation, thus resulting in finaloutcomes
opposite to those predicted by elite- focused transition theory.
One may of course be entitled to raise an objection to this line of
argument by pointing out the following: if the opposition in Chile was so
much stronger and better organized than that of Argentina, why did the
Chilean transition take so long? It is not the task of this study to provide
an analysis of why the military regime in Chile proved to be so much more
durable than that of Argentina, in spite of Chile' s long democratie pre-coup
tradition. Very briefly, the interpretations offered to this seemingly
paradoxical situation have focused on aspects such as the difference
between Pinochet s personal consolidated one- man rule versus the shifting
alliances and factions within the Argentine military. Partly due to the
economic mismanagement of the Argentine juntas, a severe economic crisis
spurred a wave of discontent which the military tried to convert into
support by playing on the strings on nationalism when entering the
Falklands/Malvinas war. Ironically, the catastrophic consequences of this
ill-prepared move led to the final downfall of the military regime. It is true
that Chile faced a similar, although less severe, economic crisis in 1983,
spurring protest, followed by liberalization. Nevertheless, Pinochet managed
to consolidate his power due to the still fragmented and weak character of
the opposition and the support of a united military. 20 One may conclude
from this digression that the opposition in Chile had ample time to work
out a viable alternative to Pinochet s sovereign rule between the political
opening in 1983 and Pinochets final electoral defeat in the 1988 plebiscite.
We will shortly return to a more detailed discussion on how this time span
allowed links between the human rights movement and the political parties
in Chile to develop and solidify, as opposed to the Argentinean situation,
20 See Remmer 1991 for an account clarifying the consolidation of the Pinochet regime.
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where these two groups of civil society took on an antagonistic position
rather than a spirit of cooperation.
I would like to sum up the above discussion by emphasizing two of the
most important achievements of the human rights movement in Chile and
Argentina: they functioned as openers of political space, contributed to the
revitalization of ei vil society, and through their persistent demands, they
managed to place the issue of gross human rights violations in the political
agenda, thereby attracting the attention of the world as well as that of their
own countrymen.
Before moving on to the consolidation phase, let us briefly recapitulate
Przeworski's argument that transition is always initiated by splits within the
authoritarian block. My question is, why does a coherent ruling military
elite suddenly fragment? It was suggested in the elite-focused analysis in
Chapter 3 that the military rulers disagreed on whether to open up for
liberalization or not. But why was the question raised in the first place?
One of the reasons, I believe, Hes in the fact that the military soft-liners
started to feel uncomfortable when they received persistent international
criticism for their massive human rights violations. Moreover, this
international criticism led to partial international diplomatic as well as
economic isolation, which negatively affected the economy, and in turn
provoked a lot of unrest in the two societies; the crisis which spurred the
Argentine junta to launch the Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982, and the
wave of protest in Chile in 1983. This outburst of visible unrest was a
result of discontent building up over time, which finally found an outlet
after civil society had fortified its new and old structures, i.e. the human
rights organizations and the political parties. The governments in both cases
were at last forced to explicitly respond to the demands of the public. We
already know the end result: military defeat in Argentina, and the military
initially regaining control in Chile only to be beaten at their own game in
an unexpected electoral defeat several years later. That brings us over to the
role of human rights organizations in the actual phase of regime change and
the ensuing phase of democratic consolidation.
5.7 Accounting for the paradox of democratie consolidation
At the very beginning of this study I stated the hypothesis that Chile in
many ways has found a more palatable solution to the legacy of past gross
human rights violations than has Argentina, in spite of the famous trials of
the generals in Argentina. It is time to point out how the human rights
organizations contributed to this apparent paradox.
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Before analyzing the differences between the collective achievements of
the human rights movements in the consolidation phase with respect to the
problem of past gross human rights violations, a few comments on their
commonalities may be relevant. We know that the human rights organiza-
tions lost some of their prime importance as other civil society actors, in
particular the political parties, entered the scene of the democratic game.
The direct effects of human rights organizations on state policy were
probably few, since there was very little contact between the organizations
and the military, and consequently hardly room for dialogue. Nevertheless,
there is reason to claim that the human rights organizations had a
substantial indirect influence on the military through their links with the
political parties, who participated in the elite negotiations in the transition
proeesses, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Leaving aside the connection between the political parties and the human
rights organizations for the moment, the success of the human rights
organizations in encouraging the political parties to raise the banner of
human rights remains a fact. MarÍa Sondereguer notes that in the case of
Argentina, human rights became a public topic in 1980, and that in the
course of 1981, "the subject was gradually adopted by the political and
social forces" (Sondereguer 1986: 84). In Chile the human rights issue had
become one of the central banners of the social protests of the mid-1980s
(de Brito 1993: 585). How else can one explain the prominenee of the issue
of human rights violations gained in the run-up to the election campaign in
Chile, or the extreme pressure placed on AlfonsÍn to resolve the problem
of crimes commtted under authoritarian rule in Argentina?
The human rights organizations may not have had much direct say in the
elite-negotiated transitions, but their work created a climate of awareness
and expectation among the public which increased the temperature of the
negotiations further up the hierarchies of the political parties and the
military echelons. As concluded in the previous chapter, the key to the
reversal of the initial human rights policy in Argentina after the formal
restoration of democracy was public pressure brought about by poor
expectation management, which in turn provoked the military to close their
ranks and demand immunity from prosecution.
5.7.1 Information
Apart from placing the topic of human rights violations on the political
agenda, the human rights organizations in both countries specifically
contributed to the different outcomes in the post-coup human rights policy
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on two measures, namely through the information they provided to the
presidents on human rights violations, and secondly, on the way they
reacted toward the proposed and effectuated policies concerning this issue.
Information and unit y are key words. The importanee of the documentation
centres became evident when the Sábato and the Rettig Commssions were
formed to carry out investigations of the human rights violations commtted
under military rule. In fact, it is doubtful whether the presidents would have
put forward such a measure at all had not the organizations gone through
the painstaking proeess of gathering information about the crimes
commtted against individual human rights under military rule as well as
publicly demanding the revealing of the facts of state repression after the
restoration of democracy. However, there were differences in the
information gathering in the two countries which gave rise to dispute over
the real number of victims; as will be recalled, a hot topic in Argentina at
the time of regime change.
Due to its accurate registration practices and its large and active exile
population, the Chilean human rights movement, particularly its
bureaucratic NGOs, had managed to build up an impressive body of
documentation. This was specifically due to early and meticulous
registration practices of the Chilean HROs, above all Vicaría, F ASIC, and
the Chilean Commssion on Human Rights. The system of registration in
Chile is reported to be one of the most unified, efficient and complete in
all of Latin America, facilitated by the active involvement of lawyers from
the very onset of military rule, and later perfected through the use of
computers and advanced techniques of c1assification and registration
towards the end of Pinochet s rule. International human rights organs, such
as the United Nations General Assembly and the Inter American
Commission for Human Rights, have extensively referred to documentation
published by, and methods used by, the Chilean NGOs, especially by the
Vicaría and the Chile an Commission for Human Rights (FfÜhling and
Orellana 1991: 53). The UN passed a number of resolutions condemning
the Pinochet government. Some judicial proeesses, such as the trial of three
left-wing Chilean activists in March 1985 gained much publicity, and hence
had a great political impact (FfÜhling and Orellana 1991: 54). The resulting
international isolation of the Chile an military government caused divisions
with the most progressive forces in the government which took the position
that intern al security policies had to take international reactions into
account, i.e. a classic hard-liner/soft-liner split.
In Argentina the registration practices were less accurate and started at
a much later stage than in Chile. Since the Mothers were primarily
concerned with protesting against the regime through collective action, the
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registration practices were left largely to the bureaucratie NGOs, such as
APDH and CELS. CELS, we know, did not start functioning till 1980, well
after the main period of repression was over. Because the bureaucratie
organizations working on the registration and documentation of human
rights violations remained in the background for quite a while after the
coup, it meant that much valuable information was lost. The work of
preseriting habeas corpus in Argentina was made very difficult due to the
prosecution of lawyers who took on cases of victims of repression. At least
25 lawyers were killed in 1975, and 109 more disappeared; roughly 100 of
them between March and December 1976 alone (Nunca Más 1991: 417-18).
In Chile, on the other hand, no human rights lawyers disappeared or were
assassinated, although a few were imprisoned or exiled.21 This total
disrespect for the judicial system and those associated with it in Argentina
severely hampered the documentation practices. The bombing or raiding of
human rights organizations headquarters was not uncommon. In short, it
was very risky to work with the victims of human rights violations. The
absence of Church protection made the situation worse. Another fact
slowing down the documentation proeess was the very nature of repression.
When people started disappearing right after the coup, it was believed that
they were just imprisoned. It took some time before the families of the
victims realized that they were actually seemingly nowhere to be found and
started to organize. It is not without reason that those drawing most
international attention in Argentina were not primarily the NGOs, but rather
the voices of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo. Serious splits within this
organization brings us to the second factor accounting for dissimilarity
between the human rights movements in Chile and Argentina, which have
affected the proeess of consolidation, namely unit y versus disunity.
5.7.2 Unit y versus disunity
It has been pointed out that the Chilean human rights movement managed
to retain a remarkably high degree of unit y in the transition phase in spite
of its organizational numerical and ideological diversification. From the
Catholic right-wing to the militant left-wing, they all united around the
human rights issue and offered full assistance to Aylwin's policy of human
rights. In Argentina, by contras t, there was no coordinating organ, and
21 José Zalaquett were one of those exiled. Information about the respect for lawyers in
Chile was given by lawyer Jorge Mera in an interview with the author in Santiago, 27
May 1993.
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consequently a wide range of opinions as to how to act in the transition
phase. The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo was the organization with the largest
mobilizing effect in Argentina, but their strength in confronting the military
tumed to weakness in the transition to democratic rule when the Mothers
maintained their militancy and confronted the new government with
accusations of being no better than its predecessor. The Mothers refused to
cooperate with the other human rights organizations, thus severely reducing
their collective bargaining power. It is symptomatie that an intern al split,
leading to the formation of two formal groups of Mothers, further damaged
the unit y of the human rights movement in Argentina. The smaller group,
moderate in their position, took the name Madres de Plaza de Mayo Línea
Fundadora (founding line), whereas the larger radical group, heade d by
Hebe Bonafini, retained the original name. Both groups have had as their
main aim to demand legal justice for those responsible for the dis-
appearance of their children, but they hold contradictory opinions as to how
to go about reaching their goals. The main issues of dispute are cooperation
with the democratic government (first the AlfonsÍn government and now
that of Menem), as well as other human rights organizations, and the
question of exhumation of graves in order to identify, where possible, the
disappeared. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo Línea Fundadora to ok a stand
of cooperation, lending their full support to the work of the Sábato
Commission and the AlfonsÍn government' s attempts at consolidation. In
the matter of exhumations, the progressive group of the Mothers support the
Grandmothers in their search for their grandehildren, thereby also agreeing
to the exhumation of graves in order to identify, where possible, at least
some of the victims. The uncompromising spirit of the radical group of
Mothers headed by Hebe Bonafini has led to their gradual isolation. Today
the Mothers stand largely alone in Argentine society, isolated from the
other human rights organizations. An example of their uncompromising
attitude is their refusal to sign common petitions or to participate in press
conferences together with other HROs, who they consider as traitors.22
The strength of the Chilean human rights movement lay first and
foremost in their ability to retain unit y during the final stage of transition,
their well-established links with political parties, and their initial support of
the Aylwins' human rights policy, as shown in their largely unanimous
acceptance of the Informe Rettig. As previously pointed out, the universal
acceptance of the figures presented in the governmental report on human
22 This information was given by representatives of the Grandmothers and both groups of
Mothers in interviews with the author in Buenos Aires, June 1993. Various secondary
sources confirm this information.
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rights violations was largely attributed to their efficient documentation
practices, which left the figures virtually undisputed. Also, the Chilean
human rights organizations refrained from demanding total justice, thereby
not pressing Aylwin to adopt a strategy he could not sustain.
In Argentina this was not the case. The figures of the disappeared caused
major disputes and verbal confrontations with AlfonsÍn's government. The
Nunca Más was considered only a step towards full legal justice. It was the
demands for full-fledged punishment of the "military assassins" that made
the headlines in Argentine press in 1985. When their high expectations of
Castigo a los culpables - the Mothers' claim of punishment of the guilty
- attached to the trials were left shattered after the limited sentences and
later pardon of the generaIs, the human rights organizations in general, and
the Mothers in particular, did not offer much in terms of support for the
new democratie government. In consequence, President AlfonsÍn' s efforts
at staking out a sustainable policy in the field of human rights proved much
more problematie and less successful than the road embarked on by
President Aylwin in Chile, where expectations were lower, presidential
promises less hight-tuned, and the gap between the two significantly
smaller, which is what I believe ultimately accounted for the substantially
different outcomes in the two countries with respect to reconciliation in the
human rights matter.
So far, I have treated the human rights organizations in isolation, well
aware of the fact that they form an integrated part of what has been
referred to as ei vil society. As has repeatedly been touche d upon in
previous chapters, the two main groups of ei vil society actors interacting
with the human rights organizations in both Chile and Argentina were the
Catholic Church and the political parties. The last part of this chapter is
accordingly devoted to examining the role of these civIl society actors vis-
à-vis the Chile an and Argentinean human rights organization respectively.
The overriding aim remains the same: providing a more complete account
for some of the difference in achievement in the field of human rights
which may explain the paradox inherent in the Argentinean and Chilean
transitions. Since the role taken on by the Catholic Church was vital for the
very formation of the nature of the two human rights movements, we shall
deal with this religious institution first, leaving the connection with the
political parties for section 5.9.
5.8 The Catholic Church and power constellations
When taking a brief look at the power constellations in Chile and
Argentina, one is struck by the diametrically opposite positions assumed by
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the Catholic Church in the transition to democracy. In Argentina the
military, political, economic, and the religious elites joined forces to pursue
their goals of the national security doctrine, lea ving civil society on its own
to fight against gross human rights violations. In Chile, on the other hand,
the religious elite took an active position against the military, political, and
economic elites, thus shifting the power balanee in favour of civil society
in the struggle for human rights. This leads us to discuss the ro le of this
fourth power, the religious elite, in the context of the re action of civil
society to the repression outline d in Chapter 2. First a short historie al note
in order to outline the setting for their different position:
The Roman Catholic Church is perhaps the institution in Latin America
which, after the military, has wielded most influence on society throughout
history. Not only do es the Church have a virtual monopoly in religious
matters, it also has played a central role in world affairs. Traditionally, the
Church may be said to be conservative in the sense that it is the de fender
of time-honoured morals and virtues. Very of ten it has had close ties to the
upper classes. The Church has generally been associated with hierarchy,
oligarchy, strong leadership, and hence allocated little room for
individualism. The values based on the Iberian heritage transmitted by the
Catholic Church on to Latin American societies are by many scholars
believed to be of an intrinsically authoritarian and anti-democratic
character.23
However, a new trend was set in the 1960s, as the increasing conflict
between implementing the Christian ideals of helping the poor on the one
hand and simultaneously ensuring tactical alliances in economic matters on
the other hand resulted in a split in traditional Catholic ideology. The
holding of the Second Vatican Council in 1962 marked the formal onset of
the movement that became known as the Theology of Liberation.24 Instead
of guarding the power and wealth of the Catholic Church as an institution,
the adherents to this new theology claimed that it was the Church' s moral
obligation to follow the example of Christ and defend the poor. This line
of thinking was not popular with the conservatives within the Church.
Many of the liberation theology priests were accused of preaching Marxist
ideas to the poor and were thus seen as traitors and enemies of the Church.
This cleft became evident in the opposing strategies adapted by the Chile an
23 For a detailed account of the Iberian heritage and the legacy of CatholicIsm, see Calvert
and Calvert 1989.
24 On the Theology of Liberation and its impact on socIal movements, see Berryman 1987.
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and Argentinean churches in situations vis-à-vis the politics of the military
governments in the 1970s.
5.8.1 The pro-human rights Catholic Church in Chile25
The one public institution in Chile that really stood up to the military
government from the start was the Catholic Church, in spite of the well-
known fact that not one of the Chilean bishops sympathized with the
Popular Unit y government of Salvador Allende on the day of the coup. The
clergy were inherently critical of the Marxist ideology and of the chaos in
society resulting from the economic and political mismanagement of the
Socialists. Unable to foresee the consequences of the national security
doctrine, the Church believed the Armed Forces to be composed of
professionals; honourable Christian men who would respect tradition and
keep their promise about returning to institutionalism as soon as order was
restored. Neither the Church, nor the rest of the Chilean population believed
that the atrocities subsequently commtted by the military regime were
possible in a civilized country with as long a democratie tradition as their
own. However, only two days after the coup, Cardinal Silva HenrÍquez and
the Permanent Commttee of the Episcopal Conference issued a public
declaration "decrying the bloodshed, and calling for moderation by the
military and respect for previous social gains by the poor" (B. Smith 1 986:
273). A month later, aware of what was taking place around him, Cardinal
Silva Henríquez took the initiative to form the first human rights
organization in Chile, the Commttee for Peace (COP ACHI), also known
as Committee 2. This organization, composed of representatives from five
churches and headed by Fernando AriztÍa, was later to become the largest
and most famous NGO in Chile; the Vicaría de la Solidaridad. From then
onwards, "Parishes and church organs in Chile served as umbrella
organizations for opposition community groups and surviving elements
from the political parties and labour movement" (Valenzuela and
Valenzuela 1986: 2).
What made the Chilean Church react so fast and in the way it did? It
may be useful to make some reflections on historically favourable
conditions. The Catholic Church in Chile has historically been one of the
most progressive in Latin America. It has developed in a highly politicized
25 The following discussion on the role of the Catholic Church in Chile's transition to
democracy and its connection with the human rights organizations draws on the
following literature: de Brito 1993; Camus 1986; Frühling 1992; Garretón 1989; Orellana
1991, 1992; B. Smith 1986; Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986.
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society with almost 150 years of democratic tradition, notwithstanding
occasional breaks. Separated from the State with the Constitution of 1925,
on the insistence of the Liberals, it has been free to confront the challenges
of modernity and enjoy the fruits of the Second Ecumenical Vatican
Counci1.26 The Chilean Catholic Church has traditionally played an
important ro le in politicallife as well. The upsurge of the special Catholic
Action methodology in the 1940s saw thousand of workers, farmers, and
university students brought up in the spirit of the social doctrine of the
Church. Many of the present bishops in Chile were raised in the same
social tradition.
This inspired various social and political programmes, caried out on a
massive scale in the poor poblaciones (shantytowns), especially in Santiago,
during the following decade. Priests gained experience in social matters,
and retained close ties with the poor. This was criticized by some of the
more conservative clergy, but the sensitivity wh.ich the Church developed
regarding the suffering and humiliation of the poor was certainly an
important factor in explaining its rapid awareness of the repression
following the coup, and its quick and largely undisputed action in response
to that repression. Having first-hand knowledge about events and being able
to resort to experienced activists, the Church was quicklyable to take on
a large responsibility in the struggle against human rights violations.
Due to this liberal tradition, which interestingly enough did not directly
form part of the Theory of Liberation Ideology, the Church's prominent
position in Chilean society, its legalistic tradition, and last, but not least, the
outstanding personal qualities of some of its top clergy, such as the
Archbishop of Santiago, Cardinal Raúl Silva HenrÍquez and Cristián Precht,
enabled the Church able to play a critical role in the defence of human
rights. All except two of its bishops, including the bishop of Valparaiso,
were opposed to the regime of Pinochet. It should be noted, however, that
there was an intern al split between those who believed that it was not the
duty of the Church to get involved in political matters; a position taken by
several military chaplains, among others, and those who believed it to be
the Church' s duty to actively engage in the protection of human rights. The
latter became the formal position of the Catholic Church in Chile, largely
due to the prominent and highly respected position of Cardinal Silva
HenrÍquez. His leadership merits special mentioning. In many ways there
are several parallels between the political skilIs of Silva HenrÍquez and later
President Aylwin: they both enjoyed a high degree of public respect, they
26 The practice of civil marriage and civil registers had been established as far back as
1830.
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both made tactical moves to weaken the position of the military without
explicitly provoking them into action, and they both surrounded themselves
with able politicians or helpers. Silva HenrÍquez managed to launch the
Catholic Church as an active defender of human rights and voiced open
criticism against the military regime in the form of numerous petitions and
pastoral letters. Due to the heavy social and religious prestige of the
Church, the military did not dare to act too strongly against it for fear of
causing total uproar among the people and attracting unwanted international
attention. But the Church did not remain untouched. Pinochet ordered the
dissolution of the ecumenical organization Committee 2 at the end of 1975.
Cardinal Silva immediately ordered the formation of Vicaría, correctly
assuming that Vicaría would enjoy better protection if placed directly under
the auspices of the Catholic Church. He appointed as the first vicar of
Vicaría young Cristián Precht, who became a highly respected leader of the
organization forming the core of the Chilean human rights movement.
Pinochet would not risk delegitimizing his military government any further
by openly attacking the Church or Vicaría. This, however, is not to say that
the Church, or the organizations or people affiliated with the Church, were
exempt from repression. Three priests were assassinated. At least 200
priests, monks and nuns were expelled from Chile, a fate suffered also by
co-President of COP ACHI, Helmut Frenz, and one of COP ACHI' s principal
founders, José Zalaquett. 50 other functionaries from various church-related
organizations were detained, and the assassination of Vicaría functionary
Manuel Parada in 1985 caused public outrage (Orellana 1991c). Cardinal
Silva HenrÍquez, too, received death threats (Keesing' s 1980: 30620).
Even so, the Church was perceived as a safe haven where people could
seek refuge. Its prestige and relative immunity gave it the function as an
umbrella for the human rights organizations. It enjoyed good contacts with
other churches both in Chile and abroad, as well as a close cooperation
with several European embassies in Santiago, hence making it even more
difficult for the military to stage open attacks against it. The importance of
the human rights stanee of the Catholic Church in Chile may be summed
up in the words of Iain Guest: "In ... Chile, human rights work would have
been entirely extinguished had it not been for the resilience of the Roman
Catholic Church" (Guest 1990: 234). In Argentina the situation was quite
different.
5.8.2 The pro-military Catholic Church in Argentina
The Argentinean Catholic Church is infamous for its severely conservative
and authoritarian nature (Veiga 1985: 101; Guest 1990: 16; Snow and
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Manzetti 1993: 157); an image which was reinforced under the recent
dictatorship. The Church as an institution took an apolitical stand, and
never went as far to officially defend the military juntas. In spite of this
position, Videla' s appointment of prominent lay Catholics to his Ministry
of Religion and Foreign Relations drew the Church into politics and lent
religious support to the military junta's conservative foreign policy (Calvert
and Calvert 1989: 34). More importantly, by its silence, the Church tacitly
accepfed the politics of the juntas by remaining passive onlookers to large-
scale repression; even when the repression was directed against its own
members. Two bishops and twenty priests, nuns, and seminarians
disappeared or were killed in the dirty war (Guest 1990: 58). The leadership
of the Church never openly denounced the atrocities committed under
military rule. Neither did the Church as an institution ever offer any
assistance to the thousands of people who, in despair, came pleading for
help to find their relatives, except to encourage them to keep praying
(Veiga 1985: 84). It vaguely protested against the regime in the form of
denunciations in some public notices and publications, but no direct action
or outspoken protest from the pulpit was ever made. It is no secret that
several of the Church' s bishops, including the late Archbishop of La Plata,
Antonio Plaza, favoured the military regime. Even the Pope's nuncio
Monsignor Pio Laghi, was charged with collaboration with the junta (Guest
1990: 58). As good Christians they could not openly defend the large-scale
human rights violations that were taking place, but they reasoned that the
Marxists were enemies of the State and of Christianity. Jf some of them had
to die, it was regrettable, but in the long run it would be better for
Argentina to rid society of such subversive elements.27
This official position of the Argentine Catholic Church may be traced
back to the increasing split between liberals and conservative clergy in the
1960s. As in Chile, the Second Vatican Council also had an impact on
Argentine society. In fact, Argentina had received its first work priest
already in 1960, and the impact of the Theology of Liberation became
visibly stronger after the Conference in MedellÍn in 1968. The Church as
an institution had remained largely politically conservative till the 1960s,
but the radicalization of certain sectors of the clergy had been accelerated
up by the 1966 military coup. The Catholic Left criticized the OnganÍa
regime, while the Catholic Right remained supportive - widening the
divisions. The Left was a clear minority, as seen in 1972 when the roughly
10 per cent of the priests belonging to the Argentine Movement of Priests
27 For an excellent account of the position of the Argentine Catholic Church during the
military dictatorship, see Mignone 1991.
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for the Third World, established in Córdoba in 1968, made an alliance with
Peronism.28 The 1976 military coup was welcomed by much of the
hierarchy as "a potentially binding force on the Argentine Church" (Calvert
and Calvert 1989: 33).
Several bishops and priests are known to have had dose ties with top
military officials, and they could hardly remain ignorant of the repression
that was being carried out. In fact, many of the priests who chose to deviate
from the official position of the Church and voiced open criticism of the
regime, later appeared in the lists of the victims of repression. 29
Prosecution against religious people was far heavier in Argentina than in
Chile. Roughly 0.3 per cent of the investigated cases of detained-
disappeared are listed as religious (Nunca Más 1991: 296). The most
famous examples of religious victims, are the two French nuns, Alice
Dumon and Léone Renée Duquet, who were detained in 1977. Given the
diametrically different position of the Catholic Church in Chile and
Argentina, the room for political action for the human rights organizations
was larger in Chile. Moreover, in Argentina the Church' s position in the
human rights question openly inspired mistrust among the human rights
organizations in general, and among the Mothers, with Hebe Bonafini as
their main advocator, in particular.
To sum up, the pro-human rights stand taken by the Catholic Church in
Chile had a very positive effect on the development and growth of the
human rights movement. This was reflected in the early birth of the first
HROs which soon grew into a movement, its magnitude and diversification,
its retention of a relatively high degree of unit y in spite of diversity, its
building up of valuable documentation archives almost from day one after
the coup, and its positive attitude towards reconciliation and cooperation.
This contrasts with the failure of the Catholic Church in Argentina to offer
a similar kind of umbrella-protection for the Argentinean human rights
movement, which resulted in a slower mobilization proeess, restricted the
scope of action for the HROs, failed to provide a unifying organ resulting
in deep splits in the human rights movement, and made the power balance
28 The Church had always had an ambivalent relationship with the Peronists; first
supporting them, then abandoning them after squabbling with Perón over divOfce. It is
believed that the most extreme part of the Left-wing within the Church actively
supported the Montoneros, while the extreme nationalist Right of the Church
demonstrated their militant anti-communist stand with the founding of Ateneo de la
República in 1962 (Calvert and Calvert 1989).
29 A non-exhaustive list over names of religious victims is to be found in Nunca Más
(1991: 350-60).
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even more uneven at the time of transition. As a final word on the subject,
the Chile an Catholic Church may be seen as an active contributor to the
process of democratization and reconciliation, whereas its Argentine
counterpart has passively - or even actively - hindered or, at best, slowed
down the human rights organization' s quest for justice and reconciliation.
The Catholic Church was one protagonist in the human rights issue. The
hunian rights organizations also bore close ties to the political parties. In
fact; several of the HROs in both countries were accused of being front
organizations for subversive activity and forming part of the pro-marxist
plot against the nations. It goes without saying that this was an overreaction
by the paranoid authoritarian rulers, but how in fact were the human rights
organizations linked to the political parties in Chile and Argentina, and
what effect did these connections have on the proeess of transition and
democratic consolidation?
5.9 Human rights organizations and political parties
The human rights organizations' affiliations to political parties and their
ability, or lack of such, to maintain unit y after the reintroduction of
democratie rule, affected their bargaining power. I will argue that the
positions adopted by the human rights organizations together with the
political parties regarding human rights policies proposed by the
democratically elected governments, had a decisive impact on the outcome
of these policies and consequently also on the proeess of democratie
consolidation.
The human rights organizations had at least an indirect influence on
military policy through their links with political parties, who participated
in the elite negotiations in the transition process. Most importantly, the
attention drawn to human rights made it hard for the political parties to
ignore this issue in their election campaigns, as well as impossible for the
democratically elected governments to sweep this issue under the carpet
once they were in power. In short, the human rights organizations were
those primarily responsible for placing the issue of gross human rights
violations on the political agenda, and it was up to the political parties to
de al effectively with the problem.
The connection between the human rights organizations and political
parties existed on two leveIs, first at the individual level through the
participation of ex-militants who had been barred from politics and became
active in the newly founded HROs, and later at the structurallevel through
interaction between the human rights organizations as separate institutions
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and the reemerging political parties. The Chilean and Argentinean situation
bear distinct traits on both leveIs. Because the struggle for human rights
was almost synonymous with the fight against the authoritarian regime, the
work of most human rights activists naturally had a clear political profile,
generally belonging to the centre-left part of the political spectrum. The
military regime in both countries accused the HROs of being political
groups used by the left to organize subversive activities against the
government. This criticism cannot be justified as the HROs differ from
political parties in too many dimensions. Their programmes of legal, social,
and medical assistance etc. may well have been supported by political
parties, but have never been part of permanent political programmes, or
even a main activity of political parties. Furthermore, the HROs never
advised the military regime on politics outside the field of human rights,
and, most importantly, the HROs never formed alternatives to traditional
institutional power groups. Still, the HROs have suffered the dilemma of,
on the one hand, becoming too political and hence losing their credibility
as institutions of human rights, and, on the other hand, being so apolitical
that they run the risk of being accused by their own supporters - who have
been prosecuted for their political ideas - of laeking political direction and
purpose. This has been a problem for the Chilean human rights
organizations as well as for their Argentinean counterparts.
5.9.1 Connections at the individuallevel
As repeatedly stated, it was the human rights organizations that initially
paved the way for the liberalization proeesses in Chile and Argentina, thus
playing a prime ro le at the outset of the transition proeess. Since human
rights is not a party-political issue and therefore cuts across ideologies and
political stances, working with this issue did not require a specific political
conviction in terms of ideology. Nevertheless, most of the people initiating
the struggle for human rights belonged to the political Left. With the large
majority of political left-wing leaders in both countries executed, dis-
appeared or in exile, and the remaining political activists being restricted
from normal political activity, many former militants used the human rights
organizations as a basis for their struggle against the authoritarian regime.
The human rights organizations therefore came to function as a kind of
training ground for future politicalleaders.
Tliis tendency was stronger in Chile than in Argentina for several
reasons. Most importantly, the bureaucratic NGOs were more influential in
Chile, whereas the human rights movements dominated in Argentina. The
latter family-based movements were primarily run by women and were
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generally of a non-political character (in the meaning of party politics) with
a strong one-issue focus; related in one way or another to the detained-
disappeared. In Chile, on the other hand, the most influential human rights
organizations were the NGOs; first Vicaría and F ASIC, later strengthened
by the work carried out by the Chilean Commission on Human Rights,
CODEPU, and CODEJU. All these organizations had a formal charaeter;
a high number of professionals, including lawyers, psychologists, doctors,
academicians, and a large number of ex-political members, many of whom
were fired from their jobs with the onset of the military dictatorship. The
very character and procedures of these organizations provided a leadership
training ground, as well as providing those previously political active
persons with a way of keeping in touch with other people of a similar
conviction. Many of these people resumed their political activity once the
ban on political parties was lifted, and advocated the human rights cause
in the election campaign.
After the reintroduction of democracy, many human rights activists have
either gone back to their former professional positions, are currently
engaged in political activity at some level, or hold influential positions
within the new government. On assuming political leadership positions,
most of these people have retired from their human rights work, because
being both a politician and a human rights activist is generally perceived
as not compatible, and the HROs have to maintain their non-partisan image.
However, former human rights advocates, for instance, who now sit in the
Ministry of Justiee or hold important positions within the Judiciary,
obviously have a good opportunity to serve the human rights cause by
influencing the decision making proeesses. The lawyer and human rights
activist Jorge Mera's efforts to introduce the subject of liberallaw into the
Universities, as well as proposing judicial reforms, is another example of
how human rights activists may continue their influence in a democratic
setting.3D Chilean politicians are reported to have a high regard for the
HROs in general, and for the Chilean Commission of Human Rights in
p articul ar.
In Argentina the bureaucratic NGOs were fewer and caried less moral
and legal weight than their Chile an counterparts. However, there are always
exceptions to the rule. President Raúl AlfonsÍn took an early stanee on the
human rights issue and was one of the founding members of the APDH
together with Socialist Party delegate Alfredo Bravo and Nobel Peace Prize
winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, who was also a founding member of
3D large Mera has been and is currently the editor of the Christian Program for Defense of
Human Rights' journal.
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SERPAJ. The former Peronist-supporter Dr. Emilio Mignone, later
president of CELS, is among those persons actively engaged in the struggle
for human rights who won great international recognition. It is interesting
to note that non e of the female leaders of the biggest human rights
movements in Argentina have entered party politics after the restoration of
democracy. Hebe Bonafini, leader of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, has
won fame and recognition through her uncompromising stanee with elite
politicians, be they military generals or democratically elected politicians.
However, she has not succeeded in redireeting her fighting spirit and energy
into the changing nature of Argentine reality , and as aresult she and the
Mothers have been left very much on the sideline after the formal
restoration of democracy. They have even been referred to as acronyms for
their persistency in demanding the return of their children ten years after
the vast majority of Argentineans have decided to let the past be the past
and look to the future.
Let us return to the main argument. The second main reason why the
NGOs in Chile formed a broader basis for the participation of ex-militants
and recruitment of future politicians and leaders than those of Argentina has
to do with the nature of the political parties in the two countries. In Chile
all the parties of the Left (the Socialists, Communists, MIRists, MAPU, and
the left-wing of the Social Democrats) all took a firm position against the
military regime. All parties had activists involved in the human rights
movement; those belonging to the parties further to the left most
prominently in CODEPU and CODEJU. There was therefore no main
conflict between ideological adherence and participation in human rights
work. It should be noted, however, that none of the Chilean human rights
organizations were formally, or even indirectly, connected to any political
party, and that all organizations allowed for political and ideological
plurality. Not surprisingly, very few people of the Right joined forces with
the Marxists and Socialists in the struggle for human rights in Chile.
In contrast, the alleged links between the Liga in Argentina and the
Communist Party damaged the credibility of this organization and rendered
it largely inoperative during the first few years of the dictatorship (Orellana
1991c; Veiga 1985). The Argentinean Communist Party was accused of
having adopted a pro-military stance, which is surprising considering the
massive prosecutions against its members. This is believed to be related to
the former Soviet Union and China's position vis-à-vis the Argentine
government These two countries' interest in maintaining trade relations with
Argentina seems to have gained priority over ideology. Both the Soviet
Union and China refrained from voting in all the UN resolutions passed
against Argentina for its violations of human rights (Guest 1990: 118-19,
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182-83). This perceived non-neutrality of sectors of the Argentine human
rights movement had adamaging effect on the movement s unit y . It also
caused strain in the relation between the human rights organizations and the
political parties once the parties were firmly back as in the political arena.
5.9.2 The structural leve L
In spite of the restrictions on political activity under the authoritarian
governments, the military in both countries permitted, in its last years of
rule, some dialogue between the groups of the surviving political fore es and
the growing consensus for the need to reinstate democracy. Gradually, as
the space for political action was widened with the onset of liberalization
and the ensuing process of democratization, the political parties emerged
from their c1andestine activity and started acting more in the open. In
Argentina the formal legalization of political activity was begun when
Bignone's transitional government in June 1982 ordered the preparation for
future elections. In Chile the ban on political partyactivity was lifted after
the massive public protests in 1983. The trade unions were severely
weakened and remained very much on the sidelines in both countries and
have accordingly been left out of the discussion.
As we know, the role of opposition to military rule was initially played
by the human rights organizations, but it was gradually taken over by
political parties, and thereafter the human rights organizations lost some of
their importance. The political parties had to reorganize themselves
institutionally through intern al democratic elections; convince the
electorates that they were capable of dealing with the economic, social, and
political problems facing the countries; and reassert themselves as mediators
between the State and civil society. More specifically, they had to propose,
and if elected, cary out a policy which would assure reconciliation. The
human rights issue was a crucial part of the political programme, and the
human rights organizations, in spite of having lost some of their political
clout, remained in the front lines in keeping the human rights a hot topic
on the political agenda. It is the position of the political parties versus the
human rights organizations on this issue which is the very key discrepancy
between Chile and Argentina.
Given the fact that activity by political parties was forbidden in
Argentina as well as in Chile, one would assume that the human rights
organizations might have gained a similar position of political importance
in both countries. On the contrary, in Argentina "the relation between the
NGOs and the most important parties (the Radical Party and the Peronist
Party) was much tenser than in Chile" (Frühling and Orellana 1991: 57).
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This has partly to do with the difference in structure of the human rights
organizations in the two countries, as mapped out in sections 5.4 and 5.5.
In Chile the largest and most influential organizations were the formal,
bureaucratIc, highly professional NGOs, supported by the Catholic Church.
By contrast, the human rights organizations with most influence and
international stature in Argentina were the aggressive human rights
movements incorporating family members of the disappeared, in particular
the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo. Their line of action and their isolation from
the rest of Argentinean society made these organizations unsuitable
cooperation partners for the political parties. Due to Argentina' s turbulent
history of fluctuation between military and civil governments, political
leaders in general thought the transition proeess might be smoother if they
kept a distance from the human rights organizations, which the military
government had frowned upon as organizations supporting terrorist activity.
In Chile there was continuous and close cooperation between the two
groups; partly through the active participation of ex-militants in the struggle
for human rights throughout the dictatorship, and partly by the absenee of
problems of the Argentine Liga-Communist Party type. De Brito notes that
"the linkages between the opposition parties and the human rights
movement became a structural characteristic of the movement itself' (de
Brito 1993: 585-86). The durability of the Chilean dictatorship also
enhanced unit y . The fact that human rights organizations for many years
served as the only legitimate meeting place for political activists opposed
to the regime naturally brought people of varying ideological backgrounds
together, thus creating a forum for cooperation and discussion which would
have been difficult to achieve in a normal competitive party system. This
is probably one of the factors which contributed to the extensive dialogue
among the political parties which resulted in the creation of the Democratic
Forces for the No, and later the Concertación; the conglomeration of a
large number of parties covering the major part of the Chilean political
spectrum. As discussed in Chapter 3, the nature or mode of the Chilean
transition required the political opposition to set their differences aside and
join forces to reach their overriding goal: that of return to democratie rule
by winning the plebiscite against Pinochet. Although some of the left-wing
parties at first refused to participate on the conditions set by the military,
they all stood together in the end. This successful bridge-building between
the human rights organizations and the political opposition ensured
President Aylwin full support in carrying out his political programme in the
field of human rights.
In Argentina, on the other hand, the relative isolation of the human rights
organizations from the rest of Argentinean society and the historically close
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ties between the military and the biggest political parties prevented a dose
relationship between the human rights organizations and the political
parties. As touched up on in the preceding chapter, this influenced
AlfonsÍn's credibility over his human rights policy. Few of the political
parties were willing to incorporate the demands of the human rights
organizations because they feared endangering the transition proeess itself.
One may generalize in saying that the political parties chose a largely
pragmatic strategy, whereas the human rights organizations had nothing to
lose in electoral terms and were therefore free to press for ethically correct
solutions to moral problems. It was the way they went about it that caused
the split with the political parties. The Mothers and the Liga were from the
outset opposed to AlfonsÍn' s suggestions, and openly criticized the new
government for continuing the policy of their predecessors on many points;
that the trials were just a cover-up to let the rest of the military off the
hook; and that the President was a coward who gave in to the military' s
wishes. To them, there was no justice, and hence no scope for recon-
ciliation before those involved in the detained-disappearances of at least
10,000, or, as they claimed, 30,000, Argentineans were identified and held
accountable. The division between those political parties and human rights
organizations lending AlfonsÍn their, if reluctant, support, and those openly
opposing him, clearly did not help to heal the wounds inflicted on the
Argentinean society.
5.10 Assessing the human rights movements in Chile and
Argentina
Both Chile and Argentina saw the upsurge of a strong human rights
movement as a response to state repression, forming the seed of an
opposition which marked the onset of the transition. The human rights
movement in both countries increased the potential for further mobilization
of civil society and contributed to the delegitimation of the authoritarian
regimes by drawing international attention to their cause which resulted in
much embarassing criticism for the military. In both countries the human
rights organizations were important actors in expediting the preparation of
governmental reports that officially recognized the human rights violations
commtted by the military; a step on the way to reconciliation. And they
have not let the matter rest: human rights organizations are still pressing to
open more cases against alleged violators of human rights in Chile, and the
Mothers in Argentina continue their march around the Plaza de Mayo every
Thursday.
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Although the movements in both countries were based on the same
principles and had the same aims, their development was somewhat
different. In spite of the existence of two human rights organizations prior
to the coup in Argentina, the movement seems to have found a broader
base in Chile, reflected in its higher number of active organizations and its
achievements. Despite its diversification, the movement has been united.
The main explanations for this is the role of the Catholic Church, the
related factor of timing, and finally , the relationship with the political
parties, previously described. The diametrically opposite role played by the
Catholic Church in the two countries was decisive in shaping and unifying
the human rights movement. The strong presenee and involvement of the
Church in Chile had a unifying effect on the human rights movement,
whereas in Argentina there was no such umbrella organ. The long-standing
democratic tradition in Chile, peoples' experience with organizational work,
a strong legalistic tradition, and a corresponding faith in the legal system
may have been other factors contributing to the efficiency of the Chilean
organizations. Compared with the situation in Argentina, Chilean human
rights organizations became active at an earlier stage after the coup both
because of the Catholic Church's quick move into the political arena and
because there was less fear of retribution against organized protest. Due to
the initiative taken at an earlier stage, the organizations in Chile were from
the very beginning able to register cases of human rights abuse, and build
up more complete archives than in Argentina. The wide public acceptance
of the numbers of victims published in the Informe Rettig is in strong
contrast to the highly disputed numbers of detained-disappeared listed in the
corresponding governmental report, Nunca Más, in Argentina. Most
Argentinean human rights organizations claim, as mentioned earlier, that the
actual number of victims is up to three times higher than the official
number.
The main conclusion to be drawn from the analysis in this final chapter
is two-fold. Civil society, exemplified by the human rights organizations,
did play a central role in the Chilean and Argentinean transitions to
democracy; secondly, the different profile of the two human rights
movements, in turn linked with the Catholic Church and political parties,
contributed to change the initial advantages enjoyed by the AlfonsÍn
government vis-à-vis the military in the favour of Aylwin and his more
careful step-by-step policy in the field of human rights. In short, the
apparent paradox of these two transitions remains less of an enigma when
the ro1e of civil society is taken into account, than when applying an
exclusively elite approach to the transitions.
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Some people might think that it is perhaps not entirely fair to uncritically
praise the Chilean human rights organizations for their efforts, as their
Argentine counterparts in many ways faced greater challenges. However,
my task has been to account for the differences, not to distribute praise. It
may certainly be argued that repression was much more widespread and
sinister in Argentina than in Chile, and for that reason alone the human
rights organizations faced greater challenges. Documenting a death when
the body is found is an easier job than proving the guilt of an official
responsible for the disappearance of a person, and the psychological
traumas and fear inflicted on a society is probably greater in the case of
massive disappearance than in executIons and exile. Moreover, those
professionals taking the side of the victims in Argentina became immediate
targets for repression. The notorious absence of church protection and a
blurred relationship with the political parties placed more obstacles in the
way of the human rights movement. All in all, one may conclude that
admirable efforts were made in both countries to combat the state terror,
but that the conditions in Chile were more favourable to produeing a more
positive result - in spite of the objective conditions initially established by
the modes of transition indicating another outcome.
Although Chile has repeatedly been praised as "the country that has made
most progress towards consolidating democracy in Latin America" (for
instance, AngelI 1993: 563), Argentina too has shown a favourable
development in that it has survived three consecutive democratic
government changes; its best record so far this century. In other words, it
has not suffered the "sudden death" by authoritarian regression that has
sometimes been predicted to accompany transition by regime collapse
(O'Donnell 1992: 12), in spite of several military revolts and a catastrophic
economic development under AlfonsÍn. One may perhaps draw the
conclusion that the terrible repression carried out during military rule in
Argentina has in itself been a motivating factor for civilian reluctance to
return to military rule. This in spite of great dissatisfaction with AlfonsÍn
achievements in the economic field, and his dismal failure to adequately
deal with the legacy from the previous regime by finding a radical solution
to the human rights problem, and at the same time subordinate the military
to civilian rule. On a final note, we should not forget that the military came
to power with widespread civilian support in both Chile and Argentina in
the 1970s, and it was their lack of legitimacy which eventually led to
transition and the return to civilian rule in the 1980s. Few people today
seem willing to repeat the experience, which bodes well for further
consolidation in both countries.
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5.11 Concluding remarks
Why take civil society into account when dealing with transitions to
democracy? From an empirical point of view, the discussion of the
transition and consolidatIon proeesses of Chile and Argentina has shown
that civIl society plays an active part in bringing about liberalization in the
first place; greatly influences the issues around which the elites base their
negotiations in the run-up to restoration of political democracy; and finally
influences government decision-making in the consolidation phase. How
does this affect the postulates of elite-focused transition theory?
My first criticism of elite theory was that it fails to address the reasons
for the onset of transition, i.e. why the split between hard-liners and soft-
liners occurs in the first place. Przeworski argues that the proeess of
liberalization is not the result of the loss of legitimacy, but of intern al splits
within the military ruling block, but he does not say why. I believe the loss
of legitimacy is the very underlying explanatory factoL According to the
doctrine of national security, which established the rationale for the military
governments in both Argentina and Chile, the military intended to remain
perpetually in power. Their faIlure to achieve this objective was largely due
to the fact that civil society organized and voiced opposition to the military
regimes, hence forcing the military incumbents to make concessions, which
unleashed increased opposition, leading eventually to the breakdown of the
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, either due to military or electoral defeat.
As I have argued earlier, authoritarian regimes, unlike totalitarian regimes,
do count on the support of at least some sectors of society in order to stay
in power. Jf there were no popular discontent, nor any perceived danger of
opposition, why should the military embark on a road of dispute which
inevitably would lead to their own downfall ? I believe that the answer is
linked to the fact that some sort of opposition does indeed survive, even in
the face of massive and extensive repression. People do protest, and people
who protest cannot be continuously ignored by the power-holders. Authori-
tarian leaders, be they personal dictators, as in the case of Pinochet, or
military juntas, as in the Argentinean case, have frequently tried to
legitimize their rule through gaining the support of at least certain sectors
of society. Pinochet s seeking approval of a new Constitution by holding
a plebiscite is but one example; another is his dissolving of DINA due to
massive national and international criticism. Galtieri' s ill-prepared
launching of the Falkland/Malvinas war constitutes yet another example of
a frenetie attempt to gain support from an increasingly discontented and
frustrated population. In short, legitimacy is very much a subject matter for
authoritarian rulers too, as they have repeatedly prove d not to be immune
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from criticism, neither from the intern al opposition nor from the inter-
national community.
Because authoritarian rulers never succeed in totally reaching their stated
aims of breaking down all social structures contributing to solidarity or
collective action through the use of institutional and individual repression,
civil society is a force that must be reckoned with when explaining the
transitions. The conclusion drawn from these observations is that the inter-
action between the elites and civil society is likely to be much stronger than
acknowledged by O'Donnell and other elite-focused theorists discussed in
this study. Jf this was not so, it is not likely that there would be a break-
down of authoritarian regimes, and even less likely that a "resurrection of
civil society" (O'Donnell and Schmitter VoL. 4, 1986: 48) would take place,
let alone redemocratization.
M y final point and second substantial criticism against elite theory is that
not only does this kind of theory leave out the aspect of civil society, it
also fails to capture the issues which civil society mobilizes around. Neither
the onset of liberalization, nor the elite negotiations at the time of regime
change in Chile and Argentina can be fully understood if one leaves out the
issue of gross human rights violations. This is not to say that elite-focused
transition theory is useless. On the contrary, it offers a fruitful way of
analyzing the processes of democratie transition. Regarding its predictive
value, it quite successfully accounted for the initialoutcomes of the
transitions in Chile and Argentina. Had it added the aspect of civil society
and taken a closer look at why the different elite actors acted the way they
did during the transition itself, and equally important after formal political
democracy was restored, the theories in question might have come closer
to predicting the outcomes of the Chilean and Argentinean democratie
consolidation processes as well.
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Appendix A
Interviews carried out in Santiago, Chile
Garretón, Roberto. Vicaría de la Solidaridad. Lawyer. Now in Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
6 April 1993.
Infante, María Teresa. Head of the Department of InternatÏonal Studies, University of
Santiago. 5 April 1993.
Mera, Jarge. Programa de Dereehos Humanos de la Academía de Humanismo Cristiano
(PDHAHC). Lawyer and Director of PDHAHC and professor at the University of Diego
Portales. 27 May 1993.
O'Campo, Hugo. Comité de Defensa de los Dereehos del Pueblo (CODEPU). Lawyer and
Executive General. 28 May 1993.
Orellana, Patricio. Fundación de Agrupación de Documentación y Archivos. Political
Scientist. Former functionary in COP ACHI, Vicaría, and several other human rights
organizations. Repeated talks March-July 1993.
!
i
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IPrecht, Cristián. Vicaría de la Solidaridad. First vicar. 6 July 1993.
Ranestad, Per. Norsk Folkehjelp. 12 May 1993.
Reina, Veronica. Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas (FASIC). Lawyer
and Executive Secretary. 25 May 1993.
Salas, Veronica. TAC. Lawyer. 26 May 1993.
Salazar, Hector A. Lawyer. 9 July 1993.
Salinas, Alejandro. CODEPU. 26 April 1993.
Sierra, Sola. Agrupación de Familares de Detenidos Desaparecidos (AFDD). President.
23 April 1993.
Vergara, Juán. Programa de Acción Solidaria (PAS). 18 May 1993.
Zalaquett, J osé. Lawyer and former President of Amnesty International in London. Member
of Rettig Commssion. 7 July 1993.
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Interviews carried out in Buenos Aires, Argentina
Aragón, Raúl. Asamblea Permanente par los Dereehos Humanos. Founder and 1eader of
APDH. Secretary of Sábato Commission. 2 July 1993.
Arroyo, Bertha. Movimiento Ecuménico par los Dereehos Humanos (MEDH). Repeated
talks throughout June 1993.
Familiares de Desaparecidos y Detenidos par Razones Políticas. Group interview with
several members. 1 July 1993.
Fondebrider, Luis. Equipo Argentina de Antropología Forense. 30 June 1993.
Freixas, Javier. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS). 15 June 1993.
Gonzales, Oscar. Deputy of Socialist Party. 30 June 1993.
Lagos, Daría. Psychiatrist. 29 June 1993.
Liga Argentina par los Dereehos del Hombre. Representative. 29 June 1993.
Madres de Plaza de Mayo. Group interview with several of the Mothers. 21 June 1993.
Madres de Plaza de Mayo, Línea Fundadora. Group interview with seven of the Mothers,
including Celea Mignone. 10 June 1993.
de Mariam, María IsabeL. Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo. 2 July 1993.
Mignone, Emilio. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales. Lawyer, and Director of CELS.
21 June 1993.
Olivella, María Inés. Psychologist. Repeated talks in Buenos Aires during June 1993.
Oliveira, Alicia. Specialist in Penal Justice. Earlier functionary in Centro de Estudios
Legales y Sociales. 21 June 1993.
Pantaleones, Rosa. Partido Socialista. Secretary of deputy Alfredo Bravo. 30 June 1993.
Partido Marxist-Leninista. Representative. 30 June 1993.
Paso, Leonardo. Marxist historian. 15 June 1993.
Servicio Paz y Justicia. (SERPAJ). Representative. 3 July 1993.
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Appendix B
Victims of death and disappearance in Chile 1973-1990
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Source: Summary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (1992: 1-93).
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Appendix C
Victims of disappearance in Argentina 1976-1983
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Source: Annex Nunca Más (1991) in Sikkink (1993: 427).
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Appendix D
The "generations" of human rights organizations in Chile
and Argentina
Organization Year of Type of origin Type of organization Detained-
origin disapp.
princip.
theme
Church I Family I Political NGO I Movement
CHILE
Vicaría 1976 * * *
FASIC 1975 * * *
SERPAJ 1977 * * *
PDHAHC 1979 * *
AFDD 1974 * *
AFPP 1976 * * *
CPRE 1978 * * *
AFEP 1978 * *
PIDEE 1979 * *
AFAREL 1980 * *
CCHDH 1978 * * *
CODEJU 1978 * *
CODEPU 1980 * * *
CNCT 1983 * * *
MTSA 1983 * * *
ARGENTINA
Liga 1937 * * *
APDH 1975 * * *
FDDRPG 1976 * * *
Madres 1977 * * *
Abuelas 1983 * * *
MEDH 1976 * * *
CELS 1979 * * *
SERP AJ 1980 * * *
(74)
Sources: Frühling 1986; Meijide 1986; Orellana 1991; Veiga 1985; various primary sources.
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